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PREFACE

When Henry Kissinger assumed responsibility in
1969 for
directing the National Security Council in the new
Nixon
administration, he probably did not fully anticipate
how
important, even decisive, a role he would play in determin-

ing American foreign policy in the next several years.

I

am concerned with the divergence between the ideas of Kis-

singer as a scholar and the policies of Kissinger as a
statesman.

An almost unique case affords the opportunity

to examine how the ideas of a scholar undergo modification

as they are implemented in actual practice.

By the late 1960

,

s,

it was evident that the postwar

bipolar global structure of power was rapidly disintegrating.

Military bipolarity persisted, though in a less pro-

nounced form, but political multipolarity increased.

The

independent foreign policies of France and Rumania, the

Sino-Soviet dispute, and Third World nationalism confirmed
this trend.

Since the late

19^-0* s

America's position in the world

had been buttressed by its many alliances.

Its ties with

Western Europe and Japan had been essential to the maintenance of its power and prestige in the world.

But in a

period of profound political and ideological change, would

the relationships with Western Europe
and Japan continue to
be so important? Would the new Nixon
administration articulate and implement new principles in
alliance relationships
that stressed coalition and cooperation?

This study will examine Kissinger's policies
toward
Western Europe from 1969 to 1976. Kissinger's
scholarly

publications were of high quality and most of his writing
was concerned with the relationship between the United

States and Western Europe.

The most thorough and compre-

hensive presentation of his views on Western Europe can be
found in his two books* The Necessity for Cho ice (1961),
and The Troubled Partnership. (1965).

Both are highly

critical of America's Western European foreign policy in
the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

However, none

of the books published on Kissinger as a statesman deal in
a comprehensive manner with his policies towards Western

Europe.
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ABSTRACT

Scholar Versus Statesman! The Record of Henry Kissinger
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Ohio University
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Directed byt

Professor Peter J. Fliess

The assessment of a contemporary statesman presents

difficulties.

The primary problem is that the ultimate out-

come of policies cannot be foreseen.

The secondary problems

include unavailability of documents and literature.

How-

ever, it should still be possible to analyze the policies

that shall, eventually, determine whether a statesman will

succeed or fail.

Every statesman must have a vision and act

to implement that vision.

Henry Kissinger placed the highest

priority upon the development of detente with the Soviet

Union and China but the relationship between the United
States and Western Europe was not as important.

The ultimate

wisdom of his vision is a matter of serious concern to both
contemporary and future analysts.
I

am concerned with the divergence between the ideas of

Kissinger as a scholar and the policies of Kissinger as a
statesman.

An almost unique case affords the opportunity to
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examine how the ideas of a scholar undergo
modification as
they are implemented in actual practice. The
first two

chapters examine the principal tenets of Kissinger's

philosophy of international relations and the
relationship
between the United States and Western Europe. I then

focus

upon the theory and practice of American foreign policy

with respect to its multilateral and bilateral relations
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the

European Community (EC); West Germany, France, and Britain.
Each chapter presents a summary of Kissinger's writings and
an analysis of his policies probes the specific circum-

stances that account for modifications of his policies.

NATO's Strategy, NATO's Organization and the relationship between the United States and its NATO allies are

examined with respect to Kissinger's previously elucidated

views as a scholar and the subsequent practice of his
diplomacy.
The European Community and its external relations and
economic and political problems between the United States
and the EC were of concern to Kissinger both as a scholar
and a statesman.

The central themes of Kissinger's work on Germany are

examined with respect to specific problems in United States-

viii

West German relations.

West Germany and the EC, The
Offset

Costs Issue, Energy, and American
troops in Europe are discussed with regard to their bilateral
and wider implications.
France merited considerable attention
in Kissinger's
work, and the relationship between
the United States and
France was particularly important to him.
However, the
central themes of French foreign policy today
should be considered within the framework established by
de Gaulle and

modified by his successors.

The Atlantic Alliance, Europe

and the Middle East are the areas in which
Franco -American

differences are examined with respect to the Gaullist
legacy
and the ideas and policies of Kissinger.

As a statesman Kissinger must deal with Britain both as
a European power and in terms of the uncertain relationship

with the United States.
In the concluding chapter

I

discuss the central tenets

of Kissinger's philosophy of history and the impact of his

statesmanship upon the world with respect tot

Detente

i

The

Soviet Union and China, the Middle East, Japan, economic issues, and morality and foreign policy.

I

then examine the

relationship between the world of the scholar (the realm of
theory) and the world of the statesman (the realm of practical

solutions) and assess Kissinger's successes and failures in

reconciling the worlds of the scholar and the statesman.
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CHAPTER

I

KISSINGER'S PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

My objective is to assess the record of a contemporary
statesman, Henry Kissinger, who is both a scholar and
a

statesman.

Prior to his tenure in public office, Kissinger

had become an outstanding scholar in the field of interna-

tional relations and a trenchant critic of American foreign
policy.

Few statesmen and no twentieth century American

Secretaries of State have produced scholarly works of high
quality that have articulated the central tenets of their
views on international relations prior to their tenure in
office.

Consequently, the case of Kissinger presents a

unique opportunity to examine the relationship between the
ideas of the scholar and the policies of the statesman.

This study will be limited to Henry Kissinger's policies toward Western Europe.

I

shall try to determine how

the ideas of a scholar undergo modification as they face

the needs of the world of action.

Both multilateral (NATO

and the European Community) and bilateral relationships

(West Germany, France, and Britain) will be examined.

Henry Kissinger is an extraordinarily able scholar of

international relations.

He has written perceptively and

1

2

with imagination on the subject of international relations,
particularly on problems of the trans -Atlantic relationship
between the United States and Western Europe.

In 1969,

Kissinger became Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs and in 1973 was named Secretary
of State.

From I969 to 1976, when a change of administra-

tion occurred, Kissinger's influence on American foreign

policy was considerable, at times perhaps even predominant.
His extraordinary influence upon American foreign policy
is acknowledged by most analysts.

However, a definitive

assessment of the extent of this influence will have to
wait until documents and other supporting material become
available.

Thus, it will not be possible to answer every

question concerning Kissinger's influence upon various
aspects of American foreign policy.

Kissinger's importance is all the more surprising when
the relatively powerless position of either of his two posts

from 1969 to 1976 is
dent.

compared to the powers of the Presi-

Certainly no one can acuse Richard Nixon of letting

someone else guide American foreign policy.

Nixon's primary

interest was in foreign policy and, given his reluctance to
share its execution with a broad range of interested parties,
it is surprising and yet understandable

— considering

the

domestic and international circumstances of Nixon's presi-

dency—that Kissinger should have achieved such extraordinary
influence.

3

To some extent Kissinger's
importance arises from the

tragic events that surrounded the
American involvement in
Vietnam. Considering the highly adverse
diplomatic situation of the United States when the new
Nixon administration
assumed its duties, it is understandable
that the Nixon team
did not succeed in withdrawing the United
States from Vietnam unscathed, causing an excessive strain upon
the presidency.
This strain manifested itself in the "Watergate"

syndrome which seriously weakened Nixon

1

s

position and

finally resulted in his resignation in August of
1974.
Gerald Ford, a man of limited experience in foreign affairs
and faced with a delicate domestic situation, became the

next President.
Vietnam, Watergate, Nixon's resignation, and the badly

weakened presidency of Gerald Ford were all complex, interrelated events that were to make and unmake many a career.
The one leading figure to emerge relatively unscathed from
the turmoil of these events was Henry Kissinger.

Although,

according to one commentator, Kissinger "was a bureaucratic
infighter of superlative skills,"

I

do not wish to pass

judgment upon his responsibility in the crisis that was to
cause the resignation of a president.

What is pertinent

here is that as Nixon's star waned, Kissinger's waxed.

Moreover, an inexperienced President Ford found that he had
to rely most heavily upon the advice and authority of a now

very influential and uniquely important Secretary of State

for ensuring the continuity of and implementing
American

foreign policy.
In considering the factors that led to
Kissinger's influence upon American foreign policy, it is
appropriate to

realize that, as Raymond Aron states, both Kissinger
and

Nixon saw the world through the same lenses. 1
true of the presidency of Gerald Ford.

This is also

Indeed, one may

categorize all three as tactically flexible conservatives,
although this may apply to a lesser extent to Ford.

Diplo-

matic circumstances, a severe domestic crisis, an unusual

personal rapport between two men

— these

factors, when linked

with Kissinger's extraordinary talents, explain the preeminent influence of Henry Kissinger upon American foreign
policy.
The Scholar-Statesman
It is the major theme of this paper to trace the con-

nection between the scholar
ideas

— and

— operating

in the realm of

the statesman- -operating in the realm of prac-

tical solutions.

Obviously these areas of endeavor are

connected and interrelated.
sarily to do.

And yet, to know is not neces-

It is one thing to know the solution to a

problem, it is quite another to garner the necessary support, overcome obstacles, and actually implement and suc-

cessfully conclude policies.
Moreover, a combination of the best qualifications for

5

these two areas is rarely found in a single individual,

brief glance at American history will confirm this.

A

In the

19th century, there were no scholar-statesmen who attained
eminence.

2

In the 20th century Woodrow Wilson occupies a

prominent place.

Yet, while Wilson was an acknowledged

authority on Congressional matters, the wisdom of his
guidance of American foreign policy during and after World

War

I

is open to serious question. ^

Wilson's ideals were

laudable, and yet he manifested a serious lack of political

judgment in their implementation.

Another prominent scholar-statesman was George
Kennan.

P.

However, Kennan's scholarly activities were far

more important than his activities as a statesman.

He has

published a number of notable books and yet, while he
served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and
as Chairman of the State Departments Policy Planning Com-

mittee after World War II, he never had a major role in the
formulation and implementation of American foreign policy,

It

except for the Policy of Containment, which was perhaps
Kennan* s most notable contribution to the formulation of

American foreign policy.

Unfortunately, other than in

Western Europe, his policy of containment was never implemented as he wished.

President Kennedy brought a number of scholars into
his administration and, while they were influential in cer-

tain respects, the President generally exercised a strong

6

control over foreign policy.

When in I969 Henry Kissinger was appointed Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, President

Nixon hoped that his abilities could help to resolve successfully the ever worsening crisis over Vietnam.

However,

given the circumstances of the Vietnam war, it is not sur-

prising that his performance in office has had mixed results.

Knowledge alone does not guarantee that a problem can be
solved, but assuredly no solution can be successful without

some degree of knowledge.

Are certain problems in interna-

tional politics intractable?

To what degree are the prob-

lems of international politics subject to rational control
and resolution?

It is the task of the analyst of political

affairs to recognize the limitations of the rational ap-

proach and to determine the precise amenability of each
problem without excusing the failures or lapses of judgment
of statesmen.

Kissinger's Perspectives on International
Relations
Before discussing the reasons for Kissinger's policies
towards Western Europe, it will be useful to review the more

general aspects of his view of international relations.
a word of caution must be introduced.

But

All statesmen have

preconceived ideas prior to assuming power.

However, when

they are faced with the actual responsibilities of power,

many of these ideas undergo modification or
are abandoned.
It would be an injustice to Kissinger to deny
that he might
be similarly affected. Men are self-conscious
beings,
and

prior knowledge of individual perspectives does not
guarantee certain knowledge of subsequent actions.

However,

the case of Kissinger raises the particular question of
a

profound student of international relations, having the op-

portunity to implement his ideas in practice

i

to what ex-

tent were his thoughts applicable and when and how did they
have to be modified?
A Psychological Inquiry

An examination of Kissinger's world view may reveal
some general precepts from a psychological perspective.

Again limitations germane to the subject matter must be
borne in mind.

However, some initial observations can be

made.
It should be noted that while Kissinger arrived in

this country at an early age, his outlook has been colored

by his European experience.

At Harvard, Kissinger studied

Europe's past, present, and future to the virtual exclusion
of all else.

Thus his formative impressions were rein-

forced by the tensions of the thirties, which Kissinger

experienced in Germany, and were further strengthened by
his intense immersion in European studies in this country.

One may be tempted to see a psychological parallel in

8

the saga of Joseph in Egypt.

Joseph too arrived in Egypt at

an early age. and became an Egyptian
as he rose to become the
second most powerful person in Egypt. And
yet Joseph remained an Israelite as well. Kissinger
also reflects this
duality he is a European in America. Many
Europeans are
i

more aware of the element of tragedy in
international relations than most Americans. The European Continent
is strewn
with the wreckage of dreams. Kissinger himself was
personally touched by tragedy; moreover, he was a student
of European diplomatic history; therefore, the awareness of tragedy
is an important aspect of his statesmanship.

It is not only a greater appreciation of the role of

tragedy in international relations that separates Kissinger
from the mainstream of American views.

He also has a great-

er understanding of the hydra-headed nature of power.

He is

at once more willing to use power qua power divested of the

political and moral confusion that often surrounds and obscures the American usage of power.

He is also less naive

about the efficacy of power in attaining political goals,

less certain than Americans that power will once and for all
resolve political problems.^

Therefore, Kissinger would not

hesitate to apply force while simultaneously maintaining

diplomatic contacts with the adversary.

Force and diplomacy

are two interrelated aspects of international relations in

Kissinger's view.?
Interwoven with American ideas on the use of force are

American ideas on morality.

It is a rare occasion when Amer-

ica's use of force in the international realm
was not accompanied by a moralistic statement distorting, warping,
or

obscuring the rationale for using force.

To Kissinger inter-

national morality has centered upon the need for the
state
to survive intact.
Americans too often develop a moral

edi-

fice that basically views the use of force as a very
regretable incident in international relations.

Morality, for Kis-

singer, centers upon the survival of the state % therefore,

the occasional resort to force should elicit no surprise. 8

Tragedy, power and force and morality are all important
elements of international relations.

Men can and do differ

about the relative meaning of these terras.

Moreover, dif-

fering perceptions of political reality do exist between

Europeans and Americans.

Thus Kissinger is a European, his

ideas on vital aspects of the international order are European.

It required exceptional diplomatic circumstances and

the election as President of a man whose international views

were on the periphery of American thought before Kissinger

finally obtained the influence that he sought.

Kissinger's sensitivity to his experiences in Germany,
his immersion in European studies and his basically European

outlook all conditioned and influenced his acts as a statesman.

One example will suffice to illustrate this point.

In

extracting the United States from Vietnam, Kissinger probably
agreed with Nixon on the need for applying force often on a

10

massive scale after 1969.

But, simultaneously, intense nego-

tiations were carried on with the North Vietnamese
while both
of Hanoi's allies, the Soviet Union and China,
were the subjects of a very active diplomacy.

Finally. Kissinger made

clear to all three powers that the United States would
not
and could not be humiliated

1

basis of a negotiated peace.

it would only withdraw on the
To the American public Kis-

singer spoke of the need for "honor" in meeting America's

commitments.

The liberal use of force when required, the

active all-inclusive diplomacy, the careful limitation of

international morality, and Kissinger's knowledge of the
ever present abyss of tragedy, all highlighted an essen-

tially European diplomatic response to an American crisis.

Kissinger's World View
However, as a scholar, what ideas did Kissinger express

concerning morality, the statesman, and diplomacy?

Kis-

singer's general outlook on international relations is best

expressed by the term Realpolitik

o
7
.

However, he has also

displayed a concern for the moral element in international
relations.

^

Indeed the avoidance of nuclear war has to him

always been the highest moral imperative.

He has also been

concerned with human rights and the plight of the undeveloped
countries. 11

A close examination of Kissinger's world view

may well reveal more continuity than is usually thought to
exist between his ideas as a scholar and his actions as a

11

statesman.

However, regarding areas that were,
for various

reasons, of secondary concern to him
pe

-

-

such as Western Euro-

the discrepancy between what he wrote
and what he did

is considerable.

I

now wish to turn to an examination of

the primary and secondary ideas on international
relations

that he has expressed as a mature scholar.

Mo rality.
To Kissinger, "The ultimate test of morality in foreign

policy is not only the values we proclaim but what we are

willing and able to implement." 12 This statement contains
the essence of his views on morality, ranging from nuclear

weapons to human-rights problems.

In his view "peace is a

fundamental moral imperative in the nuclear age." 1 ^

Con-

sequently, he has written extensively on the problem of arms

control and nuclear weapons.

He has been highly influential

in, and indeed, one of the architects of detente with the

Soviet Union.

For him the greatest moral imperative is the

avoidance of nuclear war.

He has consistently upheld this

position and it is not surprising that relations with the
Soviet Union should have been the cornerstone of his foreign
policy.

With respect to human-rights, Kissinger is also aware
of limitations.

He has pointed to "Quiet Diplomacy" as

aiding hundreds of political prisoners and enabling many

Jewish emigrants to leave the Soviet Union.

With respect

12

to American support of regimes that practice
repressive po-

licies, such as South Korea and Iran, Kissinger posed
a

series of questionsi

"If we insist that others accept all

our moral preferences, are we then ready to use military
force to protect those who do as we urge?

And if those who

refuse our prescriptions are deprived of our support, what
will we do if the isolation of those governments tempts ex-

ternal pressures or attack by other countries even more re-

pressive?

Will we have served moral ends, if we thereby

jeopardize our own security.

Kissinger is concerned with morality, but only to the
extent that it can be realized.

He is certainly not a

Wilsonian idealist but has a more modest, prudent view of
morality that is no less sincere in its conviction but
recognizes greater limitations in its implementation.
The Statesman

Kissinger was greatly concerned with the role of the
statesman? this is particularly evident in his work as a

graduate student.

His doctoral dissertation, A World Re"

stored , contains perceptive and trenchant views on the obli1
gations of the statesman. ^

Another paper, also written

1^
when he was a graduate student, is concerned with Bismarck.

The importance he attaches to the statesman is evident

from the quantity and quality of his writings on the subject.

Nor would he affirm that the role of the statesman (and by

13

implication the nation-state) is of diminished
importance in
the modern world.
The acid test of a "statesman,
then, is

his ability to recognize the real relationship
of forces and
to make this knowledge serve his ends." 17

Thus, neither

Castlereagh, Metternich, nor Bismarck fare well in his estimation.

"A statesman who too far outruns the experience of

his people will fail in achieving a domestic consensus, how-

ever wise his policies, witness Castlereagh, a statesman who

limits his policy to the experience of his people will doom

himself to sterility

%

witness Metternich." 18

As for Bis-

marck, Kissinger correctly points out how his policies brought

great tragedy on Germany

i

"In the end the things Bismarck

had warned or fought against occurred

\

any alliance with

France was impossible after 1871, Germany was increasingly
tied to Austria, and the requirements of the national interest were highly ambiguous after all.

Thus Germany's greatest

modern figure may well have sown the seeds of its Twentieth
Century tragedy." 1 ^

Kissinger thus takes a rather critical view of each of
these great statesmen; he applauds their successes, but,

based on the merits that are the hallmark of true greatness,
none of them pass the test.

None fully recognize the "real

relationship of forces" and thus made "this knowledge serve
his ends."

Most importantly, none built a structure that was

lasting. 20

For Kissinger, these are the acid tests of true

greatness in a statesman.

14

Diplomacy
For Kissinger, there was simply no substitute
for a
sound, well-ordered diplomacy.
For conducting relations
among nations, the skills and intelligence of the diplomat
were at a premium.

Thus Kissinger's views on diplomacy are

what could be expected of a student of 19th Century Euro-

pean diplomacy.

However, even in an age of modern com-

munications, Kissinger considered the diplomats' skills to
be indispensable.

Indeed, his general view of diplomacy

closely parallels that of Hans J. Korgenthau and George F.
Kennan.

Consequently, diplomacy is a useful tool for

carrying on the business of nations? to engage in diplomatic
activities, it is not necessary also to extend one's moral

approval

Associated with these main themes are Kissinger's concerns with stability, his distaste for violent, revolutionary change, a dislike of moral absolutes, his insistence on
the stark reality of tragedy, and the need to insure the

survival of the state.

Stability is absolutely necessary in the nuclear age.
Vast upheavals in the international order pose an immense
danger because of the presence of nuclear weapons.

Thus his

remark that if he had to choose between injustice and order
and justice and disorder, he would always choose the former.

Kissinger disliked Communism on similar grounds because
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it posed a serious threat to the stability of
the interna-

tional order through its emphasis upon violent, revolutionary
change.

He was vehemently opposed to the (more irresponsible)

policies of the Soviet Union and China, but he did not think
that this ruled out the need for negotiations between the

West and the East.

The need to avoid moral absolutes, the

omnipresence of tragedy, and the harsh necessities of survival are imperatives of the international order that cannot
be ignored.

These are the primary and secondary ideas in Kissinger's
world view.
sult?

What type of intellectual framework is the re-

Is it possible to discern in Kissinger's world view

the ideas that he would later put into practice?

Kissinger's view of international politics emphasizes
the clash and compromise that occurs among the real movers

of world politics

i

the nation-state, the single most im-

portant unit in world politics. 22
actors exist.

But other transnational

It does an injustice to a thinker of Kis-

singer's caliber to imagine that he does not understand the

importance of multi-national corporations and other transnational actors.

But the survival of the nation-state and

its way of life are of supreme importance.

The task of guiding the state falls to the statesman,

necessitating a rather wide range of discretionary powers.
The necessity for maneuver, for diplomatic surprises (many
of which may be unpleasant)

,

for secrecy and the need for

16

rapid, quick adjustments - if the diplomatic situation
war-

rants

-

these exemplify the actions that may have to be un-

dertaken by the statesman.
This is a sobering picture of Kissinger's view of in-

ternational relations.

Yet, it is entirely possible to have

foreseen much of the future direction of his foreign policy.
A perceptive observer in 1969

-

tenets of Kissinger's views

-

might have predicted some of

his policies.

-

with qualifications

Thus

I

agree

acquainted with the main

-

with

those who contend that he wrote one thing and did another. 2 3
As regards his policy towards Western Europe, there was a

divergence between his ideas as a scholar and his practices
as a statesman.

Was his scholarship faulty?

judgments - as a statesman

ments?

-

Or were his

the result of incorrect assess-

Yet Kissinger's rationale for his often callous

actions towards Western Europe and Japan would be that the

very desperate diplomatic situation of the United States necessitated placing - for the time being

portance upon American interests.

-

the highest im-

The penchant for secrecy,

the dislike of the bureaucracy, the virtual exclusion of the

public and others interested in foreign policy, the increas-

ing centralization of foreign policy decisions in the White
House, the often brutal tactics with respect to alliance

diplomacy, the seemingly unrestrained use of force in Indochina, the emphasis upon relations with adversaries who

could aid in extricating the United States from Vietnam, the
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preoccupation with "high politics" that caused
Kissinger so
badly to underestimate the intent of the Arabs
to use the

oil weapon,

all these views and policies are entirely
con-

sistent with Kissinger's world view.

Implicit in this view

is the potential for some or all of the above
policies de-

pending upon the circumstances.

Nixon and Kissinger thought

that the war in Vietnam was tearing American society
apart

while America's ability to maintain its power and prestige
in the world was being seriously undermined.

Since the survival of the state and its way of life are
the supreme objectives of statesmanship, a non-doctrinaire

approach by the practitioner of Realpoliti k is called for.

Their personal predilections

5

for example, their distrust of

the bureaucracy and their dislike of delegating serious re-

sponsibilities to subordinates reinforced Nixon's and Kissinger's ideological perspectives.

Odd as it may seem, Kis-

singer's greatest success was with the Soviet Union (and
China) and his greatest error the excessively prolonged

withdrawal from Vietnam (and the tendency to minimize the
importance of Western Lurope and Japan).

None of these po-

licies was inevitable, but to a serious student of Kissinger's perspectives on international relations, they occasioned no great surprise.
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CHAPTER

II

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SEVENTIES
It is not easy to assess the record of
a contemporary

statesman.

It is always difficult to arrive at
balanced

judgments j this is particularly true in a period of
rapid
change.
Not only has the United States suffered a disaster

in Vietnam, but the failure of American statesmen to
antici-

pate and take appropriate measures to lessen a growing de-

pendence on a vital necessity of the industrial state

-

oil - must be considered as an important failure of American

statesmanship.

These disasters have occurred in a period

that marks the demise of the Cold War order while the nature
of the newly emerging configuration of world politics is not
clear.

By the beginning of the Seventies the American public
displayed a considerable sophistication and maturity con-

cerning foreign affairs that many earlier observers would
have been reluctant to predict.

This development was all

the more remarkable in view of the oil embargo and the quad-

rupling of prices that occurred in 1973 and the fall of
Saigon two years later.
Nevertheless, there still remain some unanswered
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questions concerning America's role in
the world.

More than

100 years ago de Tocqueville pointed out that
consistency of
purpose, foresight, secrecy, and
maneuverability were qualities that were necessary for the successful
conduct of foreign policy. 1 He was remarkably prescient
in his vision; in
general, the United States still remains deficient
in the

characteristics that are necessary for the conduct of
a successful foreign policy. However, democracies very
often are

deficient in these characteristics even though these
qualities are no less important today.

record is clear.

Moreover, the historical

The United States drifted into two world

wars without adequate military preparation, it ended these

wars with inadequate political preparation, and it suffered
two major and related disasters in the Seventies in Vietnam

and the Arabs' use of the oil weapon.

merely failures of statesmanship?

Were these events

It seems that the roots

are far deeper than mere lapses of judgment.

They have to

do with the very manner in which the government of the

United States is organized for the conduct of its foreign

policy and with the values and objectives cherished by the

American people.

2

Both domestic and international conditions should make
cold war protagonists as well as advocates of world leadership for America aware of the limitations imposed upon

foreign policy by democracy in general and the United States

democracy in particular.^

The decade of the Seventies has
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been confusing and tumultuous, climaxed by
two major foreign
policy disasters for the United States. The
task of analysis is to determine whether these disasters
could have been

avoided and to what extent they were caused by the
failures
of statesmen and governments.

The theory and practice of

American foreign policy towards Western Europe should provide conclusions that are not only germane to that topic but
have more general application.

Ame rican Foreign Policy Toward Western Europ e
To understand American foreign policy toward Western

Europe

I

should like to cite, however briefly, Soviet-

American relations.
The central problem of American foreign policy is its

relationship with the Soviet Union.

Despite the presence

of serious economic and environmental issues in world politics, a general nuclear war between the two superpowers is

still the supreme catastrophe that threatens mankind.

The

nuclear arms race between the superpowers is thus far restrained only by rather tenuous, limited agreements.

No

steps have been taken actually to reduce the vast nuclear

arsenals of the superpowers.

Both have vast conventional

armaments as well, particularly in Central Europe, the most

heavily armed area of the globe.

I

do not wish to enter

into the arguments over Soviet capabilities and intentions.

Suffice it to say that when a superpower faces a group of
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medium and small powers and that
superpower is potentially
capable of hostile actions of varying
kinds, then prudence
demands that the other superpower neither
exacerbate nor
ignore that potential.
Thus, geopolitical factors
suggest

an assessment of the importance of Western
Europe in the
world today.

Today the relationship between the United States
and
Western Europe (and Japan) is a vital concern of
American
foreign policy.
Americans and West Europeans are linked
by many sentimental and strategic bonds.

Western Europe is

a leading center of economic, technological, and political

power in the world.

The European Community (EC) also is

potentially the most important experiment of our era in
overcoming the political fragmentation of a world of sovereign nation-states.

Arnold Toynbee has stated that over-

coming the division and fragmentation of the global order
should be one of the foremost priorities of statesmen everywhere.

'

Consequently, there are a collection of states on each
side of the Atlantic that, for historical and contemporary

reasons, should cooperate on the many issues of mutual con-

cern that confront them both.
logic.

But politics often confounds

Towards the end of the Johnson administration and

more markedly in the Nixon administration, serious strains
became apparent in both the multilateral and bilateral relations of America and Western Europe.

2k

The NATO organization seemed to continue
on a course of
slow decline while increasingly intractable
problems
ap-

peared to diminish further its future
capabilities.

The EC

became mired in internal problems while the
Americans

treated Brussels almost with contempt at various
times.

lateral relations were little better.

Bi-

The state of West

German-American relations remained generally good and yet
a
few problems, concerning West Germany and the EC, the
offset
costs issue and American troops in Europe, inflamed passions
on both sides to a considerable degree. 6

The Franco-Ameri-

can relationship at least grew no worse than previously and
in certain respects perhaps even improved somewhat.

Yet

very serious differences remained between the two, particularly over the problem of energy.

The once vaunted "special

relationship" with Britain continued to fade.

Britain's do-

mestic preoccupations and gravely weakened economy limited
its ability to influence world affairs and, though Britain
(and Denmark and Ireland) entered the EC in 1973, doubts and

hesitations remained concerning Britain's commitment to that
organization.

There seemed to be a cloud of mutual suspicion, even
animosity, that reached a peak in 1973"7^» over Euro-American

relations in general.?

Ill temper and spiteful rhetoric were

8
particularly apparent on the American side.

These frictions

occurred in a period when Americans and Europeans were facing

many problems that could only be resolved by mutually
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supportive efforts.

Thu 8 in a period of rapid change, when

economic and environmental issues have assumed a new
importance, Western Europe remains an area of vital concern
for

American foreign policy.
Here

I

shall briefly discuss some of the general prob-

lems that are part of the Euro-American relationship.

The

place of Western Europe in American foreign policy has never

been the subject of a particularly searching analysis.

European interests often automatically concorded with those
of the United States.

However, there have been occasions

when they have diverged and even clashed with disastrous
consequences for both sides.

Americans and Europeans

-

as indicated earlier - are

joined by a number of unique sentimental and strategic ties.
Yet, in viewing the historical record, the frequency of

serious differences between Americans and Europeans is
striking.

The results of such differences were apparent

before, during, and after both world wars.

The Mideast

October war in 1973 again brought to light very serious disagreements between Americans and Europeans. ^°

Despite their

strength and long duration, Euro-American ties have been

greatly strained.

It is quite possible that similar inci-

dents might recur, with tragic consequences for all involved.

Since the end of World War II Euro-American relations
in NATO and other multilateral institutions and in bilateral

26

relations have generally been conducted
serious lapses

-

-

with only a few

in a spirit of partnership.

All members

of the coalition recognize the wisdom
of mutual cooperati,Lon
in the attainment of shared objectives
l) to defend Western Europe against the Soviet threat,
2) to reconstitute the
economic and political life of the European
states that were
devastated in World War II, 3) to enable Western
Europe
i

to

regain its place in the world and the industrial
democracies
to advance their mutual global interests.
But in the 1970s
these objectives have changed. To some extent the
Soviet
threat remains, but all Western European countries
have re-

covered from World War II and through the EC are increasingly
able to advance their own interests in the world.

It there-

fore seems necessary to reassess the importance of the Euro-

American relationship.
In a period such as the Seventies, when turmoil and

profound change mark the demise of one order while the outlines of the emerging order are but dimly perceived, three

additional factors add to the uncertainty of the situation.
The social, economic, and political problems that emerged in
the European states before World War

I

have reappeared and

rendered their internal equilibrium more precarious at a
time when a high degree of international stability is needed. 11

Social fi ssures in Britain, Italy, and France have

reached the point where class animosity and conflict are at
the highest levels in many years.

Especially in Britain it
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is difficult to see how some of these
problems can be resolved without incurring the risk of inflicting
serious
wounds upon the democratic-constitutional
order.

Economic stagnation coupled with inflation has
also
dealt a serious blow to the economic systems of
Britain and
Italy, and to a lesser extent France.
To find solutions to
the economic difficulties of these states is no easy
matter.

The economic disparities between members in both NATO
and the
EC have widened, making agreement on common policies much

more difficult.

The result is added centrifugal pressures

that already plague Europe.

Political activity has greatly increased at either end
of the political spectrum.

Groups on the political fringe

are increasingly willing to use force to attain their poli-

tical objectives and pose a grave threat to the constitu-

tional order.

fragmentation.

The problem has been aggravated by political

In pre-World War

I

was apparent in the Irish question.

Britain, this difficulty
Today, not only the

situation in Northern Ireland but separatist demands in

Scotland and Wales are raising serious questions about the

political unity of the United Kingdom.
alone.

Nor is Britain

Spain (Basques and others) and France (Bretons and

Basques) face similar problems.

Finally, the possibility

exists of the Euro-Communists' participation in or control

of a Western European state. 12

Are the Euro -Communists

really ready to accept a pluralistic political system and
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legitimation by the electoral process?
How will NATO deal
with the problem of cooperation
with a European country
where Euro -Communists participate
in

or control the govern-

ment?

Can NATO retain credibility as a
defense against a
Soviet (Communist) threat when Euro
-Communists are members
of NATO?

How can this be explained to Western
publics?
summarize, will domestic problems make it
difficult

To

or im-

possible to maintain the position of the
European states
in NATO? How will the domestic problems
of

the states af-

fect the further integration of the EC?

Western Europe must

insure against an adverse tilting of the balance
of power
while defending - increasingly through the EC its interests in the world.
The second major problem has already been alluded to.

What will be the attitude of the Western public towards military expenditures and the support of NATO if in ten years
even the Cold War is but a dim memory?

Inflation, the ris-

ing cost of military equipment, the lack of real military
and other integration in NATO are all taking an increasing
toll of NATO's capabilities.

With pressures mounting every-

where to cut military budgets, will public indifference to-

wards the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe increase?

NATO is the expression of the West's resolve to

maintain the balance of power in Europe.

However, far

reaching reform and a more mature, balanced perspective on
the part of the political leadership and the public is a
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prerequisite if the military balance in Europe is to
be
maintained. Potentially hostile policies and
geopolitical
realities can be ignored only at the peril of all concerned.

There is a final problem, more subtle, perhaps more
complex, than most.

It has to do with the psychological

consequences that the Europeans have suffered as a result of
the destruction and chaos of two world wars.

need

The constant

more acute in some periods than in others

-

-

of the

West Germans for reassurance and support by the United
States

i

the often exaggerated posturing of France in its

quest for grandeur, particularly under de Gaulle; and

Britain's increasing loss of self-confidence have all been

manifestations of this same problem.

When considering, for

example, the ramifications of the Suez crisis and the Sky-

bolt affair, can it be said that Americans have conducted

themselves with due regard for these various difficulties?
Probably, Americans, in no small measure, have contributed
to the partial demise of self-confidence that is part of

the profound crisis affecting Britain today.

Wars are

catastrophes that are often unambiguous signals of the decline of civilizations.

Will future historians consider

that the world wars marked the inevitable decline of Europe
that was only temporarily arrested by the intervention and

thereafter diminishing support of the United States?

Has

the Europeans' belief in themselves been irreparably damaged
to the extent that their capacity to govern themselves and

30

to contribute to the betterment of the
world is doubtful?

There are no certain answers to these questions.

These are some of the more general problems in Euro-

American relations.

During the latter part of the Johnson

administration and during Henry Kissinger's

terra

in office,

relations between nations on both sides of the Atlantic
worsened.

It must be admitted that Kissinger himself

most perceptive observer of European affairs

greatly to this state of affairs. 1 **

-

-

that

contributed

If the present diffi-

culties lead to a reaffirmation of the vital role of the

Euro-American relationship

-

Europeans as well could recog-

nize and reaffirm the importance of this relationship from

their side

-

then present difficulties can be resolved.

this period, however, represents a prelude to

a worsening of

-

-

perhaps even

the situation, then there may be no further

chances to restore concord between the United States and

Western Europe.

If
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CHAPTER

III

MULTILATERAL RELATIONS
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION (NATO)
,

TJie_ScholaC
NATO and European Spcu r i-hy

Kissinger thought that one of the most
profound questions
concerning international relations centered upon
the ability
of the West to cooperate in the attainment
of its political
1
objectives.
Two objectives - security and cooperation
on

common goals - were of the utmost importance.

Kissinger

warned that if the Western powers became disunited,
"sooner
or later, these states on the fringe of the Eurasian
land

mass would be drawn into the Communist orbit." 2

Americans

then would be truly isolated, they would live in a foreign
world.

However, there are other reasons for the West to attain
cohesion, for neither Americans nor Europeans alone can hope
to deal individually with all the concurrent revolutions and

challenges of our times.

To build a world order based on the

inherent values of Western civilization, the closest cooperation between America and Europe is necessary.

Yet Kissinger thought that neither the Eisenhower nor
the Kennedy administrations really demonstrated that they

3^

35

could effectively deal with the issues
of NATO strategy, arms
control, nuclear weapons, German unification,
or European
security. 3

He was pessimistic and highly critical of
the

responses of both administrations to these
problems and
thought that "unless the North Atlantic group of
nations develops a clearer purpose, it will be doomed."**

Strategic doctrine, political cohesion, and NATO's future are three areas that reveal Kissinger's concerns on
the

problems facing the Atlantic Alliance.
Strategic Doctrine

Kissinger was greatly concerned with strategy.

Over the

years he has devoted a great deal of attention to strategic
matters, and it was his work in this area that first brought

him national recognition with the publication of Nuclear

Weapons and Foreign Policy in 1957.

Strategy was a vital concern for the United States in
the nuclear age.

bring disaster.

Faulty strategic doctrine could inhibit or
Indeed, Kissinger demanded that "it should

be the task of our strategic doctrine to create alternatives

less cataclysmic than a thermonuclear holocaust. "5

This is

why he was uncompromisingly opposed to the doctrine of massive retaliation for "the penalty for doctrinal rigidity was

military catastrophe."

What he advocated was a strategic

doctrine that provided the maximum room for diplomacy and

recognized that the nuclear age contained not only risks but
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opportunities.

Yet Kissinger thought that
Americans had very oft,;en
failed to understand strategy
and deal adequately with
strategic problems.
They were "more comfortable with
technology
than with doctrine." There can
be little doubt that for
Kissinger strategy and its attendant
problems were of
fore-

most concern.
In the three books that he published
between 19 57 and
1965. Kissinger was a trenchant critic of
American strategic
doctrinei Eisenhower's policies with
respect to Europe were
bankrupt, indeed since the founding of NATO
and the creation
of the Marshall Plan there had been no really
promising

American efforts to inspire the North Atlantic nations
to
develop a clearer purpose."'
7

Common strategy was a shambles.

The allies depended to

an excessive degree upon the American nuclear deterrent.

The

whole NATO deployment in Europe was faulty, being "too strong
for a trip wire, too weak to resist a major advance."

This

could tempt Soviet pressures and obscured from many Americans
the fact that it was the presence of the U.S. in Europe that

deterred the Soviet Union.

There were other adverse effects of NATO's sole reliance on a retaliatory strategy.

First, America's allies saw

themselves protected by the United States which (subsequently)
released them from the need to make their own military effort.

g

Second, some of the European allies had doubts about

37

America's behavior in a crisis
and its future dependability
consequently, they sought to develop
their own independent
retaliatory capability. These
circumstances and policies ha«
equally adverse consequences, local
defense efforts
were

weakened while the independent
retaliatory forces were virtually worthless.

This indicated that the British and
the French either
lacked confidence in the American
understanding of its European interests or they were concerned that
the United States
would not run certain risks on behalf of
Europe. For Kissinger both of these policies were signs of the
early disintegration of NATO. And the United States - often
self-

righteous and critical of France and Britain

- was

doing

nothing to rectify this increasingly dangerous situation. 9
The Europeans were constantly seeking reassurance that
they

would not be abandoned.

Kissinger considered American strategic doctrine after
1961 as particularly inept. 10

He saw no military reason for

the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal that proved to be such
a bone of contention among the allies during the early six-

ties; he recognized the inadequacies of NATO's conventional

defense posture, continuing problems with NATO's organization, and the deficiencies of troop deployment and logistics

structure.

He also criticized policies of the Eisenhower

administration.

The stationing of intermediate-range mis-

siles (IRBM's) in Europe and the so-called double-veto

38

system were "panic measures" brought
about chiefly by the
need to do something to counter the
Soviet Union's success
with Sputnik. These were merely technical
responses to what
were the far more essential political
problems of the Atlantic Alliance. 11

Political n 0 frp^ ?r

Kissinger clearly saw that with the completion of
postwar reconstruction and the decline of the Soviet threat
differences would emerge between the United States and Europe.
He never assumed that an integrated Europe would find its

interests to be identical with those of the United States. 12
In fact, he argued that differences between America and Europe should be recognized for then "it may be possible to

agree on a permissible range of divergence."
should regain a measure of flexibility.

Each partner

Europe should also

assume a greater responsibility for its defense and its future course in the world.

Excessive centralization of de-

cision-making in the hands of the Americans relieved the
allies of their responsibilities.

At the same time this

could create great differences of opinion when a conflict of

interests became apparent.

Kissinger recommends "an allied structure which makes
possible a variety of coordinated approaches on some issues."
The problem was to restore some measure of responsibility to

America's allies.

The decade and a half of American hegemony
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must not beguile Americans into
believing that they always
best represent the general interest.
Kissinger thought that
some autonomy of decision-making was
essential for the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance. x 3
These adjustments are vital for the future
of the Alliance. Excessive paternalism will destroy
it.
What is
needed is to "require wisdom and delicacy in
handling the

transition from tutelage to equality."

Assertions of dis-

tinctly European interests are to be welcomed
as they are
really the growing pains of a new and healthier relationship.
Here Kissinger also criticizes America's style, its in-

grained optimism, excessive attention to abstract models and

technological solutions that express themselves in a restless quest for "new" solutions and technological remedies.
Finally, for the sake of its own stability, America could

benefit from a counterweight to impetuosity and supply historical perspective to many "final" solutions. 1 **

Kissinger

calls for "the establishing of a psychological balance be-

tween us and Europe."

The basic problem is to strike a

balance between unity and respect for diversity.

on either plane can have adverse consequences.

Excesses
He asserts

that "to strike this balance is the big unsolved problem

before the Western Alliance.

"1-5

It is evident that Kissinger has a profound concern for

the political problems facing the Alliance.

And, as men-

tioned above, he recommended an organizational change that
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should not be confused with
a final solution hut does
attempt to provide a new structural
balance in Euro-American
relations.

This "allied structure" should
be constituted as an
Executive Committee of the NATO
Council.
There would be six
members, five of whom would be
permanent (the United
States,

Britain, France, West Germany and
Italy),

the sixth non-

permanent rotating member would represent
the smaller NATO
countries.
The NATO Council (excluding the
permanent members) could elect the rotating member.
A two-thirds
vote

would be binding.

Members of the Executive Committee should

be no lower than Deputy Foreign Ministers,
who would meet at

least bi-monthly.
The role of the Executive Committee would be
to formu-

late common Atlantic purposes, to give guidance on
military
matters, and to develop a common strategic doctrine.

But there would have to be provision for dissent.

Each

ally - whether or not a member of the Executive Committee

-

could appeal its decision to the NATO Council, where a two-

thirds majority would carry.

Each country could dissent and

for an interim period refuse to be bound by such a vote.

Thus provisions for dissent would be maintained along with

mechanisms for carrying out the will of the majority.
Given this framework the European countries might wish
to form a closer union.

A closer union could become a real-

ity if, for example, the Western European Union were given
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responsibility for the European component of
the Allied Nuclear Forces.
For Kissinger "Atlantic partnership
and in-

creased European cohesion thus could be pursued
simultaneously with no advance commitment to giving
priority to

either course."

The course of European evolution could be

left to the Europeans while Americans could make their
main

contribution in the reconstitution of Atlantic relationships. 16
NATO's Future
.

Kissinger clearly attached the utmost importance

to

NATO as a manifestation of the Western powers* determination
to ensure their collective defense.

But he was aware that

collective defense is difficult to maintain in an era of
detente, when the external threat has diminished but not

vanished.

He also realized that organizational structures

such as NATO were not sufficient to ensure unity among the
Allies.

Consequently, he attached the highest importance to

the maintenance of NATO while recognizing that NATO's ef-

ficiency depended upon a consensus on political objectives. 1

''

These circumstances would rule out the use of NATO as an

instrument for detente as well as for defense.

For Kissin-

ger a military alliance simply did not have the necessary

diplomatic flexibility.

Neither military nor legal obligations are sufficient
to assure an adequate NATO response to Soviet aggression.

Under prevailing conditions no
statesman will risk a catastrophe simply to fulfill a legal
obligation. What is important, indeed vital, is that the
necessary "degree of political cooperation has been established
which links
the

fate of each partner with the survival
of all the others." 18

In an era of East-West diplomacy and
rapidly changing

circumstances, it is obvious that Kissinger did
not neglect
NATO's problems. Yet he was also aware that the
Western
allies stood at a crucial juncture in their history.

Under-

lying all the problems of strategic doctrine, rapidly
changing conditions and the many difficulties faced by the West
is the challenge of the times.

This challenge centers upon

the need to move beyond the political fragmentation caused

by the nation-state and to find political forms that will

meet the needs of the times.

The central question concerns

the ability of the West to move "from the nation-state to a

large community and draw from this effort the strength for

another period of innovation. "19

For Kissinger this chal-

lenge is vital, as the ability to master this problem will

largely determine whether the West will remain relevant to
the rest of the world.

The dynamic periods of western his-

tory have occurred when unity was formed from diversity.

Kissinger argues that "the deepest question before the
West may thus be what kind of vision it has of its future." 20
The disagreements that have occurred on both sides of the

Atlantic must be turned into a source of strength.

The West

must manage to "relate diversity to community."

This genera-

tion need not surrender to the doctrine of
historical inevitability.
Indeed, history derives its meaning from the

"convictions and purposes of the generation which shapes
it."

North Atlantic*

Trpp,t-y

Organization

The Statesman
NATO in th e Seventies

Several themes emerge from Kissinger's writings on NATO.
He is concerned with NATO s strategy and its organization,
•

with the problem of defending Europe in an era of detente,

with political cooperation and cohesion among the allies, and
the long-range necessity for the Alliance to move beyond the

confines of the nation-state to a true level of community.

Once again the West would be instrumental in demonstrating
the potential of new forms of political organization that

would have a decisive influence on world politics.

From 1969 to 1976 Kissinger, as a Statesman, was in a

position to implement the ideas that he had written about as
a scholar.

ings

1

I

shall deal with his efforts under three head-

NATO's strategy, NATO's organization, and Alliance re-

lationships.

NATO's Strategy

Kissinger was never exclusively interested in strategic

problems.

Though his reputation was initially
founded chiefly on his criticism of and recommendations
for American
strategic thought, in later years he became much
less preoccupied with strategic problems. While he completely

dis-

agreed with the strategy of massive retaliation, he found
the
doctrine of flexible response less objectionable. He did
not
agree with certain aspects of flexible response (such as
the

problem of tactical nuclear weapons), however, he accepted
the central premise of the doctrine. 21

While Nixon and Kissinger were preoccupied with the

Vietnam negotiations, with the SALT talks, and with the Middle East, European problems (with the exception of the

treaties signed in 1971 and 1972 involving Berlin and West
Germany) by contrast, did not seem to be as important.

John

Stoessinger writes "During his first three years in office,
however, Kissinger paid little attention to America's allies

in Western Europe and even less to Japan.

Most of his time

was taken up with Indochina, the Soviet Union, and China.
The fate of Europe, which had occupied him so much during
his earlier days, had virtually drifted from his range of
vision.

He was aware, of course, of serious strains in NATO,

and criticized the new economic competitiveness, the selfishness, and the growing nationalism of the Western European

countries.

Many of Europe's leaders seemed weak and inef-

fectual to him, and when they were strong, like Charles
de Gaulle, they appeared opposed to the U.S.

To Europe, in

^5

turn, the U.S. seemed to
have lost its sense of
priorities
and gotten bogged down in
a suicidal

^

^^

European leaders found Kissinger's
attitude high-handed and
accused him of placing the
interests of U.S.-Soviet
detente
before the interests of Europe.
By 1973. it was quite
clear
that America's main military
alliance was in serious disrepair and that the relationship
with Western Europe was drifting from respect and friendship
into mutual resentment and
hostility. "22 „ owever> the
administration was aware Qf
neglect of Euro-American relations.
Consequently,
it was

announced with great fanfare that
1973 would be the "Year of
Europe. ••23

During a famous speech in April,
1973. Kissinger discussed some of the more general problems
that troubled America's relations with Europe. I shall later
on refer to this
speech in greater detail. Here I wish to discuss
what Kissinger had to say about NATO's strategic doctrine.
He agreed that the policy of flexible response
was, in

principle, the basic strategy for NATO.

But he warned that

the requirements of flexibility are complex and expensive.

There must be sensitivity to new conditions, and this re-

quires continued consultation among the allies in response
to changing conditions.

An adequate defense posture must

also be maintained and "it must be seen by ourselves and by

potential adversaries as a credible, substantial and rational posture of defense."

He also discussed!

l) defi-

k6

ciencies in important areas of
conventional defense that
should be rectified. 2) in terms
of doctrine unresolved
questions still remain such as the
role of tactical nuclear
weapons. 3) in NATO deployments
and in its logistic structure
problems still remain.

Kissinger affirmed that "we owe to our
people a rational
defense posture at the safest minimum
size and cost, with
burdens equitably shared."
NATO has serious inadequacies in its
conventional defense? anti-tank weapons are insufficient,
a new, main battle
tank is needed for the late seventies and
eighties (the

United States and West Germany are developing
a new tank), 25
the number of front-line troops is inadequate,
inventories
of ammunition and spare parts are "critically low", 26
rein-

forcements are often insufficient or improperly organized,
and NATO's conventional defense posture is deficient.

A

very serious problem for NATO planners is how to utilize
their forces with the greatest efficiency in view of steadily increasing costs.

If the number of front-line troops

were to decline, NATO planners may wish to add mobility and

firepower to existing units.

much greater importance.

Reserves would then acquire

The border units would hope to

slow the thrust of an invading force long enough for the

very mobile regular units and rapidly mobilized reserve
troops to stop the invasion force completely.

enough first-rate reserve troops be trained?

But can
The reserve

^7

forces would

^

to supplement the
regular units.

Moreover

this strategy is not one
of forward defense but
envisages
stopping the invader on West
German territory where
this
force will still he in
possession of considerable
West German territory. Thus if NATO
will have to manage with
fewer
troops its strategy must
reflect this reality. 2 ?

However, it is probable that
in a conventional war.
future technological developments
will favor the defense.
Anti-tank weapons can now be
managed by one soldier and are
increasingly accurate.
"Bomblets" shot from artillery
can
delay or halt invading armies or
tank columns.
Helicopter
gunships are another lethal addition
to NATO forces.
And
laser and wire-guidance systems make
all weapons systems increasingly accurate. Consequently,
invasion forces may have
to exceed by considerable margins
the ratios that were historically necessary to achieve breakthroughs.
This, of
course, may lessen the advantage conferred
by surprise attack and perhaps allow more time for diplomacy
to avert conflict. 28

NATO's doctrine also suffered from two weaknesses concerning conventional strategy and tactical nuclear weapons.
Its conventional defense posture was predicated upon the

idea that a conventional conflict in Europe would be of long
duration.

The model envisaged is World War II.

There would

be time for reinforcements, time for the superior manpower

and material of the West to be mobilized.

Moreover, this
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doctrine influenced the
organization of Western (and,
particularly American) divisions
which have too many men engaged in logistics and insufficient
front-line troops. In
an era of rapidly rising military
costs, this strategy becomes increasingly questionable.

What is questionable or inefficient
under some circumstances may become a serious concern
in a different
situa-

tion.

It is generally recognized that
the Warsaw Pact
Forces are equipped for a lighteningwar to force a quick
breach of NATO's defenses, with heavy armor,
and then to
achieve rapid penetration of NATO territory.
The potential
danger of the situation is readily apparent.
NATO needs to
be guided by a new strategy that "establishes
a new defense
pattern, emphasizing immediate firepower, greatly
reduced
t

support and long-lead reserve forces, strengthened
logistics
for a short conflict, and quick deployment of combat units." 29

In November, 1974, a small step was taken in this direction
with the announcement by Defense Secretary Schlesinger that
two new combat brigades would be established in Germany.

The

number of troops would remain the same in Europe while there
would be a reduction of comparable support troops.
Beyond this step nothing was done by Nixon and Kissinger
to alleviate the increasing imbalance between NATO's conven-

tional defense strategy and the deployment of its forces.

At

present there is a rough balance of power in Central Europe.
The West is even superior in firepower and the quality of
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its weapons systems, but in
rapidly chang i„ g circumstances,
can the present balance of
power be taken for granted?
The
question is not if change will
occur but how NATO's major
deficiency, the strategy for
conventional defense, should be
rectified. However, not enough
was done by Kissinger
to

garner the necessary political
support to remedy this deficiency.

Concerning the role of tactical nuclear
weapons in NATO
doctrine, little has been done to
clarify matters. Through
the NATO Nuclear Planning Group,
European members can influence the manner in which nuclear weapons
are to be used
in Europe. However, no attempt has been
made by Kissinger
or anyone else to clarify the role of tactical
nuclear weapons in NATO s doctrine. 3° Does the present ambiguity
•

con-

cerning tactical nuclear weapons best serve as a
deterrent?
Are 7000 tactical nuclear weapons really necessary in
Europe?
As plans for force stabilization and then force reductions

acquire greater importance in Europe, the role of tactical

nuclear weapons will have to be fully clarified with respect
to both quantity and Doctrine.

NATO's troop deployments and logistic structure continue to cause problems for the Alliance.

After the drain

placed on men and material in NATO by the Vietnam War,
trained personnel and material stocks needed to be rebuilt
to former levels.

And in 1977 troops were still inadequately

deployed to represent a true forward defense of NATO territory
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for too many American troops
were concentrated in
Southern
Germany, somewhat removed from
potential invasion routes on
the plains of Northern Germany.
Consequently, it is still
questionable if a credible defense
of NATO territory could
be made by the allies without
the use of nuclear weapons.

Diverse logistic structures still
represent a major problem
for NATO planners. While the United
States - West German
main battle tank may ease the situation
somewhat, formidable
problems remain. 2
It is not at all surprising that the
resolution of the
preceeding problems did not have a very high
priority on the
administration's agenda. Kissinger was well
acquainted with
all of these problems, but in the Nixon-Kissinger
years when foreign policy was centralized in the White
House -

sustained attention to NATO's secondary concerns was
rare.
The view was that the administration's diplomatic
concerns
were centered upon adversaries and, furthermore, Kissinger's

often tactless behavior in Alliance relationships undercut

many of his policies.

Stanley Hoffmann writes that "Ominous

threats, such as those President Ford and Kissinger uttered

concerning Portugal's participation in NATO, or the presence of U.S. forces in Europe, can be double-edged and are

of uncertain effect. "33

Nixon's and Kissinger's policies

were uncoordinated, conflicting, and excessively unilateral. 3^

Their often abrasive diplomatic style amid the general acri-

mony surrounding Euro-American relations almost ensured that
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they could not garner among
Americans and Europeans the
necessary support that was vital
to initiating the
policies required for changing NATO's
strategy and tactics.
Instead,
charges and counter-charges
were hurled back and forth
across the Atlantic.
Some positive steps were
taken, but
more could have been accomplished
by the man who, as few
ethers, was so well acquainted
with NATO's problems.

For many years, scholars (including
Kissinger) have
lamented the weaknesses of NATO's
organization. My comments
will be brief.
The ossification of the central
institutions
of the Alliance is a serious problem.
Alastair Buchan has
discussed this problem as well as the
usefulness
of the

Atlantic Council as a diplomatic forum. 35

Others have warned that the military command
structure
should be modernized and that a European should
hold
the

position of Supreme Commander.

Drew Middleton suggests that

the headquarters organization "would require weeks
of warn-

ing and preparation before it could function effectively in

war."36
It is clear that NATO's organization is in need of

modernization in rapidly changing circumstances.

One posi-

tive step, taken with the direct encouragement of the White

House, was the announcement in 1970 of a European Defense

Improvement Program where the members of the Eurogroup

52

(except for France, Portugal, and Iceland)
pledged to spend
an additional $1 billion over the
next five years to improve the European forces as well as
the NATO infrastructure,
This initiative was followed by similar
efforts of the Euro37
group.-"

However welcome such initiatives are, they
cannot compensate for the increasingly serious organizational

problems

of NATO.

Modernization of the NATO organization will require a large cooperative effort by both the
Europeans

and

the Americans.

Was such a major effort possible in the

acrimonious and suspicious atmosphere surrounding Euro-

American relations in the Nixon-Kissinger years?

David

Landes has stated that, he would, "pinpoint an area, single
out the improvement of image and interpersonal relations to

help restore the sense of community and affection that once
existed on both sides of the Atlantic. "38

NATO's organiza-

tion will always reflect varying degrees of imperfection.

But the time is fast approaching when major reforms will

become imperative.

In an age of detente and increasing

East-West contacts, the Western allies must retain the
political determination and organizational means to ensure
their collective defense.
Alliance Relationships
If there is a single theme that may be found in Kis-

singer's scholarly writings and in his numerous speeches
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after 1969. it is the emphasis placed
upon political cooperation.
It is understandable that after
1969 Europe did
not have a very high place in Nixon's
and Kissinger's diplomacy.
Serious domestic turmoil occurred over
the administration's slow withdrawal of American military
power from
Vietnam.
American diplomacy was directly engaged in
Vietnam
and intensive efforts were also directed
at Hanoi's allies;

the Soviet Union and China.

Consequently, differences between the Americans and
the

Europeans were becoming more acute as the Americans first
became involved in Vietnam and then attempted to withdraw

while Europe became increasingly preoccupied with its
internal problems and construction of the European Community (EC).

These differences are cause for serious concern according to
Fritz Stern who states "the balance between unity and discord
is precarious.

There are not only substantive differences be-

tween the U.S. and its European allies; there is

on the nongovernmental level
sides.

-

-

at least

a growing impatience on both

The roots of discord go deep; to ignore or under-

estimate the shifts of power and attitudes might heighten
the dangers of drifting apart.

In the past an external

threat has always served to unite the alliance.

Now we can-

not count on the automatic reappearance of solidarity."-^?
Thus rapidly changing circumstances in a more complex world

required that more, not less, time and attention be given
to Euro-American relations.

Nixon's and Kissinger's pro-

5h

longed diplomatic attention
to adversaries
occurred at the
expense of relations with
America's major Hi...
Actually
adversaries and allies should
have received rao re equal
attention as time and
circumstances allowed. However,
by the
time Kissinger realized
that trans-Atlantic
relationships
were increasingly acrimonious
and corrective measures
needed
to be taken, it was really
too late.
Shortly after Kissinger announced "The Year of
Europe" in his speech in
April. 1973. the administration
was caught unprepared by
the
sequence of events that began in
the Middle East in October
and culminated in a severe
crisis in Euro-American relations.
Thus 1973. "The Year of Europe",
ended with an alliance debacle that was exceeded by
only two other crises in
the Atlantic Alliance,
the Suez crisis in 1956 and the
Skybolt affair in 1962.
There would be no purpose here in
ascertaining which of these crises had the
more serious consequences. Each was avoidable and each has
done considerable
and lasting harm to alliance relationships.
However, it is

probably safe to say that the crisis in Euro-American
relations in late 1973 will not have such serious or
prolonged
effects on the Western Alliance as did the two previous
crises.

It is, nevertheless, paradoxical that Kissinger

himself, who was so trenchant a critic of the events that
led to the crises of 1956 and 1962, should have been involved
in an almost equally serious crisis.'* 0

Kissinger's "Year of Europe" speech was "a plea for
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partnership" in which he asked that
Americans and Europ<>eans
partake cf "mutual efforts on mutual
issues."** He stated
that the United States planned to
build "a new Atlantic
Charter" with its European allies in
1973 to overcome the
economic, military, and diplomatic
strains that had recently developed.
It was apparent that the United
States
and Europe "had reached another critical
point in their relationships", consequently, America, Europe,
and Japan needed to define anew the common political
interests and ideas
of the old and the new world.
The speech was not well
re-

ceived in Europe.

Kissinger and the National Security

Council (NSC) staff were quite surprised at the discord
it
produced.

2*

2

Moreover, according to the London Economist

i

"The Atlantic Alliance was in worse shape than in any time

in its 2*J<-year history, and not just because of that row
about the Middle East war, not just because detente erodes

defense budgets, not just because of the different impact
the oil embargo has had on America and Europe.

The heart of

the matter is that 1973 has been the year when the nine

countries of the EC wanted to define what binds them to each
other, and Mr. Kissinger has simultaneously wanted it to be
the year when they defined what binds them to the democracies

on the other side of the Atlantic."^

During the early seventies a number of monetary, economic, and political problems plagued the relations between

Americans and Europeans.

Then, from 1973 >

"the

Watergate
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crisis began to take increasingly
large amounts of Presidential time and energy. Despite
Kissinger's intentions, no
United States-European declaration
was to be forthcoming,
only an eventual NATO declaration
largely on security and
political affairs (in June of 1974 at
Brussels the United
States and its European Allies signed
a declaration that obligated them to achieve increased consultation).^

However, in the Middle East, a crisis was
rapidly developing. Kissinger had always warned
that threats to American security "may not always take an unambiguous
form."
And this is precisely what was to occur when
the October war
led to the oil embargo and the subsequent
quadrupling of the

price of oil.

The White House ignored a State Department

(Office of Fuels and Energy) warning in early
1973 concerning
the possibility of an impending oil crisis and underestimated
the political will of the Saudi s to use the oil weapon. 45
1

Kissinger's behavior toward the Europeans was less than circumspect both during and after the crisis.

ment "I don't care what happens to NATO,

I

His negative comam so disgusted"

was widely reported, and resented, in Europe.

In December,

Kissinger had further words for the Europeans' behavior during the crisis referring to them as "craven," "contemptible,"
"pernicious," and "jackal-like.

"^

Again, these remarks were

not uttered discreetly, but they were widely disseminated by
the press.

NATO's role as the collective manifestation of the
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West's determination to achieve
and maintain a collective
defense was further imperiled
by the first public breach

between the United States and West
Germany during the October War. The press discovered
the shipment of war material
from West Germany to Israel, and
Bonn asked that this cease
at once.
James Schlesinger, Secretary of
Defense, then
made an overt threat to move American
military equipment
out of Germany, and there were also
bitter American recriminations that its European allies had
deserted it in
8
its hour of need.^

^

During the October War American actions
were, all too
often, not preceeded by adequate consultation.
Its
allies

were not informed of its plans.

To illustrate the point

"in the Cuban Missile Crisis of I962 President
Kennedy dis-

patched special envoys, envoys known to and trusted
by

European statesmen to explain his position.

Nothing of the

kind occurred on this occasion."^ An astute commentator
has summed up the Nixon-Kissinger policies to 19?4i

"Aside

from Gerard Smith's careful briefings regarding Salt I, the
record of this administration in serious consultation has

been miserable. " -5°
The October War (could an Administration less obsessed

with Vietnam have begun a diplomatic effort sufficient to
avert or mitigate the outbreak of war?), the failure of the

administration to consult or even inform its NATO allies,
the serious public breach in United States-West German
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relations, the previously noted
accusations hurled by the
Americans at the Europeans, could
any of these occurrences
have aided the cause of allied
solidarity?

NATO was placed under severe
pressure by American demands to use NATO facilities to
pursue its policy of supporting Israel in the war. But
was it wise for the Americans to have insisted on European
participation in such an
effort when Europe was so vulnerable
to the use of
the oil

weapon?

Europe's economic and political
weaknesses were
evident from the moment the oil embargo
reached serious
proportions.

Did Nixon and Kissinger appreciate
how vul-

nerable Europe was to the "oil weapon?"

Moreover, the Arab

oil embargo and subsequent price increases
have contributed
to a critical inflation,

"the end results of which are in-

calculable. "5 1

Since this crisis in Alliance relationships, some
degree of harmony has been restored.

But Europe's political

and economic margins for maneuver have been greatly nar-

rowed.

Suspicions persist on both sides of the Atlantic.

In less favorable circumstances and in an often acrimoni-

ous atmosphere, can Americans and Europeans find anew

corn-

mon grounds to pursue and resolve the great challenges that
an only be solved by their common efforts?

Summary
The splintering of the Western Alliance can no longer
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be ignored.

Was the strength of the
Western Alliance and
growing European unity in the
post-war era a natural development or the result of unusual
conditions?52 Consultation and cooperation among
the democratic states is
vital
if the values of Western
Civilization are to be maintained
in today's dangerous and
uncertain world.

In the areas of NATO strategy.
NATO organization, a nd
alliance relationships many weaknesses
are apparent. The
administration did not try to remedy very
many of NATO's
secondary deficiencies in view of its
more important concerns elsewhere.

Nixon and Kissinger did not deliberately
undertake to
damage NATO and trans -Atlantic relations.
But in

an era of

rapidly changing conditions, were they
excessively concerned with stability? As Stanley Hoffmann
writes

"Hence

Kissinger's predicament and the contradiction between
his
call for a pluralistic "legitimate" order accommodating
change in the world and his interpretation of NATO as
a

kind of Holy Alliance based not only on a common interest

in external security, but also on a common constellation
of political forces.

Indeed both his failures and his suc-

cesses in the business of preserving American primacy show
an obsession with stability, which puts him far closer to

Metternich than to his own criticism of the Austrian
Statesman and also quite close to his predecessors* policy. "53

Hoffmann then asks "Metternich'

s

excuse was the
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^agility of his country
,

Us

desperate

status q uo outside.

^

^

Is the social and
political order of
the U.S. equally brittle
and tied to conservatism
everywhere?"

^

Moreover, from 1 97 1 to
1975, their policies often
were
too calculating, insensitive,
and undertaken with
little or
no prior consultation.
With respect to detente
and increased East-West contacts as
well as the problems faced
by
the allies, an active diplomacy
that emphasized consultation and cooperation was vital.
The Berlin Agreement of
1971 and the intra-German accords of 1
97 2 represented the
kind of diplomatic effort that
the administration could successfully conclude in Europe. Both
of the superpowers were
either directly or indirectly involved
in the negotiations.
Moreover, except for some particulars,
both superpowers are
in basic agreement with the status
quo in Central Europe.

Unfortunately, there has always been considerable
sympathy in the United States for limiting
or otherwise
greatly constraining the role of the United States
in Europe.

Every year, until recently, a large number of Senators
voted
to reduce the number of American troops in
Europe unilaterally.

Labor unions concerned with economic competition from

Europe, are increasingly protectionist.

Nor are the ranks

of academicians free from advocates of withdrawal or "dis-

engagement" from Europe.

The European balance of power must

be maintained, and that presupposes American engagement
in
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Europe.

This is the lesson of the
inter-war years.55 M<ioreover, the continuation of
detente presupposes a balance
of
power.
West German Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt, in the London
^PnpM^i states "if you want to have continuity
of detente
you have to have continuity of
the balance of power,
the

equilibrium.

Continuity of detente cannot
persist if you
let the military equilibrium
deteriorate. "56

A large> di _

verse organization such as NATO will
inevitably be imperfect, particularly from the
perspective of military strategists and planners. However, if NATO
is to serve as the allies* mechanism for their collective
defense, it is vital
that the West's determination is always
apparent
to the

Soviet Union.

The danger is that many of the imperfections
and deficiencies in NATO could - over a considerable
period of
time - prove to be of such magnitude that the
means and

therefore the determination of the allies to defend themselves might be imperiled.

Thus another administration has

lost the opportunity to achieve reforms in NATO

i

with the

further passage of several years, future changes will be
all the more difficult to achieve.

Moreover, the alliance

debacle of 1973 and Kissinger's often tactless behavior will

make it that much more difficult to achieve once again that

atmosphere of mutual trust and harmony that must be re-

established before the Western Allies can transcend their

differences and develop new political organizations that
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will reflect a trans-Atlantic
con^unity. A scholar
narced
Henry Kissinger once called
this the preeminent
challenge of
our times.

"
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CHAPTER
MULTILATERAL RELATIONS,

IV

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Th e. Schola r
As noted in his work as
a scholar Kissinger
devoted
.uch thought to NATO s problems
and the broader problems
faced by the Atlantic Alliance.
He recognized the importance of the movement for
European unification, however,
the scope and depth of his
work on the EC is not
comparable
to his efforts on NATO.
However, he was aware of the
potential seeds of discord that could
develop between a
united Europe and the United States
basically because he
*

never assumed a complete identity of
interests.
I shall
examine two areas that were of concern
to Kissinger,
the
movement for European integration and
the relations between
the United States and an integrating
Europe.
The Moveme nt for

Tryteg-ra ti

rm

Kissinger indicates that American policy towards
postwar Europe was remarkably consistent in its

support of

the movement toward European integration. 1

The United

States advocated a European organization to allocate
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American economic aid in the
early days of the Marshall
Plan.
In this it was greatly
influenced by such eminent
Europeans
as Jean Monnet and Robert
Schuman. American support
for
European unification also extended
into the military sphere
as was manifested by its support
of the abortive European
Defense Community (EDC).
But even though Secretary Dulles
threatened an "agonizing reappraisal" of American
foreign policy if the treaty
failed, American policy did not change
when this occurred.
From 1955 to 1957 when the delicate
process of reviving the
Community approach and endowing it with
structure and substance was occurring, the United States
welcomed this development.
It even resisted British efforts to dilute
the

emergent Community by turning it into a free
trade area. 2
The Americans supported the dream of Monnet and
Schuman to
move from economic to political union.

They opposed the

attempts of the Scandinavian countries and Austria (and
Britain) to treat the EC simply as an economic enterprise
and encouraged these countries to make a firm commitment to
the EC's political unity.

In the early days of the Kennedy administration, the

President proclaimed the doctrine of Interdependence between the United States and a united Europe, considering

European political unity a prerequisite to the formation
of an Atlantic community.

Kennedy's goal was an economic-

ally and politically integrated Europe as an equal partner
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with the United States.

The burdens and
obligations of

world leadership would be
shared by both.
A united Europe, most
American commentators assumed,
would have only one form.
There would be supranational
federal institutions controlled
by a European Parliament.
Not surprisingly the main
reason for the preference for
supranational institutions was the
American example. Many
Americans were convinced that their
Federal system was directly applicable to Europe, and
prominent spokesmen, among
them President Kennedy, urged that
Europeans adopt the
American Federal system. 3 Moreover,
the nation-state was
becoming obsolete therefore, if the
individual nationstates of Europe were to exercise any
real power and influence in the world, they should follow the
American Federal
model.
;

Kissinger thought that the American proponents
of European integration were guilty of several errors of
judgment.

He questioned the applicability of the American

Federal system in foreign settings.

The American Federal

system had developed on a new continent.

The new states

had a common historical experience and were of approxi-

mately the same size.
a common origin.

Cultural and linguistic factors had

Moreover, the states had no past tradi-

tion of sovereign independence and had just jointly conducted a successful common war against a now defeated but
still powerful enemy

i

Britain.
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The situation in Europe w as
fundamentally different.
Each European state, great and
small, is a product of many
centuries of historical development.
A strong sense of national identity was often acquired
only a t the end of centuries-long struggles against the
attempts of other European states to achieve domination.
Moreover, foreign policy
ar.d national defense, two
xi±al attributes of sovereignty,
developed from the European states struggles.
Kissinger also
pointed out that attempts to establish
supranational institutions in Europe today involve a far cleaner
break with

their past than was true of the American states
when they
formed a federal union.

Kissinger also warned that the attitudes of the European states towards supranational institutions vary
greatly.
The countries that suffered most in the war, Germany and
Italy, are perhaps more willing than others to become parts

of a larger entity.

The smaller states too are more willing

to adopt supranational institutions as historically they

have often been dependent on others.

Moreover, they can

achieve greater influence in a supranational organization
than their resources and size would permit if they were to
act individually.

The most reluctant countries are those

with the longest history as great powers

i

Britain and

France,

During the Kennedy administration it became apparent
what factors were responsible for the slackening of the
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European drive for integration.

Europe had largely re-

covered economically and politically

from the War .

The

threat of invasion from the
East had also diminished, in
part as a result of American
policy. Moreover, Europe's
desire and need to unite in order
to play a global role was
diminished by the process of
decolonization, which reduced
its interest in world affairs.
Finally, it became increasingly obvious that progress toward
economic integration
is not necessarily paralleled by
progress in political integration.
Economic questions often involved matters
of a more
technical nature that could be resolved
fairly easily. Political questions involved considerations
of power and prestige and on many issues compromise was very
difficult or impossible.
But, as Kissinger pointed out, the most
difficult

question of all was still unresolved

i

whatever the struc-

ture, origin, or degree of European integration, what
kind

of policies would such a Europe pursue, and would its policies be consistent with the interests of the United States?
The United States and the European Community

Kissinger was unrelenting in his criticism of those who
accepted the thesis that European integration

national institutions

-

-

with supra-

would bring about a complete harmony

of interests between the United States and Western Europe.

Moreover, many of these American spokesmen assumed that a
united Europe would involve itself in remote areas of the
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globe.

Americans seemed to assume that their
goals represented the common interest and were,
therefore,
beyond

challenge.

This argument was rejected by Kissinger.

Americans

really seem to be more concerned with sharing
costs than
discussing foreign policy objectives. Thus
American spokesmen have continually endorsed the theme that
a fragmented
Europe must mobilize its resources before its voice
and in-

fluence can be felt in support of the common effort
and the

common view.

Kissinger's criticism rested on two grounds.

First he questioned that availability of resources is
related to willingness to assume global responsibilities.
Indeed, the experience of the United States itself would

seem to contradict that thesis.

He emphasized how during

the greater part of its history, the United States possessed
the resources but not the inclination to play a global role.^

Many European states, on the other hand, played a global
role when their resources were much less than they are
today.

Second, the United States has, by an often intemperate

emphasis upon decolonization, forced the European states to

relinquish their role abroad.

Decolonization, following the

traumatic effects of two world wars, has lessened European

interest in other areas of the world.

The European states

were also confident that long before their interests were

directly threatened, the United States would become involved.
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As Kissinger said "in
other words, they treat
Africa's
extra-European concerns in much
the s.e way that the
United
States looked at Europe's
quarrels until 1941.-7
Nor does Kissinger agree that
the constant invocati on
of "interests versus
responsibilities" by American
spok esinen
is helpful.
Europeans do not have world
responsibiliti es
because in the period following
World War II they we re
forced to give up their global
interests. The global involvement of the United States has
tended to reduce the incentive of the Allies to assume their
share of global
responsibility.

Consequently, Kissinger warns that
European unity is
not a cure-all for either trans-Atlantic
disagreements or
for lessening the burdens of America's
8
global
role.

he warns that the reverse may be true.

Indeed

As Europe unifies,

its differences with the United States may
increase.

Both

have a common interest in the defense of Europe but,
in

other areas, a common unity of interests is less clear.
Thus Kissinger warns that a wise alliance policy will not

insist on common perspectives.

It will take account of the

fact that different positions may well be normal when global

concerns are scrutinized.

It is thus vital for alliance po-

licy to allow for differing perspectives on global questions.^

Kissinger warns that in the coming decade an increasingly powerful China may well exploit tendencies toward
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turmoil in various parts of the
globe.

Moreover, the com-

plexity of global change is such that
if the United Stat,;es
insists on remaining the sole trustee
of policy everywhere,
the strain on America's resources may
be
too great.

The

United States should encourage the
Europeans to develop a
measure of autonomy. Kissinger warns that
"it is not always the least responsible allies that wish
to reserve

some

measure of control over their destiny." 10
The central fact is that the interests of the
United

States and Europe are not identical in all situations.

The

common recognition of this fact should make possible
agree-

ment on a permissible range of divergence.

Americans must

choose between immediate convenience or long-term vitality.

Centralization of decision-making is always attractive, but
there are long-term costs.

The excessive concentration of

decision-making authority in the hands of the senior partner
deprives the allies of a sense of responsibility.

But the

most dangerous aspect of this policy is that when a conflict
of interests does become apparent, the resulting fissures

may be irreconcilable.
Multilateral Relations

The European Community
The Statesman
The European Community in the Seventies
i

The nation-state is a type of political organization of

Western origin that has spread throughout the globe.

It has

served as the model of political organization for most of
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the human race, particularly
in the period following
World
War II. By the seventies it
was clear that while the
nationstate was not quite obsolete, new
forms of political organi-

zation were necessary eventually
to supersede the nationstate in part or in whole.

By 1977 the magnitude of national
and international
problems in every sphere often exceeded
the resources of even
the continent-states such as the
United States.
Trans-national cooperation on a broad range of
issues is a vital
necessity if the aspirations of the majority of
the human
race are to be fulfilled.
The immense tasks that confront
every society today cannot be resolved in one
or two generations.

Yet, an impressive beginning has been made by
Euro-

peans in overcoming political fragmentation.
The desire of the Europeans to cooperate politically

manifests itself most clearly in the EC.

Cooperation does

not, of course, guarantee the successful resolution of prob-

lems.

But, while cooperation is no panacea, it is more dif-

ficult to resolve the problems that confront societies today

without a major effort at cooperative endeavors.
This is why the EC is so important not only to Europe
but to the world.

By 1977 the optimistic goals of only a

few years ago appeared beyond reach.

Indeed, the period was

marked by such difficulties that consolidation appeared to
be the necessity of the hour.- 1
1-

The EC was beset by poli-

tical and economic problems, by difficulties with its chief

76

rival, the United States,
and by the difficulties
inherent
in its cumbersome structure.
Problems large and small
seemed, at times, to threaten
the very existence of
the
EC. 12
these itg relationsh
p

Wg

.

loomed large.

Andrew Pierre notes that "The
first half of
the 1970'
s has been marked by ungainly disputes among
the
Atlantic countries which have weakened
the fiber of the present Atlantic relationship and
opened its continuation
to

serious question.

Relations with Europe will, however,
remain a central component of American
foreign policy. 1 3
Thus it is often said that America
can or should do nothing
to promote the cause of European unity,
that what the Euro-

peans do with respect to the EC is something
that only they
can and should be concerned about.

Kissinger rejects that view.

He was well aware that

the United States could seriously damage the EC by,
for example, insisting upon retaining centralized decision-making

powers.

As a statesman, then, one should expect that he

would allow the EC to assume increased responsibility.

More-

over, it would also be reasonable to assume that he would

understand why the EC could not, for example, endorse and
support American policies in the Middle East.

Consequently,

the benevolent and, at times, actively beneficial policies

of the United States, are needed if the EC is to achieve its
objectives.

The EC can perhaps flourish under the encourage-

ment, even the neglect of the United States.

Even in the
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event of full American support,
the successful conclusion
of
this great experiment cannot
be taken for granted. But,
in
case of United States hostility,
the EC probably could not
survive the consequences.
At this stage in Europe's development, given the vulnerability of
the European states,
it is not surprising that the
policies of a trans-Atlantic
superpower would have a profound effect on
the efforts of a
group of small and medium sized European
states to form a

^

larger collective entity.

Kissinger, as few others, was

well aware of the EC's vulnerability.

Yet he showed little

inclination to share decision-making with the EC.

Moreover,

as will be demonstrated, he expressed considerable
annoyance

with the EC's often slow and cumbersome procedures.
It is essential for American policy-makers to realize
that while they can exert limited influence on Europe's

quest to unite, they can, as Kissinger warns, cripple the
efforts of the European states to unite in a larger col-

lective entity.

I

shall next examine in general terms the

role of the EC in the world.

Then

I

shall discuss the

United States and the EC focusing upon economic problems between the two and the emergence of serious political differences between Washington and Brussels as a result of

Nixon's and Kissinger's foreign policy.
The EC and the World

Scholars disagree regarding the prospects for the EC,
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To some it has demonstrated
an unusual degree of
resiliency
and strength after the
"oil crisis", thus they
see .rounds
for a guarded optimism.
Others see the actions of
the EC

after the oil crisis as reflecting
grave weaknesses because
of the member's unilateral
and selfish policies. 1 * Any
experiment as ambitious as the EC
is certain to present ambiguities.
The EC is an expression of
Europe's contemporary
needs and circumstances and, while
it may be difficult to
determine precisely where it is going,
there is no doubt of
the impact of a new kind of foreign
policy in one of
the

strategic areas of the world.
A Civil ian Pnwgr

Francois Duch£ne has applied the term civilian
power to
the EC.

He states that the EC is a new type of political

power that stresses the use of economic power and
legal and
contractual norms in its foreign policy. 16 It is
not and

does not aspire to be a military power; instead, it hopes to

appeal to high ethical standards in its external relations.

The EC is a customs market,
States.

Almost

kOfo

60fo

larger than the United

of world trade emanates from it.

There

is no doubt of its present and potential impact in an area

that is becoming increasingly vital to the entire world
the development of economic relationships, not only within
the developed nations themselves but between the developed

and the underdeveloped nations of the world.

79

Moreover, the individual
member nations of the EC
are
becoming increasingly dependent
upon external markets
for
sustained economic growth. This
dependence stands out most
clearly in the case of Belgium,
which derives almost
0f
its Gross National Product
( GNP )
f r0 m community
trade.

While Belgium is exceptional
in this respect, the Netherlands. West Germany, and indeed
all the other members are
increasingly dependent upon exports.
This has meant that
slowly but surely the members of
the EC have been forced to
eschew unilateral economic moves
that violate the organization's spirit and intent. The
members are interdependent
in the economic sphere as never
before.
The crisis of 1965,
inspired by de Gaulle, and the oil crisis
of 1973 have been
surmounted by the EC. And the community
has grown with the
addition of a reluctant Britain and two other
members,

Ireland and Denmark.

Today the EC is a factor of major importance in
world
economic relations. But it is not completely identified

with

Europe.

West Germany can promote economic agreements with

the Soviet Union and the East European states.
do the same with its former colonies in Africa.

France can
A number of

European states are not yet members, thus the process of
identifying Europe with the EC is not yet complete.

This

is why a powerful economic competitor like the United States
can, by divide and rule tactics, inject elements of dis-

harmony into the developing economic and political relation-
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ships among the members
of the EC.
The EC is particularly
vulnerable to tactics of
divide
and rule because of the
uni q ue nature of its
organisation.
Its structure, including
the Brussels bureaucracy,
is often
slow and cumbersome in
reaching compromises. I„
an age of
rapid decisions and active
diolomnrv +v,
uxpiomacy,
the process of negotiating with Brussels appears nK
spears as the n*wi
diplomacy of inaction.
This is understandable but
may - at times - severely
test
the patience and restraints
of foreign governments.

From January 1973 on. the external
trade of all members
had to be conducted by the EC
Commission in Brussels. 18 Although this has not been strictly
adhered to, this action
does represent the very real and
active steps that the EC
has been taking in the area of economic
diplomacy. Agreements have been negotiated with a number
of underdeveloped
countries in the Lome7 Convention signed in
February, 1975.
An active Mediterranean policy has been
initiated that promises to make the EC a major influence in that
region.
Greece. Turkey, and Spain have either concluded
association

agreements with the EC or are interested in becoming members
as soon as possible.

While the EC has not had an Eastern

policy, it is very much aware of its potentially important

impact on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The Russians

and the East Europeans tend to be rather ambivalent about
the EC.

The Russians have been very cautious but, in March,

1972, Brezhnev told the Soviet Trade Union Congress that the
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Soviet Union had no wi sh
to undermine the EC,
furthermore
he hinted that the Soviet
attitude towards the EC
might depend upon the EC attitude
towards the Council for
Mutual
Economic Assistance (CEMA). 19
1 97 5 the first formal
meeting between officials
n-r the n
uuiciais of
Commission

m

and the CEMA

Secretariat occurred.
The East Europeans are ambivalent
about the EC, however, external trade is generally
more important to them
than to the Soviet Union. In the
case of Hungary, for example, foreign trade is vital to
its plans for economic
20
growth.
In addition, there are numerous
other attractions
of trade and economic relationships
with the West for the
East Europeans. But the East Europeans
have to be aware of
the dangers of too pervasive an impact
of the West. At the
same time they must resist economic subordination
to Russian and CEMA plans for their national economies.
Thus the

East Europeans are faced with difficult problems.

But there

is little doubt that in the future the impact of the
EC in
this region will be important. 21

The EC thus is a new force in world politics, parti-

cularly in the realm of economic relationships.

There are

difficulties in dealing with an entity that represents a

collection of diverse states with often conflicting interests.

Will the EC gradually assume complete responsibility

for the conduct of its members' foreign economic policy and

perhaps eventually foreign policy as well? 22

Or will it
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and its member states
retain S0Vereignty

^

^

creating an often uneasy
internal relationship
with each
member claiming jurisdiction
in specific
areas.

Kissinger was aware of the
adverse as well as the
positive aspects of European
integration. But he never
wrote
as extensively about the
EC as he did on NATO. His
writings on the EC were basically
completed by l 9 64.

Since then

the EC has become a more
tangible force in Europe.

As

Francois Duch£ne suggests "the
European Community is slowly
taking root as an important part
of the international system
and that American policy should
cooperate with
it for that

reason, notwithstanding the demise
of yesterday's grand designs."
With a knowledge of Europe equalled
by few Americans, Kissinger also tended to be
skeptical, at times extremely so, of the thesis that a united Europe
would in the
short-term share America's burdens both in Europe
and the

world.

Thus he was very much aware of the fact that,
for

an American statesman, dealing with the emergent EC could
be
an exhausting and trying experience.

With the administration

beseiged domestically because of its excessively delayed

withdrawal from Vietnam, the crisis in the Middle East and

other problems, is it to be wondered at that, in the words
of one commentator, "occasional activity regarding Western

Europe was predominantly secretive and bilateral, also
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Nixon avoided the EC
de Gaulle." 24

Cohesion

and paid undue deference
to

shall turn first to economic
issues between the
United States and the EC
general problems,
I

t

the Monetary
Crisis of 1971. and energy
and raw materials.
Then I shall
focus upon the political
relationship between the United
States and the EC. While the
interrelationship of economics
and politics is obvious, this
division of subject matter
should provide a better means
to obtain a complete
analysis
of the totality of relationships
that exists between the
United States and the EC.

Economic Problems i_go r!±I:a i
It was obvious that America would
have to sacrifii.ce

short-term economic for long-term political
gains that
would accrue from a united Europe. This
was not particularly difficult to see prior to America's
involvement in
Vietnam.
But the Vietnam war exacerbated the inflation
that

subsequently placed a heavy strain upon the American economy.
Moreover, by the middle of the sixties, the economy was
ex-

periencing difficulty in competing with the often more

modern and efficient economies of Western Europe and Japan.
With an adverse diplomatic and domestic situation to contend with, Nixon and Kissinger (Kissinger had little know-

ledge of and not much interest in international economics)
were less prone to sacrifice American economic interests in
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the hope of eventually
Ay benofi
-Hn«r from
Denenting
a united Europe.
Moreover, due to the
ne exce^ivo
excessive adegree of
centralization and
secrecy that developed
with respect to foreign
policy in
the White House, complex
economic issues often
received in-

™

adequate attention compared
to more pressing
political issues.

In the three areas
previously mentioned, the
administration's performance was not
very good. Economic groups
in the United States who
were ostensibly suffering
from European and Japanese economic
competition were quick to register their complaints with the
White House. The administration, seldom in a very favorable
situation domestically
- due both to its and its predecessors'
policies - was glad
to provide some means to
dissipate domestic fears against
foreign competition.

The United States complained of economic
damage in
three areas - tariff discrimination,
agricultural protectionism, and preferential trade agreements
with third
countries.
The United States complained that the EC was becoming

an inward-looking trading bloc raising a tariff wall to

discriminate against outside exports.

Strictly speaking,

there was some truth in this contention.

However, any large

nation or group of nations may well have preferential tariff
arrangements.

Indeed, the EC has maintained high tariffs on

a much smaller range of goods than the United States. 2 5
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Moreover, the EC is the only ma
jor industrialized area
of
the world in which the United
States had a trade surplus in
the early part of the seventies. 26

Much American criticism has also
been leveled at the
EC Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP).
It is claimed that the
CAP is protectionist. Due to the
fluctuations
in agricul-

tural production, this may be true
at times.

There have

been disputes over wheat and chicken
and other products.
However, the basic problem is that since
farmers are a potent political force on both sides of
the Atlantic, in years
of surplus there are clashes over markets.
Admittedly,
this

is a problem for which there are relatively
few short-term

solutions.

But over the long-term, with a decline in the

world surplus of food, there should be sufficient
markets
for farmers on both sides of the Atlantic.

American complaints about preferential agreements by
the EC with third world countries also appears exaggerated.

Despite the agreements with ex-colonies in Africa, American
exports to these countries rose by 158^ between 1958 and
1971. 2 ?

More serious are American charges that the EC's

Mediterranean policy is preferential.

The arrangement of

preferential terms for each others' exports by both the EC
and the Mediterranean countries (including Greece, Turkey,

Morocco, Spain, Malta, and Israel) does violate the precepts of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
In response to American charges, the EC announced in May,
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1973 that the policy of see k in
g reverse preferences with
the
EC's trading partners
(particularly the Mediterranean
countries) would be abandoned. 28
It was not to be expected
that issues affecting
various
powerful economic groups on
either side of the Atlantic
would be resolved easily.
In 80rne respects> a8
of the CAP. no real solution
is readily available
except to
wait for long-term trends to
reduce the often excessive
surpluses of the fanners. In the
area of bilateral

^

^^

preferential
arrangements, the EC did violate the
spirit and intent of the
GATT but. as mentioned, this
policy has been abandoned. In
summary, clash and compromise are
unavoidable, particularly
when there are economic problems
between the EC and
the

United States.

What is deplorable is the manner in
which
negotiations were conducted by Nixon's
Secretary of
the

Treasury John Connally and the way in which
he dealt with
the monetary crisis of 1971
The Monetary Crisis of 1971
One manifestation of America's relative economic decline, exacerbated by the inflationary effects of the war in

Vietnam, was an increasingly adverse balance of payments.

By 1970 this concern reached a high point.

Europeans seemed

more prone to debate the matter while patience at the White
House ebbed.
In August, 1971 Nixon ended the convertibility of the

8?

dollar into gold and furthermore
imposed unilateral restrictions on foreign imports into the
United
States.

By
this unilateral move, with no prior
consultation or warning,

America virtually abolished the international
monetary arrangements that had existed since the Bretton
Woods

Agree-

ment at the end of World War II.

bitter and hostile.

Europe's reaction was

This is not to say that there did not

exist in Europe some, even considerable, sympathy
for America's financial problems. What alarmed Europeans
were the

unilateral measures and shock tactics by which the Americans
chose to correct their difficulties.

Kissinger was not un-

aware of the dangers of this course of action as he writes

in White House Years, "The other industrial nations resented

being pressured into adoptions of their economic policies
even though they knew very well that without pressure they

would almost surely not have acted at all.

Many were

shocked by the new American assertiveness.

We would have

to tread a narrow path between maintaining enough pressure
to provide an incentive for the adjustments we were seeking,

and evoking a trade war as well as jeopardizing political

relationships built up over decades.

I

sought to make my

contribution in finding that balance". 2 ^

Given the administration's preoccupation with adversary relations, Europeans had begun to feel a certain unease about just what direction American policy would take.

Europeans were already nervous after the Rome meeting of
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finance ministers in the Fall of
1971.

Connally, in a none

too subtle manner, sought trade
concessions and parity re-

alignments from the Europeans.

The Europeans lacked the

requisite authority but Connally dismissed
their pleas as
mere evasions. Connally was representative
of the aggressive nationalism that many Americans thought
was necessary
in order to safeguard their interests when
dealing with
foreigners.

Of equal concern to Europeans was the relationship
between Connally and Nixon.

represent Nixon's feelings?

Did Connally' s aggressiveness

Were Connally and Nixon pre-

paring to weaken opposition at home at the expense of international cooperation?
The Smithsonian Agreements (1973)

-

conducted under the

aegis of Connally' s successor, George Schultz

-

provided for

more flexible exchange rates among the major currencies.

Due to vast structural changes in the world economy
rency movements, energy, the Eurodollars

-

-

cur-

the industrial

countries realized that a return to the fixed parities of

Bretton Woods was no longer feasible.
It is difficult to fix the precise degree of blame for

American actions at this time.

Kissinger was almost exclu-

sively absorbed in the Vietnam negotiations.

He had limited

interest in economics, and as foreign policy was increasingly centralized under the direction of Nixon and Kissinger, when Kissinger was made Secretary of State, he
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consented to the transfer
of the economic function
fro, his
office.30 But wag there

^

^ a ^^^^^

in Connally's, Nixon's,
and Kissinger's
perspectives with
regard to their policies
toward Europe? Connally
was a more
extreme nationalist than Nixon
or Kissinger. Yet Kissinger
- while often sympathetic to
the European viewpoint often
found himself seriously at
odds with European policies.

Professor Max Mark has written
"there is little to suggest
that relations between Western
Europe and the United States
will ever revert to that intimacy
which existed in the immediate post-World War II period. "31

It is not surprising

that this level of intimacy is
unobtainable in the decade
of the seventies but must one go to
the extreme of aggressive nationalism (as did Connally)
and the politics of

maneuver and secrecy which always seemed to
be facets of
the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy?
Energy and Raw Materials
While relations between the United States and the EC
were becoming increasingly acrimonious due to a number of
serious economic and political problems, a further blow was

delivered to trans -Atlantic harmony.

The outbreak of the

October war in the Middle East in 1973, the oil embargo,
and subsequent quadrupling of the price of oil became sub-

jects of controversy between the United States and the EC.

The administration, satisfied with the apparently successful

90

disengagement of the United States
from Vietnam, was surprised by and unprepared for
the resumption of conflict
in
the Middle East and the
subsequent oil crisis. It must
be
recognized that the failure to
foresee and prevent
the

emergence of a situation in which
the United States and its
allies would be held hostage to
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting States (OPEC)
constitutes a major failure of
American statesmanship.

Unfortunately, the energy issue affected
every facet of
trans-Atlantic relationships. The EC was
dealt a heavy blow
and the subsequent disparities between
the members of the EC
will make the monetary and economic union
of the EC by 1980
problematical at best. 32 As Robert
Lieber has written
M

it is essential that American policies
be based in (sic)

the recognition that the European Community has
not done

harm to fundamental U*S. interests.

To this end, it makes

sense for the U.S. to encourage further progress toward

European unity, even when this may create short-term costs
for individual American sectors. M 33

Some commentators have indicated that Nixon and Kissinger may well have encouraged OPEC, prior to the October
war, to increase its price for oil in the belief that this

would further weaken competition from Europe and Japan as
the United States is better situated to provide its own

energy supplies. 3^

While Nixon and Kissinger undoubtedly

regretted the quadrupling of the price of oil in 1973, it
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appears that the general problem
of oil prices really did
not concern them until the
October war. Their diplomatic
priorities, quite simply, lay
elsewhere. And it must be
remembered that the advent of the
October war and the

sub-

sequent oil crisis w a s entirely
unexpected by everyone.
The energy crisis w as an unmitigated
disaster for the
Atlantic nations. The disagreements
between the United
States and Europe on how to handle
the crisis were exceeded
only by the acrimonious public
exchanges between Kissinger
and the French foreign minister Michel
Jobert on how to
organize Kissinger's proposed International
Energy Agency
(IEA).35 once again Nixon and Kissinger
displayed their
talent for abrupt diplomacy that seemed more
assured of

seeking confrontation than cooperation.

Once again, during and after the October war, the
allies were treated in a manner reminiscent of the "Connally

method."

Kissinger has written that "the test of a States-

man, then, is his ability to recognize the real relationship

of forces and to make this knowledge serve his ends."^^
However, Kissinger's actions in this period diverged from
his views on statesmanship.

Why the less than circumspect

public confrontations with the French foreign minister?

Did Kissinger really think that such tactics would promote

French appreciation of the need for the IEA?

That such

tactics would encourage the French to sympathize with American foreign policy in the Middle East?

This seems hardly
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likely to be the case.

Kissinger demonstrated that he
could do no better than
preceding administrations in dealing
with the French. Had
he forgotten his numerous
criticisms of past American
policy
in dealing with the French?
Kissinger and others have
criticized the French for their lack
of a real commitment
to European unity.
Such policies as Kissinger's,
however,

confirmed to many in France that they
should seek a more independent role for France and, by
implication, the EC.
The most serious charge against Kissinger,
however, is
that, with his excessive concern for
the withdrawal of
American military power from Vietnam and the
attainment of
some stability in I n do-China, the development
of serious

problems elsewhere could have been given greater
consideration than was the case. Kissinger should have
realized the
great peril to Western Europe, Japan, and the global economy

if a Fourth Arab-Israeli war was accompanied by a subsequent
oil embargo.

Apparently the potentially disastrous effects

of an oil embargo upon the allies received little or no

attention at the White House. 37

y e t, how could Kissinger

have failed to realize the extraordinary vulnerability of

both the allies and Japan to an oil embargo or precipitous
price increases?

How could he have misunderstood the "real

relationship of forces" and mishandled a crisis that
threatened gravely to damage a quarter-century of American
efforts to encourage the reconstruction and development of
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the political and economic
systems of Western Europe
and
Japan? The American failure
to anticipate the
energy crisis
is an understandable but
major failure of statesmanship
whose consequences were of
the most serious order.
However, what was so regrettable
were Kissinger's often needlessly abrupt actions during
this crisis. As a scholar.
Kissinger wrote that "the closest
cooperation between North
America - indeed the entire Western
Hemisphere - and Europe
is essential" and to be encouraged
by the United States.
In his conduct, in his obvious
annoyance at the fledgling
EC. Kissinger showed that in the
energy crisis of 1973, he
was not inclined to be particularly
charitable towards

^

America's oldest allies.
The United States and the EC

Francois Duch£ne has written that "the EC must try to
domesticate relations between states and it must be a

force

for the diffusion of civilian and democratic standards,
or it

will be more or less the victim of power politics run by

greater military and more cohesive powers than itself.
The EC is an experiment of singular importance in the con-

temporary world.

Obviously such an experiment has its nega-

tive aspects but the importance of the EC does not simply

pertain to the present period.

Indeed "Europeans are prob-

ing ways in which mature nation-states can slowly submerge
elements of sovereignty in order to cope with new problems

without losing the cultural values
or identity of old civilizations."^ Kissinger has constantly
written of the need
to "build a new community of
people on both sides of
the

Atlantic" and for the West to show
the way towards the development of new forms of political
cooperation that transcend the limitations of the
nation-state.^1
The attitude of the Nixon-Kissinger
administration
toward the EC was distinctly negative.
Stanley Hoffmann
writes "The Nixon-Kissinger dealings with
allies, until and
including 1974. deprived them of confidence
and leeway.
The European Economic Community has not
recovered from the
joint shocks of the oil crisis and of American
haughtiness,

including Washington's unwillingness to let the Europeans
play a diplomatic role in the Middle East or Cyprus, its

decision to preempt the common energy policy and to be the
chief strategist for the industrial powers at North-South

meetings."^ 2

The problem of European subordination to

American short-term interests is mentioned by the London

Economist

i

"But the biggest question is whether the will

really exists in Europe that there should continue to be
the sort of a Community that Mr. Kissinger is talking
about. "^3

in an alliance of democratic states

-

when the

Euro-American relationship is changing from tutelage to
partnership

-

public opinion and political leaders in

Western Europe will eventually question the necessity of
supporting an alliance that they think inadequately
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reflects their own perceptions and
interests.

Earlier American Presidents
State Department

-

-

with the support of the

had consistently, if not
successfully,

worked to help the EC achieve its full
potential.

It is

difficult to say that Kissinger continued
this policy.
The
attitude of the administration towards
Atlantic institutions
was often ambiguous or even hostile.
In November, 1972 the
American Ambassador to the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) resigned because of
policy disagreements.

In terms of economic relationships, the OECD

would have been a very useful forum for consultation!
however, for a year and a half, no new American Ambassador
was

named to the post in order to ensure that the Europeans

understood Nixon's basically negative attitude towards the
organization.

When an ambassador was named, he turned out

to be an obscure protege of Barry Goldwater's.

Questions could also be raised with respect to NATO
and other institutions.

The American Permanent Representa-

tive resigned because of inadequate support in mid-1971 and
yet, for nine months, this vital post remained unfilled.

When it was filled, the NATO Representative was often poorly
briefed (Rumsfeld) or discussed rather irrelevant issues
(Kennedy).

Hoffmann again writes "Kissinger's style (and

the style of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Connally) either undermined

established institutions (such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)), whose director was sacrificed to Washington's
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displeasure and whose role was affected
by the demise of
the fixed-rate system) or ignored
or even interfered with
their attempts (weak enough) at
coalescing, whenever we
deemed it dangerous (as in the case of
the United Nations
or the EEC)".^ American foreign
policy was basically too
secretive and bilateral, there was too little
consultation
and actions were often taken abruptly.
Given the administration's attitude towards the OECD and the EC,
many Europeans were concerned about American support for the
cause
of European unity. *5
It was not only the prolonged effort to withdraw
from

Vietnam but also the administration's excessive concern for
its adversaries that caused difficulties in the Alliance.

As Andrew Pierre has noted "we should remember that the web

of contemporary international politics is such that the more
we negotiate with the East, the better we must structure our

relations within the West." * 6
2

Kissinger ignored this as-

sessment of the international situation, this was a major
cause for the administration's debacles in Alliance policy.

Previous administrations had sponsored meetings between
top officials, including the President, and members of the

EC's Commission.

Other contacts subsequently developed, for

example, the semi-annual meetings between the United States

Deputy Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs and the

European Commissioner in charge of foreign affairs and trade
policy.

Kissinger was indifferent to these contacts.

He
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preferred to pressure the Council
of Ministers to be receptive to American positions and
to play
a role that consti-

tutionally and procedurally it could
not undertake. When
Nixon was to travel to Europe in
the first months of 1969,
only very grudgingly was the Commission
invited to an audience with him at his hotel. The
Commission headquarters
were five minutes from Nixon's hotel but
he refused
to go

there (ostensibly to avoid offending the
French).

Thus

from Nixon's initial months in office it
was quite clear
that there would be little sympathy for or
understanding of
the necessity to encourage the development of
the EC. With

respect to its policies in the circumstances of the early
seventies, Nixon and Kissinger apparently were unwilling to

regard the EC as anything more than an obstacle in the pursuit of American short-term interests.

J. Robert Schaetzel

has stated that "both Kissinger's speech and the 1973

Foreign Policy Report of the President stated the traditional litany of support for European unity in the past

tense while the references to the present and the future

stressed the EC's increasingly regional economic policies."^

Can there be any question but that the Nixon-Kissinger
foreign policy with respect to the EC was to subordinate
the contemporary and potential usefulness of the EC to the

immediate interests of the United States.
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Summary
It is obvious that Nixon and
Kissinger had, at best,
limited concern for the EC. As
J. Robert Schaetzel
states
"the planning for the President's
European Trip (Fall 1973)
showed the administration's ambiguous
attitude toward the

collective European institutions.

Brussels was added to

the President's provisional itinerary
only

visit to Washington.

*t±„ j^r***^

While a meeting with the NATO Council

was contemplated, the White House
refused to make any specific commitment about what European
community body or
bodies the President would meet with.' ,Zf8
It is clear that the Nixon-Kissinger
administration

would both symbolically and practically render
only very

grudging support to the EC.

The administration made little

or no effort to attempt to influence the bureaucracies'
traditional belligerency towards the EC.

All too often

were the EC or its representatives bypassed, embarrassed or
even humiliated by the administration's tactics.

The Europeans must bear part of the blame for this
state of affairs.

Concurrently with the American involve-

ment in Vietnam, they became increasingly preoccupied with
the construction of Europe, as was to be expected.

An ex-

periment of this kind involving a number of sovereign states
will, of necessity, demand a major share of the time and

energy of the participants.

Is it expecting too much of
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American statesmen that during
this crucial transitional
Phase they should realize the
reasons for Europe's turning
inward?
At the beginning of his
administration Nixon reportedly
had some degree of enthusiasm
for the EC. * Kissinger has
constantly written of the necessity
of a politically unified
Europe in helping to solve regional
and global problems
1

which cannot be solved by the United
States alone. He has
also written of the necessity to
encourage "new centers of
initiative" in world politics.
It is apparent that the EC is increasingly
identified

with Europe.

Francois Duchesne has found signs of progress

in the EC in the economic and political
areas.

The economic

behavior of the EC after the Crisis of 1973 was
impressive
as most countries switched resources into exports
and

dampened inflation.

Also, politically, there has been in-

creased consultation between the Nine with respect to the

European Security Conference and the talks on Mutual Force
Reductions. ^°
Al astair Buchan stresses the "linkage between achiev-

ing greater efficiency in NATO by rationalizing procurement
and the need for parallel progress on a common industrial

policy within the EC. "51

Abrupt power plays and excessive

unilateral initiatives can shatter or badly erode the still
fragile structures of a politically fragmented Europe that
is attempting to overcome the divisions of the past and to
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demonstrate in the future
the manner in which
sovereign
states can both cooperate
to solve common
problems and still
retain their individual
identies.
It is unfortunate that
Nixon and Kissinger put so
high a priority upon
America's
short-te™ interests with respect
to the Europeans.
What is
more difficult to understand
is how a scholar with
a comprehensive philosophy of history
should have failed to
aid (if

only symbolically) the
Europeans in a most critical
period
of transition in the construction
of a United Europe.

The problems pertaining to
Europe's (and Japan's) economic security will now be of
greater importance. Well before the October war tensions in
the Middle East were rising
with the price of oil. If Nixon and
Kissinger had not been
so completely preoccupied with
extracting the United States
from Vietnam, would a major diplomatic
effort have
averted

the outbreak of the October war. the
use of the oil weapon,
and the subsequent quadrupling of the price
of oil? Richard

Cooper points out that "the sharp rise in oil prices
will

necessitate

-

for some countries

-

changes in the structure

of their national economies and this - as one side effect
will further postpone European monetary unification."^ 2

-

Now

the goal of economic and monetary unification by 1980 ap-

pears to have suffered a setback.

Unfortunately, the margins

in which the unification of Europe can occur has been narrowed, for now the Europeans are more dependent for their

economic security upon OPEC and Washington. 53

101

From 1971 to 1975 Nixon's
and Kissinger's policies
toward the EC w ere characterized
by abrupt, unilateral

moves.

During the preceding two years
and from 1975-76 the admi
nistration tried to be more cooperative.
Yet the lack of a
consistent, coherent policy indicates
the lack of a consensus regarding the EC. Policy
towards the Soviet Uni on
and China was consistent and often
brilliantly innovative.
The difference between the administrations
views and policies toward the EC is striking.
Moreover, Kissinger's
claims that the United States had to act
alone or nothing
could be done lacks credibility.
Occasionally this might be
a correct assessment but between the extremes
of abrupt,

unilateral action and doing nothing there exists
a considerable range of alternatives.

It is not at all apparent that

Nixon and Kissinger carefully examined all the available

possibilities before initiating their policies.
In an alliance of democratic states consideration of

public opinion and democratic institutions is of critical
importance.

transition

This is even more the case during a period of
-

from tutelage to partnership

-

between the

United States and Western Europe (and Japan).

The public

must be involved in (through democratic institutions) and
understand (the educational aspect of leadership) the policies of their governments.

The West European governments

are not without blame yet Nixon and Kissinger did very little of a constructive nature in this area.

Instead - for
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»ost of the time - their
policies of abrupt maneuvers>
uni _
lateral moves, and excessively
assertive national
toward
the EC confused and angered
both Americans and West
Europeans.
In an age characterized
by conflicting tendencies

and
trends, it nevertheless should
be a paramount objective
of
United States policy to educate
its citizens (and the
members
of the EC must do the same)
as to the necessity of
supporting the EC for its successful
i
development is a vital concern of American foreign policy.
However, in terms of democratic leadership, educating and
involving the public concerning the EC. Nixon's and Kissinger's
legacy is distinctly
negative. Yet in 1964 Henry Kissinger
wrote that for the
West "its challenge now is whether it
can move from the

nation-state to a larger community and draw
from this effort
the strength for another period of innovation. " 5>*
The con-

temporary problems facing the people on both sides
of the
Atlantic cannot obscure this fundamental challenge.
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CHAPTER
BILATERAL RELATIONS

v

WEST GERMANY

i

Introduction

Bilateral relations with

+*,

maJ ° r Eur °Pean
states are
an important aspect
of America's
*i
a 5 relat
r.l
w P with
^nshi
Europe.
g
Early proponents of
multilateral institutions
institute
such as NATO
,
and in particular,
ana,
the E
vr v, ^
PlaCed to ° ™oh
'
°
emphasis on
the eventual demise
of
nation . state>
the sixties ana
seventies nationalism
has revived in Europe
'
*» origins of this development are not
si mply dUe to EUch
excesses as occurred in
Prance under de Gaulle.
rhis is not
to deny the effects
of the Gaullist movement,
hut the revival of nationalism in
Europe occurred hoth
because of the
"reemergence of the past" and
hecause in the sixties
the
memory of World War II f
ade d with the success
of post-war
reconstruction and the development
of the welfare state.
Furthermore, these developments
coincided with and were
stimulated by the rise of
nationalism in areas that had
been under colonial rule.

m

i

o

m

-,

^

Consequently. American foreign
policy has to deal with
both Europe's multilateral
institutions and bilaterally with
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-rope's

:7'

raaj or

tus

M

minor Btates

wm

-

.

Qiven

^
M zi
^

*
of Patience
standing on both sides
that has not
lox alwavs
always been
h
present. 1
ix always was - and «?tm
still remains - Very
doubtm th&t
major European states,
with a long
^
lomr history
M
of
diplomatic
act ivity , win transfer
or merge their sovereign
identities
with collective institutions.
In the foreseeable
future
Europe's major states are
likelv to retain
iiKely
*
considerable room
for diplomatic maneuver.
•

.

On the American side
a complicating factor for
foreign
policy makers has been the
post-Vietnam assertiveness of
Congress.
Not only did the Vietnam
catastrophe undermine
America's claim to moral and
political leadership but

it
also weakened confidence in
the executive branch.
With
respect to United States-West
European relations, many Europeans are worried about the
direction and consistency of

American foreign policy.

Raymond Aron has mentioned that

Europeans tend to be very skeptical
and wary of an enhanced
foreign policy role for the American
2
Congress.

But as

neither the executive branch nor the Congress
is infallible,
someway must be found for both to support
an appropriate and
consistent foreign policy.

For any post-Nixon administration

this will be an extremely delicate and difficult
task.

Finally, the seemingly intractable nature of many current problems will exhaust patience and understanding on

both sides.

For many problems such as inflation, energy,
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^

America's enormous
trade deficits, the
Soviet arms
and re S tl essness
bsness ln
in E
+
Eastern
Eurot)P
pe

answers.

However
ever

»

Inn*- +
-Long-term

hr0Ugh C ° nSUltati0n

^"-up.

ther © are no immediatp
'eaiate
solutions t0 „some
m ay be founri
»

—-

3

WeTtern
out consultation
and cooperation
m ust be sustained,
cannot be predicated
upon momentary
impulses. Can the
nations of the North
ions,

^^^^

cooperation needed to solve
problems that transcend
the
capabilities of any single
state? What were the
policies
of the Nixon-Kissinger
administration with respect
to the
major European states?
The next three chapters
win deal
*-th American foreign
policy towards West
Germany. France,
and Britain.

The

Gpp^

P r ^KT_rm

Since at least 1871 the
"German problem" has been
at the
center of European politics.
When the long quest of the
German people to attain national
unity
was successful in 1871.

this raised the question as
to the role a unified
German
state would play in Europe.3
The successes of Bismarck's

policies secured a place for Germany
in the concert of European powers. But Kissinger wrote of
Bismarck that all the
things he had warned or fought
against occurred anyway, no
alliance with France was possible after
18?1, Germany was
increasingly tied to Austria, and it was
difficult to specifically determine Germany's national interest.'*

Ill

Kissinger goes on to sav th,+ r
° say th at Germany's
Q +~c+
neatest
^ s P-rv>
modern
tragedy.

J

->

Thus, in an age when
self-determination and
national
unity are the driving
forces of mankind,
are the Germans to
be denied the fulfills
of their historic
drive for national unity? Two world
wars have not answered
this question.
But thirty-five years
after the defeat and
collapse
of Germany the remnants
of the Reich have
attained considerable importance in the
world.
The German Democratic
Republic (GDR) is the seventeenth
ranking industrial power
in the world and the largest
trading partner of its
ostensible occupier, the Soviet
Union. « West Germany is
economically the strongest country in
Western Europe and is trying to define a political
role commensurate with its
economic power.

The German problem thus presents
itself anew, what
role and place shall the successor
states of imperial Germany have in Europe? Both German states,
in particular West
Germany, are engaged in the process of
redefining their

place in Europe.

This will not be an easy task.

post-war era has ended.

But the

New political alignments are oc-

curring as states wax and wane.

Britain, in an unparalleled

manner, has gone from a great to a medium power in only
a

quarter of a century.

France, particularly under de Gaulle,

seems determined to be once again in the front ranks of

-
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nations.
Thus, shorn of the
excesses of «,

- «- «.

r

T,Z\""

-

.
factor to contend
Can the Western
allies - with +K w
6 Ea8t Eur °Peans
and
the
^ne Kussians - hp
suffxclently xmaginative
to devise structurea that will s»-H=f,, +u „
satisfy the Germans
in their quest for

wi+h?
with?

p

,

^est for national unity
must

be conducted

in such a way as
to arouse their
neighbors- fear and
apprehension, Kis-

singer wrote "it is
against all probability
that a large
and dynamic oountry
can he kept divided
indefinitely in the
center of the continent
that gave the concept
of nationalism
°
M
to the world.

During Kissinger's tenure
in office disagreements
occurred between the United
States

and West Germany regarding

several areas,

West Germany and the EC,
the offset costs
issue, energy and African
troops in Europe. Concerning
the
EC excessive American
pressures upon the West Germans
to
serve as advocates for American
policies often placed Bonn
in a difficult position. The
offset costs issue, energy,
and American troops in Europe
were further complicated by
economic and political disagreements.
Other problems caus-

ing tension between the two
countries are the United StatesWest German main battle tank, the
shipment of NATO war material from West German bases to aid
Israel, the American
pressure upon West Germany to stimulate
its economy, and the
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West Gerra an-B ra2 ilian
nuclear reactor
treaty
Am
Amencans and
West Germans have
had df
disagreements in the
past but in a
of rapid change> when
neoessity compeie
sagreements may cause m
aj or di ff iculties
in the fu ture.
i. within this
context that the
scholarly writings
^sequent policies of Henry
Kissinger should he
of considerable interest.

^

»

^

Kissinger did almost axj.
all of
hi* writing
w.u;
01 his
on Germany during the late fifties
and eariy
early sixties.
sixtio*
n
During
this period
the Berlin crisis and
other aspects of the
German problem
were of central concern
to American
policymakers. However
from the late sixties on
American policymakers have,

through
a combination of inertia
and neglect, set the
stage for po-

tentially serious disputes
with the European allies. 9
The
state of America's relations
with its European allies
is
still central to the power
and position of the United
States
in a multipolar world.
Neither America nor Europe,
standing alone, can master the
successive challenges of the
last
quarter of the 20th century without
sustained and consistent

consultation and cooperation.

And of the foremost importance

is the relationship between the
United States and West Ger-

many.

Kissinger has written that "Germany
has held the key to
the stability of Europe for at least
three centuries." 10

During the period prior to 1871 when Germany
was weak and
disunited, the other powers sought to
perpetuate its

Ilk

divisions and prevent it
+•
5+ from
fw™ attaining
national unity while
ensuring that no single
gie power
Dow^r gained*
preponderance in Central Europe.
•

•

Germany's history mus t De
understood against this
hackled Germany, after
1871. to identify security
with BUffi _
cient strength to defend
itself simultaneously
against all
of its neighbors. However,
this effort required
mobilization
of resources and cultivation
of nationalism on such
a scale
that Germany's neighbors
feared for their security.
But
since Germany was situated in
the heart of Europe. Bismarck
spoke of "the nightmare of hostile
coalitions." However,
twice in the 20th century, the
peace of Europe was shattered
by a unified Germany. Kissinger
writes that "it was Germany's tragedy that the effort to
prevent these coalitions

made them inevitable.

"H

Thus "Germany has been either too

weak or too powerful for the peace of
Europe.""

ln

other

words, Germany should be able to defend
itself but not to
attack.
It should be united, so that its frustrations
do
not erupt into conflict and its divisions do not
tempt

other countries.

Nationalism should be more mature, not

jingoistic.

Kissinger is very perceptive when he writes of the
psychological problems facing the Germans.

Every German

over fifty years of age has lived through three revolutions.
Four regimes have existed in this period and each has
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claimed to be morally
antithetical to
00 lts
its Predecessor.
orprt
In
addition, Germany has
lost two world
xa Wars
wars and
a n*
experienced
the consequences of
two terrible inflation*
M
j-niiations.
Moreover,
not
only the older generation
feneration has suffered
*~
serious trauma. Each
German over thirtv-five
y nve has wi+„
witnessed the horrors
of the
Nazi period, World War
II,

^

the

^

snhsm

lapse of the oountry.

Kissinger writes that
"the Nazi experience has been so completely
suppressed or

sublimated
into a vague feeling of
generalized guilt that it is
no
longer a problem as such."13
But „ the rootlessness
prQ _
duced by blotting out twelve
years of history is relevant. -W
Thus, while great national
prosperity has been achieved,
it
is incongruous with the
loss of national, political,
and
territorial integrity. Consequently
German leadership
groups often suffer from a lack
of inner assurance, which
is often expressed in vociferous
and legalistic disputes.
How then could a divided and
rootless country, viewed
with suspicion and fear, avoid
the excesses of either nationalism or neutralism and yet become
a member of the
Community of nations? It was West
Germany's great post-war

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who understood
the psychological
needs of his countrymen. Adenauer
attempted
to reintroduce

West Germany into the Community of nations,
to give the
Federal Republic a stake in something larger
than

itself.

He sought to teach his people habits of
self-reliance in

international politics.

West Germany, exposed geographically
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and psychologically and
politically vulnerable,
could not,
by itself, pursue an active
and vigorous foreign
policy.
Adenauer sought to submerge narrow
West German interests in a wider community.
Of great importance to him
were
the close ties with the United
States and membership in the
EC.
Of equally great importance was
the Franco-German

Treaty of January, 1963.

For the first time in centuries,

Germany had a friend in the West.

This was a notable diplo-

matic achievement.

But perhaps Adenauer's greatest
achievement was to convey the impression
that "conditions in
the

Federal Republic were as firm and stable
as his own policy. "15 But when the Berlin crisis
transpired, including
the erection of the Berlin wall, it
marked a crucial watershed in the Western Alliance for never
before had the
emer-

gence of serious differences among the allies
been such a
real possibility.^ The allies and West Germany
would have
to agree on new policies (such as detente),
and simultane-

ously ensure the security of West Berlin and West
Germany.
But if new policies are not agreed upon, the possibility
of
a serious breach between the allies and West Germany cannot

be ruled out.
The Future of Germany

In both The Necessity for Choice (1961) and The
Troubled Partner ghi, a (1965) Kissinger wrote at length on the

"

—

"

*« * * ~

^
apm ^ ^

very critical of
can policy towards
Germany both during
and after the
crisis. The Kennedy
administration

Araeri .

^

negotiate with the Soviet
Union and
concessions
»any on both sides of
the Atlantic sought
stability in the
tion of the drive for
national unitv
tween Washington and Bonn.

t««5n„.,
tensions appeared be-

An additional complicating
factor was the emergent
Franoo-Amerioan rivalry. With

I

the signing of the Franco-

German Treaty of Collaboration
on January M, 1963,
tne
United States began an intensive
process of wooing West
Germany. This was one motive
behind the Multilateral
Force
(M1F) proposal that was to
be such a bone of contention
among the allies. To prevent
Franco-German nuclear cooperation, an agreement was signed
between the United States
and West Germany on November
14, 1964 that "in effect made
the German armed forces
dependent on the United States
for
their military equipment. "1?
Kissinger was highly critical
of these arrangements and of American
fears that the Franco-

German rapprochment would lead to
a new power grouping, a
"condition inherently impossible of
fulfillment." 18
Furthermore, "American pressure and high-handed
Franch
actions have placed the Federal Republic in
an extremely

uncomfortable position. "19

Consequently West Germany runs

a serious risk of being isolated.

Moreover, "the frequent
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changes in American
policy
P xicy on «*rv,+
strategic doctrine,
nucl.
-ear
control and the emphasis
to be
"e given to v
various partners
must radicalize German
political
xixical life,
lif« whatever
+
p
the merit
of individual United
States positions. "20
.

«

^

^

Germany occupies a kev
Key pi
olano
a c e in +w
the Western Alliance
Because of its seopcrtitiea!
position, Prench
abruptness
American short-sightedness
should he avoided.
The danger i,
that Germany will become
ahsorhed in its own
unfulfilled
national aspirations while
it realizes the advantages
conferred upon it by its growing
power and central

^

location.

Kissinger also warns of the
17 million Germans under
Soviet
control and expresses concern
that in the competition
between the two German states.
West Germany's internal
structure may not be equal to
the strain placed upon it.
He is also worried about
the development of a
potential
conflict between the Federal
Republic and its allies over
the division of Germany.
Three factors are involved.
(1)

NATO seeks to maintain the
status quo. y e t one of the most
important members seeks a change in
the status quo, (2) none
of the NATO allies places a very
high priority upon German
reunification, (3) Germany's past has
left a legacy of mistrust that will create future obstacles.
Both the FrancoAmerican rivalry and a relaxation of
East-West tensions add
to the difficulties.
Thus German leaders are often ambivalent about detente. If progress on the
German question is
blocked, the Alliance may soon have to
choose between its

own Policy on German
reunification or
PuoXic Pursue thi8 goal
independently>

«-*

^^

-

not become an obstacle
if Germany is eVer
tQ be
respected member of the

/"*

interna-H™
t
-Lxixernational
community.

Concerning the fate of
the
xne 17
miiii
17 million
people in East
Germany. Kissinger takes
a rather hard line
.
He is aWare
or the complicated
and explosive nature
or this problem,
yet he is against enhanoing
the status of East
Germany
which he refers to as
»a dangerous course."**
Both German
states would compete for
adherents all over the
world, moreover, any hope for future
reunifioation
would be deferred

indefinitely.

Splits may ooour in the
Western Alliance
over humanitarian versus
political concerns. Additionally
the moral cost to the
Soviets of maintaining
their position
in East Germany would be
lessened, and this would
mean that
with the consolidation of
the regime in East Germany
reunification would be on PankoWs
terms.
In fact. Kissinger is
fearful if East Germany behaves
with moderation after it
is
recognized that "it will have
major incentives to

undermine the Federal Republic.

^

seek to

East German nationalism

clashes with the Communist regime,
and this precarious situation may prompt measures to attack
or weaken the Federal
Republic. Thus the end result of West
German concessions
to East Germany could well lead
to an indefinite continuation of two hostile states competing
against each other
rather than progress toward unification.
It is apparent
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-at

K is

ger is

Erhard . Schroeder

little steps" for he
thinks that such
poHcies ^^^^
dangerous results. "21*

A common German policv n-r +>,„ w
P
y ° f the Western Allies
is essen.
,
t
A
tial not only t0
retain Geraiany

^

a

wiuing

^
^

^

manent division of Germany
into hostile. competing
states
is mherently dangerous.
can
alleviate this highly
dangerous situation?
Kissinger envisages that
a number of po l icies
„„
available to the Western
powers. Most importantly,
the West
must show concern for and
understanding of the anguish
of a
divided country. Thus German
reunification must be a central common concern of
the allies.
The Federal

^

^

^ ^

Republic
should not be urged into
bilateral dealings with
the East.
The allies in turn must
adopt a concrete program
that envisages specific steps. The
issue of German unification
cannot simply become an exercise
in rhetoric.

Two areas of great concern
to the allies are strategy
toward East Germany and the
problem of Germany's frontiers.
Should the Western powers seek
to increase contacts with
East Germany or should they isolate
it? Kissinger recommends the latter course for this
"seems the most promising
and the one most consistent with
a long-term policy on
German unification. "25 But the
alIle8
West Gernmy
agree on the policy towards Eastern
Europe. Kissinger in

^

^
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fact argues that a More
active Wcot German policy
would help
to isolate the GDR and
promote its demoralization.
Thus to
meliorate the Hallstein Doctrine
and to lessen the East
Europeans- support for Soviet
and East German pressures
against Berlin, a more active
diplomacy by the Federal Republic in Eastern Europe would
perhaps be conducive
to a

final long-term settlement.

But as specific plans for
Ger-

man unification become necessary,
they should not move
closer to the Soviet position as
succeeding Western plans
have done.
The second area of concern is the
Oder-Neisse line.
To Kissinger this is one of the human
tragedies of our

time, and the reluctance of the Federal
Republic to re-

nounce these territories is understandable.

However, until

this was done through Brandt's _Os±politik
the failure of
f
Bonn to renounce its claims to this area means
that the

Soviets were provided with a convenient excuse for
maintaining their hold on East Germany.

Consequently Soviet

hegemony and control of Eastern Europe is also reinforced.
Thus while it was not clear at precisely what point

Bonn would have to renounce its claims, still this had to
be done.

For "it is essential to recognize that acceptance

by Germany of its eastern frontiers will have to be part of
any responsible program for unification. 1,26

But Germany's

desire for unification, the East European concern for
security, and Soviet concern that a united Germany will
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threaten its own security
all have to h
be rec °nciled
in anv
«•<
,
,
final Plan for Germany
s future.

-

However. Ki ss in er is
g
w a ry of any
forraula
for -it is improbable
that any ne oti
g
a tin g formula

^

™ost reasonable program.

German unity reside

i

n

Therefore.

+w

_

11

^

6

^

lose their importance,
the
"e ifear
ear of any one state
will diminish.
Thus a united Western
'estern Europe will .
become a magnet
for the countries of
Eastern Europe. Here
Kissinger castigates Franco-America,
rivalry as "the West,
which has so
often been rent by internal
struggles, stands in
danger of
repeating its historic folly. "28
Genn£my

*w„

^

^

^^

a balance wheel for this
will complete the
fragmentation of
the Western Alliance.

To prevent the Federal
Republic from becoming
a menace
to the West, it is vital
to give it a stake in
something

larger than itself.

Two policies are vital
for the future
of the Federal Republic.
(1) recognition of the
psychological and political dilemmas
of a divided country and
(2)
the ability to make the Federal
Republic part of a larger
community.
These "policies are interdependent;
to pursue
one without the other is to
defeat both. "29
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In 1969 new
administrations assume
governmental responsiMlities xn
in w
Washington and in
Bonn.
And fears also

^

M ,,w

^

"*«

—

-gleet its European

es due to its
preoccupation wi th Asia
.
United States was in a ,
•

Nixon Ki
outn as

Pl ° matiC CrlsiS
-

•

AsU

before addressing

with Western Europe.

^

The

—

^^

«th

the end of the
post-war era. monetary,
economic,
-d political problems in the
Atlantic Alliance
became apparent. As Lyndon
Johnson's presidential
term drew to a
close. Americans became
more involved in Vietnam
and Europeans in the construction
of the EC.
This was the period
when "Johnson often put
heavy pressure on the
European allies, i.e.. the Federal
Republic was ordered not
to take up
contacts with Peking or to
enter into further joint
prospects with France for the
development of European
military
equipment. -30 Johnson, by
his impetuous and
indiscriminate
manner, had helped cause the
downfall of Chancellor Ludwig
Erhard when the Chancellor was
invited to Johnson's Texas
ranch in 1 9 6 5 . According to
Lothar Rule "At the end of the

Johnson administration US-European
relations were at an alltime low. .-31 Thus, when the
new administrations took power
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in Washington and
Bonn - desoit* «,
C,
>
i
Czechoslovak

oem

invasion in

u nify in

g effect of the

1 9 68 -

there wer
ere pounds for conwith respect to United
States-West
est 0
Ge ™an relations.
„,.
The erection of
the Berlin
rlln Wall
WaU «„
.

.
in August.
l 9 6l had
teen a catalyst in
Bonn's thinking
"inking.
T + was
It
apparent that
, ,
+
detente
and subsequent
progress
Progress toward
tow
n
German unification
woia be the onl y
acceptahle way to
achieve West Germany's
nation, goals. Dur ing
the sixtieg
a new multipolar
^«-ua.i world
^
wuria, less
i^oo dominated
aTea °y +w
th e superpowers,
began to emerge. The
eastern policies of
de Gaulle an d
American involvement with
Southeast Asia and its
bilateral
.

.

^^^

•

w

^

Brandt's entourage.

It is not surprising,
then, that the
new government in Bonn
decided to venture forth
more boldly
into terrain that
decisively marked West
Germany's emergence
as an important political
power. With the tacit
support of
his allies, Brandt began
a series of overtures
to the East
that were to culminate in
December. 1972 in the signing
of
the Intra-German Accords. 32
In effect East Germany
achieved
diplomatic recognition by the
Western powers while the issue
of Berlin was resolved or
at least greatly clarified
by the

prior Four Power Agreement of
September. 1971. In the space
of a few years, Americans and
West Germans would begin to
develop a new sense of equality. 35
Thus Henry Kissinger was aware
that, backed by their
enormous economic power, the West
Germans were seeking to
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redefine their political
rol e .3^

Ypt
j
Yet as Josef
Joff e writes
Secretary of State Kissinger
was q uick to suspect
»
haste in the West German
initiatives toward
Bast-West detente. "35 But for the
tfest 0eManB

^^^^

are of vital importance.

^

This idea is emphasised
h y West
German Chancellor Helmut
Sctaidt in the London

E^^,

"One of the necessities
of the alliance as well
as for us
Germans is to get along with
the Eastern power.
We don't
want to get back into the
Cold War.
There is nothing to be
gained for the Germans in a
Cold
" ar » oivioed
riiviri^ as our
" War
nation
is, divided as our capital
of Berlin is, nothing to
be
gained from a new Cold War
period.
A return to the Cold War
is still thinkable
I hope it doesn't
occur, but we have
not passed the point of no
return as yet. "36*
i

However, the record of the
Nixon-Kissinger team with
respect to West Germany is not entirely
satisfactory even
though the two countries have always
been aware that each
has needed the other. It is not too
much to say that a
special relationship exists between them.
Both have been
aware of West Germany's exposed position
and while occasional
frictions have been apparent, no really
serious breaches
have occurred. What really worries the West
German leaders
is a certain lack of reliability, of consistency,
that has

emanated from American foreign policy since the Johnson
Ad-

ministration.

As George Ball writes "Kissinger has not con-

sulted with and thus marred European-American relations

+
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since 1969.-37

z .tit*

the united states

-

^

west
*•
tain of Kissinger's
policie8 caused
reparable, differences.
What
wnat alternative
«i ow +
policies could he
have pursued? Havp
hi
™i
a
Have his
policies
sought to p la ce the
relationship between the
United states and West
Germany within a
framework that stresses
mutual consultation and
cooperation
on issues of common
interest? I n this perio<J
Qf
political and social change,
has the relationship
between
the two countries been
further clarified? Have
new principles been articulated that
provide for the security of
West
Germany ye t also seek to
impart a new dimension to
international relations by imparting
a greater concern for
moral
and ethical actions?
•

•

West ftprp^ny nnd

-fr

h g Fg

In January, 1 9 73. the EC welcomed
three new members,
Britain, Ireland, and Denmark.
The Summit meetings in 1 6
9 9
at The Hague and in 1972 at
Paris had endorsed the idea of
enlarging and consolidating the EC.
This, of course,

was
bound to involve the Bonn government
more heavily in Community affairs and as it turned out
also, to provide more
opportunity for friction between the enlarged
Community and
the United States.
I

have previously indicated some of the economic
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problems between thee
United
q+ *
unixea btates
and
vn »
M
a tho
xne EC
Nontariff
barri6rS t0
^^-ationa! trade, agricultural
trade
the
Community's nref
+1 !
preferential
agreements with
Mediterranean ana
European Free Trade
Association (EFTA )
countries all were
sources of controversy.
„ oweVer> eVgn though
^_
Ports to the EC showed
a surplus. »the
United States tried.
-«*». 1973. to induce the
European Colmmity
c e s which would
do the minimum
damage to American
commerce, industrial and agricultural
interests, and the particular zeal of American
officials ln
in attempting
a++ « +
to obtain the
maxxmum support from their
German allies for this
objec,

"

.

e^

^

^

"fcive

^

•

(slc_)."38

West Germany, in accordance
with the decisions
reached
at the two European
summits for the consolidation
of the EC '
was developing new ties
with the Community.

Thus the West
Germans were placed in a very
difficult position by the
American demands. But the
Americans, while willing to
pay
a price for European
integration, often appeared to
be highly
ambiguous about resisting short-term
economic pressures for

more intangible long-term
political benefits. During the
Nixon-Kissinger years this attitude
all too often characterized Washington's policies
towards the EC. West Germany's
membership in the EC imposes upon
American policymakers an
obligation to resist attempts to
take advantage of the special relationship.
One commentator writes "the Administration sought to avoid the partnership
implications of an
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Alliance policy, and
to maintain

Brussels and not
through
xou 5 n tho
the aegis of V/p<?+
west Germany.
But in I971 N v
Kissinger were to
demonstrat on more
aemonstrate
than one occasion «, *
that
America's military +<
•

^

«

^

^

-rcial
erciax and economic
concessions from

*

*

the West Germans.**
On March 8,
1973, Martin Hillenbrand
enorand, th
a
the American
Ambassaf
ftr to
+
bassador
Bonn,' hp?an
u egan v.*
nis~ speech
wi
+h
~
P cn Wlth a remark
_
about the
special nature of the
relationship between
the United St
West Germany
He then ent n t0
dlscu ss some of the
°
djff
differences between the
Unit^n
q+ +
United States
^d Western Europe
that would have to
be resolved
e
in the
th. forthcoming
f« «,
General
Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
a e ^ATT;
GATT ) aand
nH International
t +
Monetary Fund (IMF)
conferences.
ences.
It was
w a apparent
it
that once
3galn
United Stat
*» tempting to influence
West
Germany. Was placing
that
^
,

^

.

.

(

<=

-

^

^

^_

tion not only with reS
p e ot to the two forthcoming
conferences but also regarding
the EC, which has
a considerable
interest in these issues.

Later in the year the October
war and subsequent energy
crisis submerged all other
issues. By 1974 the
Watergate
crisis, Nixon's resignation,
and the
accession of Gerald

Ford to the presidency
also helped in creating
circumstances
which militated against the
continuation of the pressures
brought to bear upon West Germany
by Nixon and Kissinger in
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1973.

But. i, these events
had not corapened

^

cate for African interests,
at what point would
he have
realized that he was traneer^i
ransgreosmg +>,
n between legitithe line
mate influence and
pressures that approached
coercion? Some
pressure and bargaining are
inherent in any al liance
rela .
tionship. But Kissinger's
pressures upon West Germany
in
1973 went beyond bargaining between
two allies. Moreover,
this contradicted his previous
warnings concerning West
Germany's psychological and
political vulnerability. I„
terms
of the relationship between
the two countries, excessive

demands and pressures upon Bonn
that exceeded the normal
boundaries of alliance behavior
are undesirable. More than
once Kissinger was guilty of
transgressing those boundaries.
Moreover, there were no compelling
reasons that justified
this particular course of action.
In Western Europe no one
was probably more sympathetic to
America's plight regarding
its balance of payments, the
involvement in Vietnam, and
America's subsequent economic and political
difficulties
than Bonn. While some of Brandt's
initiatives no doubt irritated Kissinger, there was every reason to
consult and co-

operate with the West Germans.

West Germany had become more

secure psychologically and politically, particularly
as a

result of the OstnolitiV. but West Germany's particular

situation must always be fully considered in any policy.
Michel Tatu writes "improvement of relations with the East

As

c«

—

have favorable
consequences

Reputiic
-

~

^

just

_

*

with that Etate
should prevail over
all
all n+v,
other considerations. "^2
,

The cost of maintaining
troops has
h** long
i
s trooiw
caused difficulties in United
States-West
es West r«™
,
*,
German
relations. Curt
Gasteyger has written
that nhe Qffset
.

^

^^^^^^ ^

German-British payments
sysUm
made multilateral. "'O ay
B v 1077
- v,
this problem
1973 +m„
had reached more
serious proportions
because of the economic
problems besetting the American economy,
since the dollar was
devalued in February, 1
973 , the Americans expected
Bonn to
increase its contribution,
however. Chancellor Schmidt
refused to comply. Pinally
the Amer cans
,
make
the difference.
.

^

^

^

But a more serious American
demand was that Bonn meet
1005? of the cost of the troops
instead of the 8<# as specified in the prior agreement
in 1971-73.
The West Germans
sought some support for a
multilateralization of the offset
Payments. Britain's answer was
negative for the British
considered that they were already
supporting their troops
in West Germany.

Since both the American and West German
budgets were
under serious strain in 1973. it should
occasion no surprise
that bargaining was difficult. The
end result,
however, was

™°re or less
predictable x
">ake most UI
of the
tn e mn
,
concessions

* W ° Uld haVe *»

^^

neW

«
tho
*
the Spring
of 1974 Wa3 t
"id-1975.
When
Vh

dement

signed
lgned in
ln
*°

Press conference in
1976 CChancellor
h,„ ,1
Schmidt, highly
imitat , by
fc
tated
previous controversy on
S SUbj60t
i^icated
'
h» considered
that he
the matter closed
Th
The Payment in Ger-

" — ~ —~
6

I.

"

^"

--

n

be obtained,

SatiSfi6d

m

- -liar
«»

and the

CO

"

the future, however
uwever, this
thi* problem
„ Ki
could
cause even more
difficultv
tv,
ThS Presence °f
American troops
inwWest+rGermany benefits
both the United
States and Astern
Europe. Therefore,
the manner in which
this issue was
handled by Ni xon and
Kissinger was unfortunate.
Gertainly.
the West Germans
resented the pressures
they were subjected
to.
Would it not have been
better to try to achieve
a

»

greater degree of consultation
and cooperation on
such a
vatal matter? Moreover,
the polemics surrounding
this issue were not helpful for
public relations (an
important consideration in an alliance of
democratic states) for they
confirmed the views of many
Americans that the West Germans
(and the West Europeans)
were taking advantage of
American
generosity and were not contributing
enough to defend their
own countries. To the West
Germans American foreign policy
appeared increasingly inconsistent
and nationalistic.
They
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were worried that
America's ability to
work in concert with
and to cooperate with
its allies might
be seriousiy effected. Donatio
pressures and the crisis
in Southeast
Asia added an additional
°nai element „«•
of unpredictability.
Consecuently the economic crisis
afflicting the Western
allies
has shown that problems
such as offset costs,
unless accompanied by great tact and
patience, can seriously
damage
relations among the countries
of the Atlantic Alliance.

Energy

United States-West European
relations were particularly
difficult in 1973. Kissinger's
"Year of Europe" speech in
April had, to many in Europe
and particularly the
French,
threatening aspects.^ The link
between American military
support and the explicit demand
for concessions

on commercial and economic matters was
a matter of serious concern
in Europe. America's pursuit
of detente with the Soviet
Union and China and its activities
in Indo-China were cause
for additional concern.
But, to prepare for Nixon's Fall
visit, the West Germans were
prepared to work with the

other Europeans and reach agreement with
the Americans on a
new "Atlantic Charter."

But events in the Middle East precluded further
efforts
to mend United States-West European relations
in
1973.

The

October war and the subsequent oil embargo and the quadrupling of the price of oil were the occasion for a
severe
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crisis in United
St dues
a tes-\W
West

—fc.

-, h „,

... .

r
German

-

rela-H™„

,„lM .

"
k$

;

PreSS

Covered
the ship ment U1
,
of war Material
m
from w 0 o+ n
Germany and Bonn
asked th
+ U4
.

.

these bases to resupply

I

srar0
ael had been
ignored but, with
.

the proclamation
of the ceasefire,
e
the
xne Bon
Bonn
n government
thought that in vi GVV
of its ti
lth the Ar ^b states
and
, +
it- heavy dcpen(icnce
on
Eastern
.

longer remain silent.

^

'

^^^

^
^ ^^

Both the African
Ambassador to „ egt
Hillenbrand, and Kissinger
Bonn-s dile mma .

I„ response to the

Bom

quest that the ship rae „t
of „ eapo ns cease.
Hillenbrand is
reported to h a ve stated
"that the United St a tes
regarded
Vest Germany's sovereignty
as United, and reserved
the
right to take any action
which it regarded as
right and necessary in the interests of
international security. -*?

Kissinger reportedly agreed
with the substance of these
remarks.'* once again we witness
that Vacillation that
Characterised both Euro-American
relations

and the relation-

ship between the United
States and West Germany. On some
issues Kissinger would consult
and cooperate with the West

135

could not

«*

«

on

o-er?

Kissing

haVe been more

^

shortage upon West

As the economio
reoesEio

-

^
01

C
L

^ b5

^ ^
showed,

effects

Political

pervasive
Pervasive
economic strains can
<
havo
haVe »a «serl0Us
effect on the West
Gpr
mans political order.
Furth
furthermore few West
,
Germans have
f
++
forgotten the trauma of
the illation
inflation and„
recession of the
1920. s *nH
k
^20
and +
the
subsequent enect
effect on the
political system
*
v
Kissinger is well a
aware
are th«t
that ademocracy in
West Germany has
its vulnerabilities.
Whv then did .he
Why
not consider this
fact more fully in his
policies?
-^cies? There were
alternatives.
my.
tt
The Umted States cou
ld have responded
more
regards sharing its energy
resources with the
allies.
The
^st Germans (and tne Europeans)
understood America's dilemma as regards the Middle
East.
Would it not have
been
better to attempt to emist
enlist
p
European sympathy and
cooperation initially while
quietly resolving
disagreements?
Surely consultation and
cooperation (in sharing energy
resources) would have been
a better approach for
resolving
the oil problem that so
suddenly and unexpectedly
confronted
the Western allies.
•

™

h

.

tw

tw

*

^

Perhaps American policymakers
could attempt to anticipate problems and be more
magnanimous. If this does not
occur, a really profound crisis
in United States-West German
relations cannot be ruled out.
Kissinger was not particularly skillful in reassuring the
West Germans about energy
supplies.

He was rather inept in his initial
efforts to
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garner support for the
proposed IEA.
confrontations, in
particular di* „

The
ine «,
,
Kissinger-Jobert

Seem t0 the "est
Germ =n
*
mans,
to v
be a very good way
of
y
securing support.
Nixon's
increasing involved
in the Watergate
crisis his
crisis,
hi, resignation
tion, +h„
the accession of Gerairt p
herald Ford /(who did
not appear to
ccn one his predecessor's
taste for confrontation
politics)
to the presidency,
and the general
improvement
•

•

,

Qf econoraic
conditions lessened the
intensity of the energy
crisis. At
Present, under current
circumstances, the West
German government has little choice
hut to accede to
American pressure.
However, careless and
self-centered actions could
eventually erode the political
and moral claims to
leadership of the United o
States.
taxes,
it i,
c
oan it
be assumed that in
future
circumstances, when competition
for raw materials may
be
-ore intense. West Germany
will always be ready to
compromise its foreign policy
objectives for the benefit
of the
United States?

M

American Troop s in F» rrr

Political actions should never be
interpreted in too
mechanical a manner. The intangible
element can be decisive in determining the success
or failure of policies.
Witness the intangible effects of
Kissinger's policies upon
the West Germans.
The vacillation, confusion,
and self-

centered nature of many of Kissinger's
policies have, to
the West Germans, severely damaged
American political and
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™°ral claims to
leadership.

This 1.S wh

j

-,

American troops

am

k^+v,

3

Gy, " b01

a

new vision

n-r

+u

f America>s

°
•«-**to the defense
of Europe and
the m can<- of
,
f lm Plcmentin
it
T+ is,
f
tx.
K
It
therefore, cause for
concern «.
that members of the
,
American Congress should
year after ,Vear call
y
for larre
unilateral reductions
in the strength
of Am
.

.

,

^rope.

Km

^

In March
1973 s
Senator Mansfield,
who has perennially directed these
resolutions, induced
the Democratic
members of the Senate -t-^ «
to pass overwhelmingly
a resolution
demanding that American
ground troops xn
in Euro*
^ u rope h
„
be reduced
e
J
5<* an eighteen months. 50 „
0Wever the administration
managed to negate the
effect of the resolution.
I„
event, these vacillations
indicated that domestic
support
for American troops in
Europe
urope was
w^ often
B
v.
ambiguous,
that much
of the public and many
members of Congress did
not understand the vital role that
American troops played in
maintaining the balance of power
in Europe.
It was precisely
this lack of consistent
allied support for Germany
in the
1920-s that contributed so much
to the insecurities
leading
to the demise of the
Weimar Republic. Moreover,
with talks
on Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions (MBFR) that
,
began
in Vienna in 1973. it was
important that arms reductions
wo uld be the result of
consultations and not of unilateral
measures.

*
,

.

^

m

«»
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^

However, the
administration
dangers
involved for W PR +
ParWcUl
"
in the unilateral
a ex<u
reduction of n c +tr
°° PS in Eur
°P- The necessity for
a
appr ° ach
un
t00d y
admlniStrati °"
recently pledged to „.
r
crease
America's conventional
capabilities in Europe
.

r™

r

T

-

,

.

* «•

—^

«**

-

-

jr

When a common allied ^+y,„+
strategy ls agreed
upon
mented, the resuits
rpqultQ can v
be impressive.
.
The rncst constructive initiative by
Nixon and Kissinger
in Eur™
,
"S er i"
Europe culminated
the September. 1
971 Four Power Bfirlin
Agreement
for the first time
the Four powers (the
United States, the
Soviet Union, Britain
xnr\ Fr an«)
3
accepted legal obliga'
tions concerning Berlin
n-r
„i„
s erim. 51 0
f almost
equal importance was
the subsequent Intra-German
Treatv
J reaty of n
December, 1972 whereby
political relations between
the two German

^

•

•

^

\

states w ere

normalized.

These two treaties, despite
evident imperfections, represent a major
advance for the peace and
security of Europe. In the
context of America's bilateral
dealings with the Soviet Union
and West Germany's

QsimOiMX,

the allies demonstrated an
impressive capacity
for successfully negotiating
agreements that should lessen
the chances of future conflict
over Berlin and engage both
German states in a more constructive
relationship. Both
Nixon and Kissinger deserve partial
credit for these
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achieves.

Unfortunately from
1Q6?
tive spirit that
marked these
tre

-eas of United States-We
axes west German
However, beginning

i n 197/1 n

«

"

^

^

*

°^

relations.
e1l0W

Movement in United
German relation*
relatlons commenced
and relations continued t
tmued
to improVe .
This do
that Previous t>robi
ms h
been resolved .
Econoraic
„
S+ +
States-West

™

'

^

-

—-1
^

dimcuities

v

tempt
;i: ed to show

P.

e

ious

m

^
heater
^

ntensity

in

presidents Fora

-*

understanding f or West
Cermany.
the jQint
states _ west

But

the future.

In a period of rapidly
increasing oosts for
military
equipment, the lo istio
g
structure of NATO has
seemed a proving area for reform,
any alliance standardi
2a tion of
logistic structures has
represented an ideal rather
than a
realxty.
But as Europe becomes
increasingly identified with
the EC, trans-national
industrial firms and cooperative

m

agreements in the field of
defense might become more probable.
Such examples as the Multi-Role
Combat Aircraft (MRCA)
involving West Germany, the
Netherlands, and Britain should
have considerable potential.
The Europeans, who contribute
the vast majority of NATO's
troops, are interested in providing the most efficient and
adequate conventional defense
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This

nduet^

wiu

not be possiUe
imiess transnatiQnai
an, defense cooperation
becomes

^_

Though Western Europe's
arms industries have
revived si,
-nee
the end of the war.
the disagreements
over the politic*
direction of the EC and
disputes with the United
States
(powerful lobbies in the
United States do not wish
to lose
lucrative markets to European
firms) have meant that
NATO
has not been able to develop
an efficient logistics
structure.

During the late 1960's it
became apparent that NATO
would need a new main battle
tank for the l
9 80's.

The

United States-West German main
battle tank, jointly produced, could be an important
step in the standardization
of
NATO
military equipment. A common
gun and engine would
be used for the American XM-1
and the West German Leopard.
The Americans would use the West
German 120 millimeter gun
while the German Tank would be
powered by the American
tur-

bine engine.

A common logistics structure and
standardization of weapons in NATO are synonymous.

However, initially, pressures mounted from
the Pentagon
for a auAd_ era

omt

the Americans would buy the West German

gun if the West Germans purchase the American
Airborne

Warning and Control System (AWACS).

A Congressional report

cited "a curious but nonetheless pervasive relationship
be-

tween the Leopard-DM-1 agreement and the purchase of
AWACS.

"52

"

West Germany now has no intention of purchasing

awacs an, the
problem8 pertaining
Have basically been ,

-

Purchase the West
German

the

African commitment

lopisti.

^

„

e0On0mi
°

1

~"

Gorman relations,

« Cestic
p„t

a

.

t0

^

Jr

—

win

^

tan,

~

^tent

J'

/
•

*

standardization of

i« United
states-West

^
^

the need to
placate
PJ-acate Am
America's power•

.

interests prevail over
the need to
AT °
»a tKe w es t Europeans in
acMeving
transnationai
cooperation with resneot.
+v t
requirements for defense^
,
Th United States
The
has long advocated
ea West
Eu „
" eot European
unity but
has often been
aabiguoue or eVcn hostile
tunxty arose for Western
Europe to achieve
further development of its own defense
industries.

M

^^

.

Summary
The relations between
the United States and
Western
Europe generally and with
West Germany in particular
are
emerging from a period of
tutelage to one of equality.
The
new relationship i s necessarily
afflicted with growing
pains. However, as in the
case of France when de Gaulle
was President, more lasting
rifts can occur that threaten
the ability of the nations in
the Atlantic world to work
together harmoniously.
This problem has not yet arisen in
the case of West
Germany.
With some exceptions the United
States-West

-rman relationship

—^
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^

sinoe the end of
Worid
been
continues to te h
serious qualifica ;
tions must be added
conceming

7

•^singer w as

^

-

^

^

co

actively involved wit „

UsS

^

*.

WeSt Germ

^

«P"t.

nel S ht °rs in the
EC and NATO
, Hat the West Germans
should reoognize

^^

that exist with respect
to reunification. 55
The Tre
clarifying the status of
Berlin and the
Intra-German accords
Poant to both the constraints
upon and the
possibilities for
"the allies.

With respect to United
States-West German bilateral
relations, it is vital that
the Africans

appreciate the difficulties faced by West Germany.
It is a divided country
that while firmly anchored
in the West must also
be unusually sensitive about its
relationship with the East.
In
the future, the relative
importance of some aspects of
the
two countries- bilateral
ties might become less
important as
West Germany becomes more fully
integrated into
the EC.

However, there will always be
certain considerations that
are
unique to the relationship between
the United States and
West Germany, since only the United
States can secure West

Germany's defense and security.

And without West Germany.

NATO and American positions in
Western Europe would be
gravely imperiled.

Given the "diplomacy of emergency" of
the Vietnam War,

administration's mixture
of ciose
close (or at+ least
i
adequate)
consultation on a few Issup*,
r+* *
issues (the
Berlin Accords, SALT)
and
unilateral policies <«a
and a lack of
off(even contempt
for) consultation and cooperation
on most
jiiust other
issues.
The unilatere devaluation of
the dollar in 19?1
(complemented fey
the "Gonnally me tho
a «) ana Kissingers
Native lack of concern for African policies
that greatly increased
inflationary tendencies are two
examples that serve to
illustrate
this point.

otw

i

*o the West Germans (and
the West Europeans)
Nixon's
and Kissinger's policies
appeared as a continuation
of the

policies of the Johnson
administration. American
diplomacy
was almost exclusively
concerned with Vietnam, the
Soviet
Union, and China.
Thus (with some already
noted exceptions)
Bonn, in particular, worried
about the consistency and
reliability of American foreign
policy. Did Kissinger seek
to ensure American primacy
at the expense,
if necessary, of

West Germany and the West Europeans?

Yet, from 1 975 Kis-

singer returned to a more conciliatory,
more cooperative
policy.
But it was this vacillation, this
uncertainty about
American motives that, since the Johnson
years, have begun
to place serious strains upon the
Atlantic Alliance
and the

relationship with West Germany.

Too often to West Germany,

the West Europeans and the Japanese, Kissinger's
policies

were characterized hy
a, assertive nationalise
and acC o m Panying unilateral .aneuvers
and shock tactics,
all designed
to ensure American
primacy.

The policy of "setting
one nation off against
another"
was complemented by Nixon's
and Kissinger's disdain
for institutions such as the EC. But
there is an important connection between West Germany's
political and economic stability and the development of
the EC.
That is why the wisdom of Nixon's and Kissinger's
policy toward the EC can be
questioned. Kissinger has written
that "arrangements in
Germany have been the key to the
stability of Europe for at
least three centuries. "56 He has
repeatedly stressed that
"the long-term hope for German unity
therefore resides in
the unity of Europe."57 But Nixon
s
Kissinger s Qften
negative and parochial policy towards the
EC has not been
propitious for the development of that
larger entity that
West Germany must identify itself with in
the West.
Yet,
.

^

,

Kissinger wrote that "the future of the Federal
Republic depends on two related policies by the Westi
(1) recognition
of the psychological and political dilemmas of a divided
country and (2) the ability to make the Federal Republic

part of a larger community."-58

modified these ideas.

But in actual practice, he

His policies (with the exception of

the Four Power Agreement on Berlin and allied support for

the Intra-German Accords) lacked consistency of purpose and

were often poorly implemented.

The divergence between the

"•-—«*

'*
,„,„„;:

Moreover, the P
politics
L1X1CS of
shock tactics, does nn + 1
"

,,r,<i

^lateral

maneuvers, of

r0 ° m for
vital comMn + of, democratic (and
ponent
particularly American)
^^cuiarly
im
foreign
Policies, Realism. The
relationship between
domestic
values and foreign oli
cy i s crUcial to
P
cess of foreign policy
in a democracy.
Here was
and
Kissinger's weakest point,
for their overall
policies toward West Germany (and
the
6 West
F,,™„
6St Eur
°Peans and the Japanese)
axled to draw upon that
great reservoir of
American (and
its allies) idealism that
has been so crucial
to the close
Postwar relationship on both
sides of the Atlantic
and
Pacific Oceans. In an
interesting article James
Chace
"faults Kissinger for a
gravely flawed foreign
policy particularly with respect to its
long-term
•

,

^

KWs

consequences. "59

In the future, those who
bear responsibility for
America^ West German and Western
European policies will have
to
be far more discerning with
respect to the immediate and
long-term consequences of their
policies.
It is apparent
that Kissinger's vacillation
between the desire to ensure
American primacy and the need for
mutual cooperation on a
basis of approximate equality has
precluded the emergence of
new moral and political guidelines to
govern the relationship between the United States and West
Germany.

In a per-

iod of pervasive political and social
change, there are
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certain to be elements
of ambiguity
ambimii Ur in
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any relationship
and
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yet,
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cannot help out oe
disappointed
his failure to articuiate
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new
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BILATERAL RELATIONS

VI
i

FRANCE

The SphoT a r

In any discussion of
France and Franco -American
relations, the policies of
Charles de Gaulle should
be clearly
understood, for today the
Gaullist legacy sets serious

constraints upon the conduct and
goals of French policy.
From his assumption of power
in 1958, Charles de
Gaulle
implemented a number of policies
that were opposed to American foreign policy objectives.
In 1958 the politically
weak, unstable Fourth Republic
gave way to the Fifth Republic of de Gaulle. France has.
once again, become an
important political and economic power
whose influence
is

felt far beyond the boundaries of
Europe.

But de Gaulle's

views on Atlantic partnership and
European unity have been
in conflict with American conceptions.
The result has been
a bitter reaction, particularly among
Americans, who have

considered their formulas as the only workable
solution. 1

In 1963 and 1967 de Gaulle vetoed the admission
of Britain
to the EC.

In 1966 he withdrew France from participation

in the military structure of the Atlantic Alliance.

He

sought to improve relations with the East and these major
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policies were supported
by other moves
oves to in,
^crease French
influence in Europe and
the world.

However, for those
angered by de Gaulle's
policies
the passage of ti me
appeared to be the only
solution to the
Gaullist phenomenon. Yet
n
let was +v«
the Gaullist
phenomenon
-rely an aberration or did it
symbolize
broader
for French and European
self-assertation ? Despite
his
abrasive tactics and imperious
manner, would the nationalistic spirit that de
Gaulle represented really
decline or
become more amenable with
his demise? Were there
fundamental problems in Franco
-American and United States-West
European relations that needed
to be rethought? De
Gaulle,
like Caesar, has come and
gone, but his legacy lives
on and
must be studied and understood
if the nations of the
Atlantic basin are to overcome
their present difficulties.
-

France.

It is not surprising that Kissinger
was greatly concerned with de Gaulle and France.
He has written that
"European-American relations will never again
be the same
as they were before de Gaulle's press
conference of January 14, 1963. which excluded Britain from
the Common Market
and marked a watershed in European-American
relations." 2
To understand France today it is necessary to
understand

de Gaulle, his thoughts and dreams for France.

De Gaulle's

successors, Georges Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing, have

modified or abandoned
some of de Gaulle
Gaulle's more extreme
coitions but the GauUist
legacy
CO n-M„
g y continu
to influence
France
«- French conceptions of its role
in the world 3

"

^singer

^ ^^

gives due recognition
to the fact that
de
Oaulle has introduced »
a f undamental

^

States - European dialogue."'*
spects, fortuitous.

But this
" UB ls
is » in some reD emergence
For +h
the
of a specifically

European point of view
has now been brought
into the open
where it can be dealt with
in a more positive
manner.
Kissinger, judging from his
scholarly
work, has sym-

pathy and understanding for
the French challenge
to the
American grand design. He
states

that (a society's) "co-

hesiveness reflects a sense of
shared historical experience
and the conviction that it
represents a more or less
unique
set of values. An Alliance
cannot be vital unless it
conforms, at least to some
extent, to the image which
the
states composing it have of
themselves. "5 Kissinger further
demonstrates his awareness of how
French History influences
its current policies for he
points out how "few countries
have known the travail which France
has suffered since it

lost most of its young generation in
World War I."°
World War I shocks and bitter defeat

since

have been the fate of

France.

Insecurities concerning Germany and its
potential
threat were exacerbated by the refusal of
Britain
and the

United States fully to support France.

The terrible col-

lapse of 1940 was followed by eventual victory

-

by the arms

of others.

Yet even wl+v,
j
with the demise
of the Nazi threat
France still had to
fight two decades
light
*
of bitter colonial
wars that ended in
defeat
the collapse Qf
Fourth Republic. Into
this void stepped
De Gaulle was determined
to he his country's
savior
He understood the deep
malaise and frustration
that engulfed France, particularly
in the later years
of the
Fourth Republic. ue
De Gaulle
o-p+
Gaulle, after
the collapse of
Prance
•

^

^

-n

who cast their lot with
the allies.
For de Gaulle was
determined to restore the soul
of France, to restore
France
to greatness.
Thus he would "reestablish
the identity and
the integrity of France. "?
Kissinger writes that, while
Roosevelt and Churchill
concentrated on the tangible
goal
of military victory, de
Gaulle's goal was less tangible,
indeed "the conflict between
the pragmatic and the intangible that started during the
war has continued to this
day. "8 While the United States
has a stable government.
France has not. Therefore, the
means to attain a goal have
become as important as the goal itself.
De Gaulle sought
to ensure that policies also
contributed to France's sense
of identity. Thus, Kissinger wrote
"though de Gaulle often
acts as if opposition to United States
policy were a goal
in itself, his deeper objective is
pedagogicali to teach
his people and perhaps his continent attitudes
of inde-

pendence and self-reliance."?

This brings us to the point
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where it is necessary
to discuss
Ki
8 Klssl
"ger-s views on d
.
(,„„,,
3 1U 3
on international
relations.
Oe Gaulle placed the
nation-state in t he
center of Hi s
of intentional
relations. „ is
nationalism
sm wa
was,
traditi ° n
achl eve
greatness, a special
place for France
trance, in the world
which
would reflect the
uniqueness of France
xd/ice.
But a n
« must
nation
have a P urP ose. For
de Qaulle>
•

«-s

******

- "

^

"

—
^

"

*

—

-

^

is not si ra plv a
reflection of a nation's
phys ical stren t h
g
tut also of its moral
P urpose.

For the nation
n muqt
vi„t in an
must Sexist
extremely dangerous
n-ilieu.
international life is li ke
a jungle, it is a never
recurring battle. For de
Gaulle the objective of
pea ce is
to be obtained by
a more stable equilibrium.
This equiu .
brium is never permanent,
it must always be
adjusted in constant struggles. Peace is
a balance of forces

that often,
however, can be disturbed by
tensions that arise from
the
dynamics of the system. De
Gaulle thought that internal
instability „ as the distinguishing
feature of Communist
states.
There was a constant need to
divert attention in
the direction of foreign
adventures.
Thus de Gaulle resisted attempts by the Soviet Union
to exploit the weaknesses of the West.

Given the instability, the oppressiveness
of the Soviet
system, and the unnatural proximity
of Soviet power to
the

heart of Europe, a more stable equilibrium
must be sought.

—
s

r ;his
«»-

poiicy but as

us

auth ° r

^-

af .
faith in the Atlantio
Aiiiance wh
"Pon the identity of
Europe
rope and the
th unique
,
qualities of
France.
He thought that if
a nation
i« +
arlon ls
to serve in the

"

"* »

«•*

—

southing to itself and
he
convinoed that its
opinions matter to
others.
Here are the origins
of de Gaulle's
disagreeing with
the United statea .
Kissinger notes that
his sensitivity to
the tribulations of
Prance. was loolcing
into the distant future
when the Americans
may no longer he
interested in or ahle to
defend Europe because of
their involved in other continents. De
Gaulle wished to achieve
some measure of control
over the destiny of Prance

^

^

and his

oontinent.

But the United States was
concerned with solving immediate problems.
However, as a statesman,
de Gaulle
must prepare himself for the
best - and the worst possible future contingencies.
Moreover, de Gaulle's

concept
of the nation-state and
American ideas of its obsolescence
were bound to clash. For de
Gaulle a united Europe must be
responsible for its own destiny, it
must emphasize its own
unique place in the world. But.
unlike the American preference for federal institutions,
he persisted in viewing
the unity of Europe as depending upon
the vitality of the
nation-state. For only the states can
act legitimately and
responsibly. Kissinger makes the important
point that if
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" ly
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—

Europe. he had chosen

-ke

decisions based on a
unanimous vote of all
members.
only political leadership
acceptable
yi.aDj.e to the
thp mam
» <
currents of
European opinion could
possibly dominate Europe

Kissinger also indicates
that while advocating
European
unity, Americans have
often recoiled
quences.

from some of its
conse-

In military matters,
the united States has
preferred to deal bilaterally
with its European allies
or
through integrated commands
where it can dominate the
Europeans. However, for de
Gaulle, the question of
defense lay
at the very heart of his
concept of autonomy. No
great power
can be a lobbyist for another
power's views. Nor can a
great
power forever be under the
tutelage of another great
power,

however benevolent it may be.

De Gaulle resisted the idea

of organic defense links between
the United States and individual European countries. The
defense of individual
states or Europe itself cannot be
exclusively tied to American weapons or American conceptions.
Consequently, de Gaulle
opposed not the Atlantic Alliance but
the concept of integration upon which it is based.

No great state can leave

decisions about its destiny to another state
however
friendly. Integration leads to an abdication
of responsibility and a sense of impotence which would not
only de-

moralize France's foreign policy and drain the Alliance of
its strength, but Prance and Europe would have to accept
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American tutelage
forever.

When considering d
e
Prising that he thought

Gaulle
le S

conc epts, it is
not surit *,
m ° re ira P°^nt
to integrate
^grate
.
the French
army into French
,
PWr, v society
than into NATO. 10
This
is also why he
insisted upon
°
th«
*
n
the development
P
of France's
own nuclear strike
force.
For de Gaulle
realized tt
the impact
4.
+v
that a force would
have upon
French d1„i
rrench
±>
diplomacy, and upon
French political prestige
Prestige. n-p
Of „course, to the
Americans.
with their concern
over a centralized
command and control
structure, the French
nuclear force was an
object of serious
disagreement. It is therefore
not difficult to see
why the
United States, as the
leader of the Western
Alliance, and
,

,

France became embroiled in
a number of serious
disputes,
some of which continue
to this
day.

The Uni ted Statpg »„h
Frn "rr
The role of the nation-state,
the precise form of European integration, and the French
nuclear force have all
caused considerable difficulties
in Franco-American relations.
But as Kissinger points out.
these very real and
difficult problems between the two
countries were exacerbated by de Gaulle's abrupt tactics
and his imperious style.
During the Nixon-Kissinger years
Alastair Buchan wrote
"that just as Gaullism was a factor in
encouraging American
unilateralism, so American Gaullism fosters
Japanese nationalism and so on. "11 De Gaulle proceeded
by a series of

Xaita

»
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which have left no room
for the feelings of
other statesmen. Too often
he acted as if the
inherent validity of his positions
would overcome all
opposition. „ is
policies were often contradictory,
if not hostile, to
those
of the United States.
By his style and the
polarization of discussion,
de
Gaulle proceeded to arouse
American self-righteousness.
Both America and de Gaulle
have wanted a strong Europe,
but
de Gaulle's tactics often
detracted from the substance
of
his concepts and embroiled him
with America. Kissinger
thinks that, while history will
demonstrate that de Gaulle's
concepts, as distinct from his
style, were greater than his
critics, still a statesman must work
with the available material.
The dispute over the "American" or
the "French"
concept of European integration and
Atlantic relationships
might have drawn attention to these
problems. But instead
the debate over these two concepts has
seriously delayed

progress in Europe and thus Kissinger warns that
"they may
bring on what each side professes to fear most;
a divided
suspicious Europe absorbed once again in working out its
ancient rivalries." 12 Consequently the result for all could
be a tragedy whose scope would go far beyond the relation-

ship between the United States and France.
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Fro, 1958 to 1969 the
foreign policies of de
Gaulle
were often a source of
unease and discord to his
neighbors
and the United States.
The foreign policy of
France may he
divided into three periods in
the Gaullist erai
1) from
1958 to 1962 de Gaulle generally
cooperated in European
and

trans-Atlantic forums and sought
to extricate France
from
Algeria, 2) from 1 9 6 2 to 1 68 de
9
Gaulle, freed from the albatross of the Algerian war by the
Evian Accords
of 1962,

attempted to assert French independence
and other objectives
that stressed France's position as
the leader of the Six,
its increasing opposition to the
hegemony of the United
States, and the policy of detente with
the East; 3) from
1968 to 1969 the events of May-June and the
invasion of
Czechoslovakia in August, place limits upon the
capacity of
France to play a major role on the world stage
operating

under Gaullist premises,

Kissinger wrote that when dealing with France "outraged pride is not a good guide to policy making." 13

Others

have voiced concern over the fruitless and regressive course
that France attempted to follow in the de Gaulle years.
This period has too often been marked by bitter conflict be-

tween these two old allies.

De Gaulle has been characterized

as an anachronism and his policies as regressive and repre-

sentative of the excesses of nationalism.

Such policies, it

was thought, could only lead to a tragic ending.
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To understand France

comprehend hoth the

fuUy

today>

u^

^

specif

^

conditions in France
that 6 ave
sustance to the Gaullist
movement and the links
of Ga ulli sm
with the reviving nationalism
that occurred in Weste
rn
Europe and. in particular.
France during the early
sixties.
The increased stress on
nationalism, was not confined
to
France. During the
Nixon-Kissinger years African
foreign
policy would often be
charactered by the same tactics
of
surprise and abrupt maneuvers.
De Gaulle, of course,
gave
to the broader movement
of nationalism his own
particular
imprint.
But with the resolution of
the Cuban Missile
Crisis, detente began to be the
major objective of each
superpower. Unfortunately, this
coincided with the end of
the period of post-war reconstruction
in Western Europe,
when the relationship between the
United States and Western
Europe - and in particular, France would need to be readjusted to reflect the changing conditions
of the early
sixties.
Thus the French pursuit of grandeur from
1958 to
1969 produced great bitterness and confusion.
Consequently,
a closer examination of the major themes of
Gaullist policy

in the previously mentioned periods is necessary.

Europe and Denolnni

7.

a tt ffl

The problem with Alliances is that they do not often

readily adapt to changing conditions.

The coalition of

states that defeated Napoleon and formed the concert of
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Europe had ceased to function
hy 1822.
The coalition of
states that defeated Nazi
Gennany broke up rather
rapidly
following the end of World
War II.

But during the first
period of Gaullist rule,
the
Berlin Problem and the Cuban
Missile Crisis reinforced
the
cohesion of the Atlantic
Alliance.^ Moreover, de
Gaulle
was faced with a terrible
and prolonged war in
Algeria that
had caused the downfall of
the Fourth Republic and after
de Gaulle assumed power in
1958 - three serious revolts
led
by French Generals against
the authority of the French
state.
Consequently, de Gaulle, aware of
France's serious
weakness, initiated cautious policies.
He cooperated with
the EC when that organization
became a reality in
1958.

Subsequent cooperation on the part of
France with the EC was
considerable. *5 De Gaulle did not believe
in the federal
approach but preferred confederation based
on the nations
of Europe. He nevertheless recognized
that in the fledgling
days of the EC, cooperation was important
and necessary.
Thus, from 1959 exports and trade between
the members of the
EC increased rapidly. 16 And de Gaulle was well
aware of the

increased benefits of economic growth for France.

But by

1961, when the other members of the EC sought to advance

plans leading to the further integration of the Six (and perhaps other states as well), the French were rather insistent
that the Fouchet Plan

-

which urged the confederal approach

be considered as the basis for further discussion.

The

-

I63

nce^
"IT:
c

St0 ° d

^

S Cl6ar

M- ^ ^—
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^

the further integration
Qf

support for supranational
institutions
Wh(>r -rance
P lun sed
Fn into
4r, +
+
u
the EC
the
very serious crisis
of 19 « 5 , Walter
stem and his associates in
the
he EC fw.«
«
Co ^ssion
were to regret
the fact that thev
ney tried
trior! to ™,
u a.
push
too far and too
fast in
this direction to
please de Gaulle. However,
until l 9 6l or
1962 - and thereafter in some
respects - France did
cooperate with the EC even
though the Fouchet Plan
of l 9 6l had
suggested that there would
be
e limits
Lxm1
to that cooperation.
With respect to decolonization.
by the signing of the
Evian Accords of March. I962.
France ended the Algerian
War
on somewhat favorable terms.
But its experience in
,

^

w

^

+w

two

colonial wars had embittered
many Frenchmen over the
lack of
allied - particularly American aid and sympathy during
France's trials. While the United
States did aid France in
reoccupying Indo-China and during
the subsequent war against
the Vietminh. France's humiliation
and relative isolation in
195* were resented. The Suez Crisis in
1956 also confirmed
to many Frenchmen that on certain
issues allied sympathy and
cooperation were not necessarily synonymous
with the interests of France.
The four long, bitter, and frustrating
years of the
Algerian War further underlined - to Frenchmen the often

selective nature of allied relationships when French

crests

were at staKe.

Thus , at .

^

when
construction „as n e arin
g completion, nationalism
reviving
«* threat from the Bast diminishing
there Were those
in France who were
rather ambivalent
about the benefits
of
allied cooperation.
This ambivalence was
particularly
pognant when cooperation with
the United States
was under
discussion. Had the United
State, firmly and
unequivocally
supported France in its two
Colonial wars? Why did
the
United States aid the
British nuclear program
and not the
French? To a formerly
great and proud nation,
humbled by
many recent trials, a
reviving sense of its own
identity
and mission was a rounder
that France too had an
important
role to play in the world.

-

Acting on the basis of a philosophy
of history that saw
nations struggling to preserve
a stable equilibrium, de

Gaulle rapidly exploited the
opportunities presented by the
changing conditions of the sixties.
From 1963 to 1968 in
Europe and the world, de Gaulle sought
to pursue French interests on a global scale.

In Europe de Gaulle probably realized,
after the Five
refused to accept the Fouchet Plan, that
his conception of
European integration would not be accepted
by the other members of the EC. Yet, aware of the political
and economic
benefits that France derived from the EC
(until
the EC

.
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Commission forced his hand
19b5) hhe S0U
" in I960
S^ to ensure a
policy of cooperation. 17

De Gaulle was well
aware
cute that
wi +h +v,
tnax with
the advent of detente there were many
peoDlp in France
t?>™
v people
and„ in Europe who
would be responsive to
a greater assertion
of their inter .
ests as the Cold War
receeded. A number of
steps, however,
would have to be undertaken
if France was to emerge
leader of Europe gua Europe.
In Europe de Gaulle
would have
to limit the influence
of the rising West German
political
and economic power.
He would have to assess
the outlook of
Britain. He would have to
separate specific French and
European objectives from undue
American influence while ensuring that American military
protection would still

m

t

^

^

main-

tain the balance of power in
Europe.

Finally. France would

have to loosen the grip of both
superpowers on their respective parts of Europe so that Europe,
under French leadership, while not militarily equal
to the superpowers, could
still by astute diplomacy attain its
objectives. 18

In his quest for French grandeur, de
Gaulle carried on
a complex and multi-faceted diplomacy. I
shall begin with
Europe
In January, 1963 de Gaulle accomplished two
objectives,
he denied Britain entry into the EC and
concluded a Franco-

German Treaty.

Probably he was never enthusiastic about

British entry into the EC because of the strength of Britain's ties with the United States.

Yet if Britain was not
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so intent upon

Staining

its strategic nuclear
ties with
the United States and
showed some interest
in de Gaulle's
vision or an independent
Europe, de Gaulle mig
ht possibly
have relented.
But at the Nassau
Conference in December,
1962. Britain hulled itself
before the Americans and
proclaimed the sanctity of its
trans-Atlantic ties. If
there
had been any doubt in de
Gaulle's mind before Nassau,
there
was none after it.
Britain would not be allowed
in the EC. 1 ?
On January
de Gaulle announced that
Britain could not
enter the EC. One week later
the Franco-German Treaty
was
signed.
Again de Gaulle sought the moral,
political, and
economic leadership of Europe and
was anxious to heal the
ancient rift between France and
Germany so as to channel
Bonn's growing political and
economic strength into appropriate directions within the Gaullist
framework. 20

U

De Gaulle's vision of a Europe basically
free from the
embrace of the superpowers was a vision
shared
by some but

regarded as a myth by others.

Belgium and the Netherlands

desired Britain's inclusion in the EC.

West Germany was

not about to channel its strength and
energy in the approved
Gaullist direction. And the EC Commission under
President

Walter Hallstein was determined to advance the cause
of
European integration within a federal framework.
The events leading up to the EC Crisis of 1965 and the
Crisis itself have been discussed elsewhere. 21
of the Crisis was a stalemate.

The result

The Commission abandoned its

planE for

thfi

integratiQn Qf Europ
^

realized that he C0U ld
neither impose
others „ or Qe stroy the
EC.
After

^

^

^
^

^

^burg

the
Accords of
January, 1966 both sides
am-«>^
agreed +
to return to the
statu!
IB quo
ante and mark time until
conditions changed.

Concurrently with his
attempts to lead Europe
in the
desired direction, de
Gaulle hegan a concerted
attack upon
the United States and
its positions in Europe
and the world.
After the Cuban Missile
Crisis he viewed the
United States
as the single greatest
power in the world and
acted
accord-

ingly.

„ e thought that to maintain the proper
equilibrium,

he should occasionally
support the Soviet Union
against the

hegemonic power.

France soon appeared to many
Americans as
anti -American and as opposing
America's designs for Europe
and the world.

From 1963 to 1 9 68 Franco- American
relations sank to a
low point. For America's often
heavy-handed paternalism
and its ambiguous, indeed often
hostile, behavior in
France's great colonial wars - not to
mention Suez - left
many sensitive and proud Frenchmen
responsive to the
broad

thrust of de Gaulle's policies even if
they disagreed with
his tactics.
This was true not only in France but in
Europe
as well.
Too often American leaders and analysts
acted as
if de Gaulle himself was the exclusive
cause of the malaise
in Franco -American relations. Once de Gaulle
retired, they
reasoned, his tragic attempt to thwart American
designs
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would be ended and
things
> +
g wonlrt retUrn
t0 n»«al.
This be.
,
lief,
however, was a serious
oversimpli fication . 22
Trance is a great
European nation with
a lon g and p roud

"

^

"W

——

to understand the
relpon-

where was this seen more
clearly than in the
case of the

Britain's privileged
position regarding American
aid to
S nuclear program
had long been resented
in France
Moreover, given the symbolic
and real importance
of nuclear
weapons in world politics,
could it have been such
a surprise when de Gaulle announced
that France too would
become
a nuclear power? The
Americans responded with the
Multilateral Force proposal (MLF)
and rapid condemnation
of
France's fledgling nuclear
forced Would the restructuring
of the Atlantic Alliance to
allow for more European
selfassertion Easfiiily have influenced
de Gaulle a t least to
stay in the military alliance
even if France reduced its
military commitment to NATO?

^
_

^

But Kennedy and his successor,
intent on the command
and control of nuclear weapons,
wanted to centralize in the
White House control of the firing
of the weapons that would
determine the fate of Europe. De
Gaulle, who criticized

America's leadership in Europe, its
involvement in Southeast
Asia and indeed appeared hostile to
American designs everywhere, was in no mood to compromise.

In the Spring of 1966

169
he abruptly orderea

^

NATO military

Cities

out of

France ana oeclarea
that henceforth
Prance would>
reining a .ncnher of the
Atlantic Alliance>
cease
Part in NATO rai Utary
25
activities.
ThUs France
neatly increase its freedQm
q£

^

^

^

^
^^^

take

policies while the
thp TTm'
United c+
States, to maintain
the balance
of power in Europe, would
be uuj.j.gaxea,
obligated if necessary,
n
to
defend France against the
U.S.S.R.
a.

While attacking American
positions everywhere, de
Gaulle initiated his policy
of detente, entente,
and cooperation with the East. He
visited Poland and Rumania
in
1967 and 1 9 68 and tried to influence
his hosts to assert
their independence from Russian
control.
He visited Moscow
in June of 1 9 66 and thus
initiated a series of agreements
and

dialogs

until

-

with the Soviet Union that
were to continue
and after - the Czechoslovak
26
invasion

in I968.
In this manner de Gaulle sought
to influence the direction
of Soviet policy in Europe and
to allow for the development
of a new coalition of nations led
by France.

grandeur or Rptr OR t?
In May- June I968 a student uprising
began in Paris and
was accompanied by a series of strikes
that symbolized the
nature of serious domestic problems threatening
the sta-

bility and objectives of the Gaullist regime.

In August the

Warsaw Pact nations invaded Czechoslovakia
as that state

sought to attain a greater
aeasure of domestic and
international autonomy. In April.
19 6 9 de Gaulle resigned
as the
President of France when he
failed to achieve a
majority on
a matter of domestic reform.

Did these events prove
that the Gaullist design
was
flawed? To some extent they
did.
Frenchmen were not so
willing to pursue French
grandeur and the

^

the expense of domestic needs.

at

Internationally the Soviet

Union was apparently unwilling
to allow more than
a very
limited degree of autonomy in
Eastern Europe, and relations
with the United States were at
a low point.
Yet de Gaulle,
whose conceptions were superior to
his tactics,
had struck
a responsive chord in France and
Europe in his quest for

greater self-assertion.

So the jubilation of d e Gaulle's

critics at his retirement was somewhat
misplaced.

On nu-

merous occasions Kissinger has spoken of
the need for "new
centers of initiative" in world politics.
Yet the post-war

generation of American leaders

-

with few exceptions

-

has

had difficulty in adjusting to the concept of
a multipolar
world.

In the early sixties multipolarity began to
emerge.

By the seventies the post-war era had ended but
the emergence of a new order was difficult to discern. 27

With respect to Western Europe and France, in particular, American statesmen from Eisenhower to Kissinger seem
to have experienced considerable difficulty in accepting

European self-assertion.

De Gaulle must bear his share of
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^
^^^
p^.^^

the blame ror the
serious divisions in
both
and the accompanying
malaise in
But African statesmen,
with a marked conceptual
oeficiency
and often inept in
their persona! diplomacy,
must also hear
a major share o f the
blame. No one can
say with certainty
that if either or both
sides had heen more
restrained and
less arrogant the problems
presented by de Gaulle would
have
had a different
x conclusion.
concluqlnn
v~+
^
Yet perhaps the important
thing
is that both sides learn
from their failures.
American
hegemony in the Atlantic Alliance
must be modified to allow
for greater European
self-assertion. The French
pursuit of
grandeur is unobtainable without
unacceptable sacrifice.

Both sides must ensure, drawing
upon lessons learned from
this period, that their common
endeavors take precedence
over that which divides them.
grance Aftpr n c r.^-ij*
The distinguishing characteristic
of the statesman i s
the endurance of his work. De Gaulle's
successors, Georges
Pompidou and Valery Giscard d'Estaing,
have had ample oc-

casion to reflect on the limitations imposed
upon their
actions by the Gaullist legacy. In fact, de
Gaulle left
his successors with the difficult job of adhering
to Gaullist precepts, albeit in a modified form.

Many of de

Gaulle's concepts were valid, others were questionable.
His tactics were open to serious question.

In more general
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was a

tion i„

it can be said that

ious
fflany

^

n.W

We

aduiation Qf

in a period when

tranMonai

coQp

iB iraperative>28

most serious
charge against de Gaulle
iss +h
a+ *
that
he encouraged those
in
France and Europe who
sought to block
Dj.ocK furtw
lurther supranational
integration.

Undoubtedly, Jean Monnet
and Robert Schuman
were too
optimistic in their plans
for the development
of the EC
But will future historians
confirm the fact that,
while conditions in Europe in the
sixties and seventies
were favorable for some advances in
integration much more could
have
been achieved without de Gaulle?*?
De Gaulle
a
blow to the cause of European
integration. Nor was this the
only cause to suffer from
the excesses of nationalism

^^
that

have in the past been the cause
of so much conflict.

Europ e,

Certain Gaullist precepts have been
discarded, others
still persist. Britain, after de
Gaulle twice refused
entry, was finally admitted to the
EC in January,
1973

(with Denmark and Ireland).

But cooperation between France
and the eight is often difficult to
achieve. 30 Pompidou
(who resigned in 197^ due to illness)
and his successor

Giscard, of the Independent Republicans,
have found that
they must always be aware of the constraints
placed upon
them by the Gaullist legacy. Cooperation in
the EC is
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cautious, ana i„
concert

T'.>.

^

*
^
^ ««—
*

the attaimoent

°"

«*»

rt
hy

1980-s. proclairaed
ax
at the
tne Parls confe
19?2 '
sees as distant and
fficult to acnieve
as ever.
integration no longer arm*

«

Hesitation over how
be^t to

i-elt - and

the interna-H

e uiixcea

™„

n

repercussions of Gaullism
can-

btates reeardlooo
lGSS
g

creased cooperation

i s

^-r
f

°

+u
the manner in
which in-

sought
nought.

q+
n
Stanley
Hoffmann writesi
never have consultation,
claritv
rarity, *candor and
coordination
(as distinct from
mere
+
^j-e ex r>n*+
r
post facto information^
'formation; been more
ln1
important. "3
'

•

France has not returned
to NATO's military
structure
but the excesses of
the "all-horizon
defense" strategy.

Probated

in

1 96 7

.

^

^^

^^

.^.^ ^

have been dispensed

fense strategy now
envisages cooperation with
NATO - if
Paris decides that it is
necessary - i„ the event
of ,
Soviet attack,
the Mediterranean>

m

Czechoslovakia. French air and
naval forces have quietly
resumed cooperation with
NATO forces in surveillance
of
Soviet activities.

17k

-

^ Z1T77 ^ ^ ^^

French defense
planners no in,

«»

~—

—
J
agencies

* ^-

C0OPerate w
Th fi t

°h

re

^

+v

e

tensive

aid f rora NATO

itself

more modest dimensions^

currea as a re^ui +

envisa6e independent

^

The

-

"

f ay " JUne 1968
«»
'
° "
seouent
sequent economic crisis,
cri<H« .m* *v
the reduced emphas
s
and Discard have
placed upon the force
d P iraEP£.
f
Regret+.m,
v
tably. ho
wever. the Gaullist
legacy has prevented
cooperation from developing
hetween France and
Britain in
strategic nuclear weapons. 33

^

.

^

^„

Finally some funds,
partly derived f r0 m
the reduced
'-ding for the
£xass&>
fense budget to strengthen
French conventional
forces.
But
security policies are
synonymous with state
sovereignty and
in thxs area French
cooperation is highly
circumscribed by
the Gaullist legacy.

^^^^^^

Economjr Policy
From 1965 to 1 9 68 de Gaulle
strongly attacked the dollar as the medium of international
exchange. The events of
May-June 1 9 68 and the subsequent
economic crisis changed
this policy. De Gaulle's
successors have sought to ensure
a certain degree of French cooperation
in monetary matters.
France was a member of the "European
float" until it was
recently forced to leave. But. in
general. France has
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basically been cooperative

4

r>
n EUr0P6an

policy .

Md

W ° rld -netary

Pompidou and ciscard
have q uietl y abandoned
raany of
ae Gaulle poUcies
in economic matters. v
et with the
o.uadrupUn e o f the price o
f oU in 1973
.
difference3
emerged hetween France
and the other
industrial states with
respect to Kissing
proposed Internationa!
Energy Agency
UEA;. This will be dealt wi +v, i„
with in more detail
later on but
initially, very serious
disagreements occurred between
Michel Jobert, the French
Foreign Minister, and
Kissinger
Subsequently, these differences
were, at least, partly
resolved but the Jobert-Kissinger
confrontations

^

do illus-

trate that in economic and
monetary policies, the Gaullist
legacy continues to influence
French policy.

Eilatprpl Relations
Fr pryTft
The S tatep mpT^
The United st^o and F r p n„
p
t

The improvement of relations with
Europe and France did
not, for the United States, have
a very high priority.
Since the late sixties the Europeans,
absorbed in the construction of the EC and dismayed over
American policy in
Vietnam, had also given a lower priority
to the relationship
with the United States. Yet Kissinger,
who had criticized
the high-handedness and arrogance of
past administrations,
also had to contend with a serious deterioration
in America's
economic position. All these problems were
sometimes
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exacerbated by Kissinger's
tenaency to ignore
tendency
i
or fail fullv
to understand
economic issues
eS *
j™
k a<=e
James .
Ch
«rites that
-singer, in his preoccupation
with 'high- politic8
,
Xow. pontics Monetary
reform, scientific
developments.
deterioration, resource
supp ly and demand)
suffer from n eglect.
P xri ^+
And the centralization
of foreign
policy decisions in the
White House,
e> ax
at time.
times, overburdened
Kissinger as minor problems
were not dealt with
until they
reached crisis proportions
and by then a solution
was not
readily apparent.
.

^

env.ro,™

.

Moreover, given the changing
conditions that affect
the
Atlantic nations, it is
apparent that the Gaullist
legacy
could well cause considerable
difficulties for any new
American administration. Kissinger
has written that "Americans showed too great a
preference for hegemony, de
Gaulle's
charge was not unjustified. -35
What would
new Nixon _
Kissinger team do with respect to
Franco-American relations?
How would Kissinger deal with
de Gaulle's contention

^

that

Americans preferred hegemony to
mutual cooperation on a
basis of equality? In a period of
profound political and

Philosophical change, would he articulate
and implement new
principles that would serve as a more
suitable framework for

Franco-American relations?

In addition to the problems be-

tween the two countries concerning European
and global issues, there were other differences that
developed because of
each country's theoretical perspective.
Americans tended to
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work for short-term
solutions
10ns in th e
pragmatic tradition
Consequently, the
'
changing c irc u
rastances of the
th earl sixy
ties w
,
wer-*
i
ere largely
unanticipated rt this
Was due
certain
conceptual
al flaw*
M Amerxcan
a~
flaws xn
foreign pol lcy .
ThiE> Qf
course, is partly why
the United States
a1;es oecame so
seriouslv
Vi6tnam
ing CoL
War ana the xnorease
of political
multipolarity made the
outcome of events in
Vietnam leES important
^
strictly regional basis.
Conversely, de Caulle-s
policies
were predicated upon
n
theoro+^„i
P
tneoretxcal assumptions
that envisaged
changes that would occur
far beyond his lifetime.
I" 1969 the administration
was involved in a
major diplomatic crisis in Vietnam
that had domestic and
internatxonal repercussions and
required a major share of
its time
and effort.
Therefore, it is hardly
surprising that the
subsequent use of American
air and naval power on
a massive
scale struck a certain note
of irony in Paris. Both
in
Indo-China and Algeria, with
France on the brink of defeat,
Washington refused further military
aid and argued for the'
necessity of negotiations. From
I969 the situation was reversed, but Nixon and Kissinger
paid little heed to Pompidou's
advice to limit the use of military
force and seriously engage in negotiations with the Viet Cong
and Hanoi.
Instead
they employed air and naval power
to an even greater extent
(while slowly withdrawing combat
troops) concurrently with
their program of VietnamUatxon. It
was only when Nixon and

"

^

>

•

w

^^^--—
^

^

1?8

Kissinger thought that
the situation
situate was more
favorable that
.
they began serious
negotiations.
in March or l9 6
9 President
tempt to achieve a rpormnin +
^conciliation with de
Gaulle and obtain
EurOT3
European support for
his P
policv
1Cy of d*A
+
+
^tente
with the Soviet
Union.
After the events of
May June, «.
01 Mav-Jun*
the *
Czechoslovak invas.cn, ana Bonn's flexing
oS its econonic
pute to force revaluation
of
•

^^^

^

,

^

the

in a mood to reciprocate.

^

^^

de Caulle

^

But the following
month de Gaul le
resigned.
However. Ms successor.
Pompidou, returnee the
Nixon visit one year later
and reaffirm France's
friendship with the United
States.
As I have indicated de
Gaulle's successors have
reduced Gaullist pretensions
regarding glohal policy. However. Europe has become
far more important for
Prench policy
under de Gaulle's successors
than it was for de Gaulle
himself.

The Atlantic

Ani^ 0

^ FuHmc

With respect to NATO and Europe,
some problems betwe en
the United States and France were
solved rather rapidly,
others required more time, still
others were not resolved at
all.

Both the Berlin problem and the proposed
Conferenc e on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
were dealt with
rather successfully. Both Washington and
Paris wished to
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Moreover, the French were
also concerned with
seething
else,
the emergence of a
West European Defense
entity
Pompidou sought diplomatic
movement
the

^

^

the military aspect of
the CSCE. might well
lead to the
emergence of a West European
defense entity which
would
probably be dominated by West
Germany. And this entity
could jeopardize relations
with the Soviet Union,
and worse
yet. perhaps encourage an
American military withdrawal
or
reduction of its forces that
would unduly favor the
Soviet
Union.

Kissinger should have realized
that the French were
worried about the effects an
American defeat in Vietnam
would have upon Europe. The
French have never forgotten
the defeat of the Anglo-American
French security treaty in
the Senate in 1919. Would an
assertive Congress once again
force a reduction in the American
presence in Western Europe
and thus leave France to cope alone
with the Soviet Union?
Moreover, despite the many ties between
the two
countries,

as West Germany's economic and political
power has increased

in recent years, a certain sense of unease,
of uncertainty,
has manifested itself in France concerning
possible changes
in West German policy. As Kissinger has
repeatedly stated
history is always a factor to be considered. Yet
he did not
assure the French that their particular fears and concerns

were fully shared and understood by the United States.
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ZTT
o

was a question of
time>

resdve the tension between

«

^

«-

for hegemony and the
need for
r consult
con.nH ation
+i
and cooperation,
,
v
Kissinger did no better
than hisS oft
cHt^
*
° rt crl
^cized
predecessors
+ui
this respect.
.

m
.

However, even though
at the listeria!
meeting of the
CSCE at Helsinki,
"Europeans sensed a
background of prior
'
prxvate understanding
hetween Washington and
Moscow- according to one commentator. 3?
still both
the French have overcome
their initial fears and
hesitations and now view the
continuing CSCE and HBFR
Conferences
as a valuable means of
improving East-West relations.
While
the French remain wary of
the issue of a separate
West
European defense entity,
European cooperation amongst
themselves and with the United
States has been adequate.
Moreover, the previous concerns
expressed by the French have not
materialized. Yet both of these
conferences have been underway for only a few years. Accordingly,
no major issues have
yet arisen to cause differences
between the United States
and France.

^

^

With respect to monetary matters,
Kissinger kept his
word concerning consultation until August,
1971. After the
monetary crisis of November. 1968, French
attacks against
the dollar had ceased.
But the new economic and monetary
policy that w aB initiated unilaterally in
1971 did
cause

resentment and confusion in Paris.

In White Hoiir»

Y^ r ?

-

"

Kissinger expressed
his8 conc
conop™
em over the effects
tS of
+k
f th6Se
B ° VeS n
°
.°

<«

Europe) as he
lvrote

lateral decisions
of August

—
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««'
"r

d6Sired e'"
Has been strained
but not
At this remove it
is difficult
for ne to0 as sess
whether
+h„
u
the brutal
feet.

-

Alll6d
Allied Croh
° he

—

•

unilateralism

coming E „
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many years to

corae>

~
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relations unnecessary
v
*ar ly
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^
£
Nixon and

or whether

left us no other
option. 08

iex ai d
Iet
Q
^.
Kissinger have only two
choices?
10637 Giv
„ «.
Glven
sympathy that
...
xist d in london and
Bonn f or America's
pli ght (in addi .
tion to the importance
of smoothly functioning
monetary arrangements for all concerned)
can xt
;
oan
it real
rnly .he maintained
that - even if there
were differences
over the specific
arrangements - there were no
other alternative
policies?
Consequently the monetary
crises of
l and 1 973
caused Pompidou to reaffirm,
though in a defensive
manner.
French criticism of the
world monetary system
and unilateral American moves.
Moreover, the quadrupling
of the
price of oil weakened the
narrow basis of France's
favorable
balance of trade. 39 „0WeVer>
.

W

as

^

^

^

East shows, the dispute
over Kissinger's proposed
International Energy Agency (IEA)
made monetary

issues less im-

port ant.

On Berlin and the CSCE and
MBFR talks, the United States
did manage to work in concert
with its allies, including

HtUe

.uestion that K issinger

.

s

unilateral
s
greatly complicate* things
for the French.
consultati on
and cooperation aree
not adhered
nox
ndhe^n to more
systematically, can
the Americans and the
French avoid a serious,
even a di sastrous. breach? Monetary
and economic matters,
moreover,
caused considerably more
0
controversy.*
Particularly vehement were the Kissinger-Jobert
exchanges concerning Kissinger's proposed IE A. The
French were also highly
resentful of Kissinger's
contradictory terms stated in
his
April. 1 973 speech that European
economic interests should
be subordinated within a
common Atlantic framework.*1
Kissinger, an astute observer of
Western Europe's psychological

„

"

vulnerabilities, might have anticipated
that any references
(however implicit) to Western
European (and French) military weaknesses were unwise. And
to infer that Western
Europe should defer to American
preferences because of this
weakness overlooks two important
considerations. That the
Nixon-Kissinger administration itself could
be in error and
that a nation such as France cannot
be induced to cooperate
by reminders of its weaknesses. As Stanley
Hoffmann writes
"by bringing down the international monetary
system of the
post-war era and by exporting inflation, but in
different
proportions, to its allies, Washington has made the
European
exercise in monetary unification and coordination of
eco-

nomic policies more difficult, and underlined
the dependence

of the European
economies on we
th« American
*m
,
market. Kissinger has fully
exploited these trends.
The
,
,
*~
tion of these
circumstances by Kis ,
Kissinger caused
serious co
concern in P «
»

^

—

~

for the united
states to
i8 alance
:
of payments and to
also heavily invest
abr0ad>
i he failure
of the
<3+
ne Uni+o*
*
united States to
rectify these difficulties has caused
considerable6 exasperation
exast.e^+4
in „
France.
For these economic issues
a
r,„ n
ssues are
no
longer of secondary
interest hut are matters
that can seriously
affect FrancoAmerican relations.
Kissinger's often abrupt
tactics and
lack of a coherent strategy
were reflected in his
uncertainty over whether to
try to assure continued
American
pri-nacy or to consult and
cooperate to a greater
extent with
the French. Kissinger has
written that "the act of
choice is the ultimate test of
statesmanship."^ ThU3 Nixon
B
Kissinger's uncertainty over
policies toward France (and
Europe) reflect the partial
breakdown of America's consensus
concerning the position and
importance of France (and Europe) in American foreign
policy.

-

•

™

.

^

However difficult the controversy
was between Kissinger
and Jobert concerning the IEA,
the real differences between
the United States and France were
over NATO
and the EC.

With respect to NATO Pompidou and
Giscard have both refused to return to the Alliance. As
previously
indicated,

de Gaulle's successors have, in
certain areas, improved
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after the 0ctQb :;
war threatened to involve
NATO because of the
use of its
faculties, in the Middle
Eastern conflict on for the
French - the wrong side.
The pro-Arab policies
of Fraree
will be discussed
later. What is Important
to realize is
that Kissinger's actions
have made the French
all the .ore
anxious to avoid any
substantial identification
with NATO
Many Europeans have always
been fearful that, if
the United
States became heavily i„
volve<J in Asia> a
between its Asian and European
commitments. The rapid rise
of the pro-Israeli lobby
and its fervent support
of Israel
have also meant that it has
been extremely difficult
for

^^^

American presidents to be more
even-handed in the Middle
East.
By his actions and pronouncements
during and after
the October war. Kissinger
gave the French every reason
to
remain at a good distance from NATO.
Furthermore, with respect to NATO's
strategy and
tactics, French leaders saw no more
willingness in the
Nixon-Kissinger administration to plan joint
strategy than
in any other American administration.
Zbigniew Brzezinski
writes that "the basic conceptual framework
of Nixon's
foreign policy involves an essentially traditional
balanceo f-power approach but one that is
Bismarckian which is based
on
n movement and flexibility, surprising both
friends and
enemies alike.

The shallowness of this approach as a

———

of taxing with
rue ° f
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-of pervasive
ai«i«a*
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taerW . miea

shouid

War
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n

the 1970
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; a

change.

mMn

the baIance of
power in eu
deed America's failure
ie in +M
~
*nis« respect
aftpr* the
+h« first
-pa
j.
aixer
world
should be a sobering
reminder

^

^

balance of power will
not continue as a
result of divine
dispensation out win
necessitate considerable
wi s do ra , consistency of purpose, and
restraint on the part of
all concerned.
as
Kissinger
„
consistently followed such
policies
toward France r.t without
at least tacit French
support,
the United States will
not be able to .aintain
the balance
of power in Europe in the
future.
The relationship between
France and NATO is involved
and subject to constraints.
The existence of a large
and well-organized Communist
party
that consistently attracts
ZOf, of the French
electorate has
always been a complicating
factor in French attitudes
towards
NATO.
But the problem of the
Euro-Communists role in the
French government (and elsewhere
in Europe) was not always
well-handled by Kissinger. John
Stoessinger writes "His
(Kissinger's) pursuit of overall
stability led him to resist the expansion of Communist
influence in Western Europe.
His usual feeling for nuance did
not extend to the European
situation. So single-minded, in fact,
did his pursuit of
stability become that a British editor,
in late 1975, compared Kissinger to John Foster Dulles.
'There has been

nothing so vehement
since Dulles' tin,.. «.<
tlme
this Englishman
,
remarked
«
e-arked. K.ssxnger
has proposed a new
domino theory,
the
Italian Communists
would enter +h 6 o
R ° me Government,
leading
„
+
to
Communists sharing
power in France
P. „
33 w ell as Portugal
, „
,
and Spa.n, provoking
a withdrawal of
rican
Europe, and the
oollapse of the North
Atlantio Treaty
0rgani 2a tion...45
Consequently, in the
long-run. it will
not he possihle to
maintain the halanoe
of power in Europe
without a more positive
commitment by France
towards NATO
Serious differences also
remain with respect to
the
da Xr^a. Both Pompidou and
Giscard affirmed the
desirability of a French
nuclear force. y et there
is no
indication that Kissinger
was prepared to aid
France as the
United States aided Britain
for so many years under
the
provisions of the MacMahon Act.
American nuclear cooperation with France would be
counter to the American
policy of
nuclear non-proliferation and
appear to be a reward to
France for its unilateral efforts.
Moreover, what effect
would American nuclear aid
have upon the West Germans?
What
would be done about the fact
that France's nuclear weapons
'

•

^

^^

are not assigned and coordinated
with those of NATO? With
respect to NATO and the lore*
da frappe, certain constraints
exist between both countries and particularly when considering Kissinger's actions - there
does not appear to be
any way to resolve these differences.

Differences related to the EC also strongly
affect

188

Franco-American rations.

Pompidou has

^^^ ^

Portance upon defining and
identify ing the Ec
The EC would concentrate
on developing fi nanc
ial. industrial, agricultural and
monetary policies. Thus
the French
would no longer emphasize
strategic and foreign
policy matters.
As noted (in the section
on the EC). Nixon and
Kissinger assailed the EC and
Kissinger's implicit
connection
of economic and military
issues in discussions
between the
unxted States and the West
Europeans has meant that the
EC
has had considerable pressure
placed upon it in its most
vulnerable areas. According to
Stanley Hoffmann the United
States would be well-advised
to "abandon its attempts
to
Play on intra-European divisions,
or its effort to dissolve
the EEC common-trade and
agricultural policies or its
claim to a permanent .drpTLde^regard,
on policies affecting
U.S. interests.
This statement could equally
apply to
U.S. policies towards France.
This does not mean that the
United States should not defend its
interests, but it does
mean that the often confusing, unilateral
policies of the

Nixon-Kissinger administration could have been
more restrained. The emergence of a "European Europe"
should
be constantly perceived as a threat by Washington.

not

More-

over, in terms of the relationship between domestic

structures and foreign policy, Kissinger's policies did
little to educate public opinion in either America or
France as regards the Increased importance of consultation
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cooperation between the
two countrieg>
fiy
(or denigrating)
French expressions
ngtionaiism
bound to occur in

-

&

..^^

^^
^

J*

hereby
automatically preclude
^
"operative venture,),
Kissinger did
,
not b
„
-t
br.dge (ana sometimes
made worse) the serious
rift in
public opinion that
has developed between
the Americans
the French as part
of the Gauilist legacy.

^

^S-Qi^Sriaie

and The Mlrtdi,

v^±

In 1954 George Kennan
had warned that "in
many instances our raw material
supply hangs on slender
threads
and ones over which we
have no power of control
or even of
redress. And I worry lest
some day drastic
interruptions
of this supply should
lead to painful crises and
tensions."*?
In 1973 Kennan- warning „
s
as to become a reality.

Differences between the United
States and France over
the oil crisis and Middle
Eastern policy reveal how important these two issues have
become in Franco-American relations.
For de Gaulle and his successors,
the

Suez incident confirmed that France must
move away from a policy of
supporting Israel. In 1 9 6? a serious
clash occurred between the United States and France
over Middle Eastern policy.
De Gaulle viewed with alarm the
increased involvement
of each superpower on opposing sides.
This could only lead
to a reduction of the influence
of countries like France or,
more serious still, extend the competitive
aspects of

superpower politics to
the Kiddle East
oee innuence

zz\v
it r

uence in

m

*

Fi +h
Either
way Franr e

r

-

area that w

-

—

tii:
cons

vital to dance's
(and Europe's)
economic security
ause
of its vast oil
reserves. "e
De baulle
GaulU thus
+ v,
w as not onlv
aware of the
o f oil hut was
.so trying to ma*e
K ranco- A l eerian
relations

stance

.

^^

^

precluded French support
of Israel.
The October war. in
1 973 .
the ensueing
indicated the depth of
differing American and
French
ceptions concerning the
oil crisis and the
Kiddle East
French suspicion and anger
had reached a high
point in the
Kassinger-Johert confrontations
which occurred at the
energy
conference of February, 1974.^
According to
London
EMnamiai "Mr. Kissinger's apparent
quarrel with Europe this
year has, in fact, been a fight
with France, designed to
defeat the French attempt to
shape European policy in
a way
that excludes the United
States.'^ Thus, real and serious
differences existed between the two
antagonists. Kissinger
was inclined toward forcing
a confrontation between the
industrialized nations and OPEC while
the French preferred
to quietly discuss issues with
OPEC. But in the de Gaulle
years, when many Americans reacted
with rage and frustration to many of de Gaulle's policies,
Kissinger was one of
the first to counsel prudence and
restraint for "rage is

^

^^

^

^
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t

gnore or had difficulty
follQwing Ms previous
Diplomacy iE
more than a science
^_
Preach a g oal can be
as important as
goai
despite these disagreements
with the French, the
IEA was to
become a reality.
Arrangements to deal with
future shortages, to develop new
sources of energy and
to deal with the
financial problems arising
from the crisis were
agreed upon,
however, the French refused
to join the IEA.

^

^

^

^

^^

Kissinger's often excessive
pressures upon the Europeans
and the French to conform
to American positions
has meant
that "the chance to use
the energy crisis as
a means of
strengthening the Community has
been lost. f

irst by the
Europeans, but abetted by
American indifference. "5°
Under Presidents Pompidou and
Giscard. France has
sought to keep the Middle East
out of the exclusive sphere
of the superpowers and to
increase French influence in
the
Mediterranean and Africa. It is. of
course, questionable
whether France has the capacity to
influence events in these
areas decisively. But whatever the
degree of French influence in these areas, it would appear
to be an asset, certainly not a negligible quality. It
is curious that American statesmen (and no few scholars)
should have so many
doubts about or be willing to dismiss entirely
French efforts.
In the first place, particularly after
Vietnam,

questions can be raised concerning the ability
of the

Unite, States to pursue
consistent policies that
deal ira aginitively ana sensitively
with the peopies of
the Kediterranean and Ainca.
Africa
«„
The Americans simply
cannot deal
wi-ly and deal well with
all of the areas
problems. M oreover, after France's
past trials and tribulations,
would it
not be wise to allow,
even encourage, the French
(and the
other states of Western
Europe) to assume a more
active rol,
in areas that they consider
to be of interest.
The French
(and West Europeans) could
thereby enhance their
selfconfidence and moral self-assurance
as it became increasingly apparent that in this
rapidly changing world they
too
had important contributions
to make to their own and
mankind's betterment.

With respect to French efforts
in the Middle East, however, Kissinger, both before
and after the October war.
displayed complete indifference and indeed
hostility.

While
the French proclaimed their loyalty
to the Atlantic Alliance in 1973. they also criticized
the cooperation of the
United States and the Soviet Union in
halting the October
war as weakening the credibility of
America's commitment to
the security of Europe. 51 Kissinger's
sympathy and cooperation with France after the October war
might not have produced beneficial results. But did Kissinger
not always

argue that "if we face the fact that the interests
of Europe
and the United States are not identical everywhere,
it may
be possible to agree on a permissible range of
divergence?" 52
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His diplomacy w as too
calculating and callous.
His initiatives were designed to force
France and the Europeans
to accept American positions. In
effect, he insisted on
a predominant role for the United
States with little or no
regard
for the views of the French.
But it was France's (and
Europe's) economic security
that was at stake. Moreover,
the result of Kissinger's
policies was predictable, he
lost
credit diplomatically with the
Europeans for what was occurring in fact, i.e., the United
States was slowly becoming
more evenhanded in the Middle East
by supporting Egypt. Yet
considerable damage had been done that
perhaps by foresight
and a more accommodating diplomatic
style, could have been
avoided.

Unfortunately, as J. Robert Schaetzel states
"for the
first time in postwar history, an American
administration
had dealt with Europe precisely as it would
a hostile

state."53

The objectives and the style of Kissinger's di-

plomacy from 1973 to the summer of 197^ were questionable.

Thereafter alarm in Europe at America's anger, the departure
of Pompidou and Jobert and later Nixon further eased tensions.

And the new American President, Gerald Ford, to his

credit, did not share his predecessor's propensity for con-

frontation politics.

While, in some respects, Kissinger's

influence on foreign policy was enhanced after Nixon's resi gnation,
i

stration

the delicate domestic position of the new admin-

and Ford's desire to avoid confrontations

-

19k

meant that more
emphasiss was placed„
upon Summit meeting
conferences, such as
the Puerto nican
Ri can Conf
Conference in 107/;
„
i
resolve problems
between the United
*
Stat 68
its

^

allies.

•

Ewopean

Cooperation between the
United
Tea st
st«ates
+ « and
* «
France would
""J-a
nave been difficult
~v
nicult to achieve
when de Gaulley was
*
President.
wi +^ r>
With
Pompidou and definitely
with discard,
Giscard the
th. opportunities
~
for cooperation
increased
v
eased.
P+ for Ni
w xon
Yet,
and Kissinger
cooperation with Prance
had never a very
high
.
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demand Braudel, the great
Prench historian,

priority,

has observed
that the centuries long
contest between Sp ai „
md Turkey fQr
-stery of the Mediterranean
occurred at the time when
the
locus of political and
economic power was moving
from the
Mediterranean to the nations
that bordered the
Atlantic,
thereby ensuring that for
both Spain and Turkey,
the struggle was increasingly less
important.
In many respects. Kissinger's prolonged efforts
in Vietnam were also of
diminishing importance to American
objectives while other problems
needed attention.

Basically, the future course
of relations between the
United States and France will
depend upon the policies of
the United States.
In monetary and financial
matters, in
NATO and Europe, the United
States will have to acknowledge
French and European interests.
The United States can no

a
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Kissinger had
the opportunity to
attempt
w reacn
reach some
som. agreements
y to
with
France if only to set
a precedent
P Ceaent for blowing
f n
administrations.
Instead,
a . we imd
finri -f->.o
+
that, according to
Stanley Hoffmann, "in the Nixon-Kissinger
oolirv +tension
v,
* "ger policy,
exists between
the wish for self-restraint
ana an aggressive
pursuit or the
national interest, between
the wish to let the
West Europeans
build their own entity
and the inclination to
keep Europe
(and Japan) closely tied
to the U.S. as permanent
allies in
a basically tripolar
contest, between the objective
of preserving NATO and the tendency
to consider the emergent
European Community as an economic
rival. "55

°T'
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The present period is one
of profound political and
Philosophical change, when the post-war
order is disintegrating while the framework of the
newly emerging order can
only be dimly perceived. Kissinger
understood the pervasive
nature of these changes when he
recognized that while
the

world is still bipolar militarily,
it is becoming multipolar

politically.
.
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Moreover, simultaneously
x Ln thes
J with
cnese genpml

9

were al ao

'

ource of frustration
tor the united states
.
-side in the failure of
both

^ening

Me ^

^

^

felines

^

The

political ana philosophical
perspectives.
then, the early
19?0 .. provided
circumstanoes

Political ana philosophical

han

^

Surely

coula have heen arFranco-American relations
once
again coula have heen
a raod el illustrating
the benefits of
a new arrangement that
stressed coalition ana
cooperation,
yet also allowea for
aisagreeraents.

ticulated ana implemented.

However, this dia not
transpire.
Insteaa Kissinger
oscillated between attempts to
ensure American primacy
and
the necessity to consult
and cooperate.
Few. if any. American statesmen have been so
knowleageable concerning France
ana Europe. Yet his recora
as regaras Franco -American
relations falls far short of
greatness. His aiplomatic priorities lay elsewhere. In many
instances this is apparent
in his policies. But what will
be the viewpoint of future
analysts? Dia Kissinger miss a
crucial chance to reaefine
America's relations with France ana
Western Europe? Would
he have sought to ao this if he
had remained in office
longer? Was it really necessary (and
wise) for Nixon and
Kissinger to have been so preoccupied with
the Vietnam War
and adversarial relations that other
areas (particularly
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France and Western
Europe)
urope; suffered^ *
from neglect?
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Kissinger's policies did
not prevent (and at
times
helped cause) a widening
inening of +v.
the gap between
America and
France (and Western Europe).
„, did not
r
order for Franco -American
(and Alliance relations)
while his
shock tactics and oscillation
between unilateralism

^

and co-

operation confused and estranged
public opinion. Yet for
the democratic states on
both sides of the Atlantic,
public
support of their policies is
crucial.
If Western values are
to be maintained in a
revolutionary world, cooperation
among
the Western nations is not
just desirable, it is

vital.
The French and the West Europeans
are no longer amenable to American pressures. 5 ?
A major task of the present
administration in Washington will be
to begin restructuring
relations between the United States
and France (and Europe)
so that partnership, while allowing
for differences, may become more of a reality and less of an
ideal and. therefore,
more accurately reflect the imperatives of
a new
age.

,
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f0 rmerly a
global
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Historically f ew countrifis
exper.enced so rapid a
demise in their
international influence.
In less than a quartpr
quarter nr
of a century Britain
has
declined from a world to
a medium power whose
lmportance 4
basically confined to a
regional context. There
are .any
reasons for this change in
Britain's position, however
wars often accelerate
changes that are already

.

m

underway,
this manner World War II
marked the rise of the two.
extraEuropean superpowers to world
domination while the multipolar Euro-centered world
order ended.

Consequently, three choices
confronted Britain, to
continue as they had in the
past with alliances that were
prompted by circumstances, to
become closely associated with
the continent, or to become
the junior partner of the United
States.
To a formerly great power
these have been difficult
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Britain could have had
the leadership of
aski ng .»l But the
British preferred to
r eBain aloof from
Europe, for their
relationship to the
Continent has been
described as "extraordinarily
ambivalent. "2 When they
changed their minds in
the sixties, it was
too late. And
in the seventies, once
again. Britain is
uncertain about
the choice between the
European Community and going
its own
way. As to the Americans
little of substance
remains of
their bilateral relationship
with Britain. Except in
periods of acute crisis, when
the nature of the challenge
was

unambiguous. Britain and the
United States have often disagreed.
The United States was less
than enthusiastic about
the ^imposition of Britain's
Colonial empire at the end of
World War II. Consequently
Britain's statesmen have made a
serious mistake in attributing far
too much importance to
the special relationship with the
United States after World
War II. Americans do not work easily
with equals in international relations. They are often unaware
of or insensitive to nuance, to the more subtle aspects
of international
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the
continuation of an un b
unambiguous challenge
(two assumptions
that cannot he
expected to prevail
indefinitely) , is
doubtful that a
superpower could for a con
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Today Britain stands
at a watershed in
its history.
1* cast as.de its historical
ambivalence towards
Europe
join the Europeans
in an effort to
promote their collective influence in the
world through the EC?
Or will it
continue its present
uncertain courses
course, ambivalence
n
concerning the EC with the
knowledge that the once
vaunted special
relationship with the United
States grows more and
more
meaningless?

Kissinger wrote more extensively
on West Germany and
France, Britain occupied
a place of lesser
importance.
In
the future it cannot be
said that Britain-s
contribution
alone will be decisive for
the eventual

success of the West

Europeans to achieve greater
influence in a world of evergreater political plurality. But
is it possible that the
influence of Western Europe on
issues that affect its present and future can be increased
or even maintained without
the contribution of Britain? This
is extremely doubtful.

If the Western Europeans are to
regain the major responsibility for their destiny, it will

have to be with the active
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support of Britain.

In many areas Britain
is the leading
scientific and technology
power in Europe. And
its political system is exceptionally
stable.
Can the unity of
the West, forged in the
past by . common
perception of
danger develop a new sense
of purpose from shared
aspirations73 Britain's hostility
or indifference to the
West
Europeans' quest may prove
an insurmountable
obstacle.

Kissinger's major concern was to
examine Britain's special relationship with the
United States and Anglo-American
policy preceding the Nassau
Conference. However, his

analysis is also of considerable
importance for the relationship
between the United States and Western
Europe during the
crucial period from the Nassau
Conference (December 1 9 6 2 ) to
de Gaulle's Press Conference of
January 1*. 1963. During
this period, Britain's protracted and
difficult negotiations
for entry into the EC were approaching
a climax. De Gaulle's
veto of Britain's entry into the EC at his
Press Conference
on January 14 signaled the emergence of differing
conceptions

between France and the United States concerning the
structure
and policies of a united Europe.
But the memory of Britain's past proved far too strong
for it to, without misgivings, promote European unity.

Bri-

tain had always sought to prevent the emergence of a powerful and United Europe.

Therefore, to abandon its American

ana Commonwealth
connections wouid

w

1«

tradition.
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Unfortunately, the major
exertions during
the war had not onl
y exhausted the British,
hut they were
to
decide which option
unable
to pursue,
the relationship
with the Commonwealth,
the United States,
or with Europe
Kissinger states that
Britain is not really
involved in
a search for identity
hut rather that
Britain's identity i
s
'•incompatible with an
unreserved entry into
Europe."* Indeed. Britain's views
on the organization
of Europe as expressed by Churchill, for
example, have not been
very different from the views
espoused by de Gaulle. Both
have insisted that sovereignty
represents the highest value.5
Yet
Britain's views have been
couched in more temperate
language
and were without the
theoretical emphasis placed
upon the
links between cooperative
endeavors and national identity.
Moreover, one cannot deny that
Britain's strategic and emotional ties have been more
pronounced regarding its transAtlantic relationships. Finally,
Britain was also a world
power and not just a European power.

But what exactly is the special
relationship between
Britain and the United States? A common
language and cultural ties have reinforced the more
informal aspects. However, the British have often, particularly
in the sixties,
overestimated their importance. British diplomacy
has been
quite skillful in giving the impression that
American foreign policy is strongly influenced, if not
guided, by
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European power and
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Europe. Britain
should, of course, join
the EC.
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Two events were of
critical

instance

in signifying the

decline of Britain's influence
with the United States,
The
Suez Crisis and the Skybolt
missile cancellation. Suez
showed that Britain could not
act without the concurrence
of
the United States while
the Skybolt missile
cancellation revealed the lack of British military
autonomy.
Both wounds
were to some extent self-inflicted
but "in both instances,
brutal and unfeeling American
actions aggravated an already
difficult situation." 6

But while these events signaled
the decline of the special relationship, a number of serious
misconceptions remained in both countries concerning the
Anglo-American relationship.
Britain exaggerated its influence in the
United
States while the Americans may have
overestimated the ease
with which Britain could change its policies.
Thus,
"it be-

came an axiom of United States policy that
Britain's entry
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into a supranational Europe
would be a guarantee of
Atlantic
Partnership. -7 „ 0Wever , the
consequenoe£j
suiting from Britain's entry
into the EC could not occur
because of de Gaulle's vexo.
tv>*
veto
a™ ~<
The Americans
were outraged over
this turn of events.
Would Britain have led a
Europe that
acceded to American interests?
Or would the result have
been "that Europe would henceforth
have conducted de Gaulle's

^

policies with British methods." 8

By 1962 the only aspect of the
special relationship that
had any substance was in the
nuclear field. In 1957 Britain
began the development of a missile
called the Blue Streak
which, due to extraordinary expenses,
had to be abandoned in
February, i960 in favor of a missile under
development in the
United States called Skybolt. From i960 on
there was an intense debate in Britain between the Conservatives,
who defended the purchase of the Skybolt missile, and
Labor, who

questioned the wisdom of depending on a missile made by
another country that was not yet even fully operational.
The

Conservatives also sought to show the importance of the

British deterrent to the Americans, but Labor strongly attacked this position.

According to Kissinger, what was at

stake by 1962 was a matter of life or death for the Con-

servative government f was Britain independent with respect
to nuclear weapons?

It was in this atmosphere that sud-

denly, in December 1962, the Americans produced an uproar by

cancelling Skybolt.

A hastily convened conference was held
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at Nassau between Prime
Kiniater

^

Kennedy.

The Nassau Agreement w
as a complex and
ambiguous docu»ent forged during the
most intimate period
of the "special
relationship- which attempted
to provide Britain
with a
strategic nuclear force
that was. however,
basically to be
used only in conjunction
with NATO * s objectives.
As Kissinger writes, -it tried
to reconcile
integration with independence, the American belief
in the need for an
indivisible nuclear strategy with
the British desire for
autonomy. "9 This attempt tQ
reconcile the irreconcilable
faUe<j>
Reaction in Europe ranged from
cool to hostile. There
were
so many ambiguities, so much
that was contradictory or
ill-

defined in the Agreement that it
was small wonder that de
Gaulle viewed it with suspicion.
Even the Labor party
thought that the Agreement "proved
the validity of their
previous contention that British nuclear
independence was a
10
sham."
If Labor had these views, if many
Americans thought
that Britain's nuclear forces still
were not integrated into
NATO, can it be any wonder that de Gaulle
resolutely rejected the Agreement?

Yet the real tragedy of the Nassau

Agreement was its poor timing.

Britain's delicate and dif-

ficult negotiations to enter the EC were at
a decisive point
and, by thus reaffirming the primacy of its strategic
trans-

Atlantic ties, serious doubts were raised concerning Britain's

intentions in Europe.
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Moreover, the Agreement
r einforced de Gaulle .
s con _
e 10,1
h
1*- own defense. How
!
could
integration, he asXed.
be reconciled with
independent disposition, „ot only the
substance of the
Agreement>
aiaea France not at
all for the French h
ad neither sublines nor warheads, hut the way
in which the Agreement
was
negotiated created many
problems. Moreover. Paris
received
a copy of the Agreement
only
u-y aixer
after it had ^
been released to
the press.

States.
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Thus, while the Agreement
was probably not the
sole
reason for de Gaulle's rejection
of Britain's bid to enter
the EC, still it was a
contributory cause and raised
anew
the question of whether one
member of a Unitea Europe
should
have an exclusive relationship
with the United States on
so
vital a subject as nuclear weapons.

Kissinger states that, "in retrospect,
the failure of
Britain to consult with France and
its other European allies
before committing itself to the Nassau
Agreement
seems a

crucial missed opportunity. "11

It seems certain that even

if the EC negotiations had failed, Britain
still would have
been in a less disadvantageous position
if it had consulted
with its European allies prior to the
Nassau Agreement. But
on January 1*, 1963, de Gaulle vetoes Britain's
admission to

the EC and rejected
the

^^ ^
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date "marks an important
watershed in Atlantic
relation, ' J*
Several problems assumed
a more serious
aspeot after de
Gaulle's press conference
of January 14.
1963.
The belief that there
would
+•
"J.a be
De an automatic
progression
fro, economic to political
integration was open to
serious
question.
Politics involved questions
of values and policy
and a consensus was
henceforth much more
difficult to obtain
Also, the idea of an
Atlantic partnership between
the United
States and a United Europe,
including Britain, was now
in

need of serious reexamination.

It was Kissinger who
wrote,

"it is clear that conflicting
approaches to Atlantic rela-

tionships were confronting each
other. m1 3
The situation was further
complicated by the alignments
that occurred on different issues.
On economic issues, West
Germany and the Netherlands tended to
side with Britain

while in the field of strategy, West
Germany favored the
United States. Moreover, European
opposition

to de Gaulle

did not automatically mean support of
the United States.
Many Europeans, including left-wing groups,
while objecting
to de Gaulle's imperious style, did not
necessarily object
to Third Force policies or believe in
a long-term asso-

ciation with the United States.
The press conference of January 14, 1963 opened
a period
of frantic diplomatic activity in which, according to Kissinger, the "United States strove hard to vindicate its

Previous conception an.
France

States,

^

^ ^^
p

^

Europe> Kissinger
pointed

started out as a dispute
about the interna!
structure of
HuroPe and its role runs
the risk of
ehifting the balance within
Europe in unexpected
direc"15
tions.

ThOtiSiSiH
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During the period of
Kissinger's tenure in office
(1969-1976). no major problems
arose between

the United
States and Britain in contrast
to the situation that
existed with respect to West
Germany and France. The
West Germans were engaged in the
promotion of Ostpolitik and
the
development of a political role
commensurate with their
economic power. At the same time
they remained conscious of
the need for an active
WestpoHtik and harmonious relations
with the United States. The French,
while modifying

the

more extreme aspects of the Gaullist
legacy, still sought
to enhance their importance in
Europe, in particular,

and in

the Middle East and Africa.

Yet Britain has not been engaged in any
enterprise of
this scope and magnitude.

Some may disagree, citing Bri-

tain's admission into the EC in 1973.
no decisive contribution.

But Britain has made

Moreover, both the United States
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the West Europeans
haVfi agreed on
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British admission into
the EC.
W hile the 1975
referend,lum
indicated that Britain win
remain in the EC, the
success
of the referendum does
not ensure a positive
British contribution. Many people in
Britain, particularly
in the
Labor party's left-wing,
still implacably
v,
^
6. are still
hostile to the
EC.

Britain's influence and
importance in international
relations continued to decline
during the Kissinger
years.
Old social fissures and
even class warfare combined
with an
obsolete industrial plant have
meant that there has been
a
very real decline in Britain's
interest in the outside
world. Moreover, serious
nationalist movements in the British Isles have made the
fragmentation of Britain no longer
16
unthinkable.
The development of the welfare
state

has
also contributed to British
indifference towards the outside
world.
The more parochial aspects of the
welfare state have

been reinforced and enhanced by Britain's
loss of empire and
the decline of its international influence.
North Sea oil
has meant that, unlike France, Britain has
had no serious

disagreements with the United States over Middle
Eastern
policy.

But will the bonanza from the North Sea further

exacerbate Britain's internal divisions if claims for this

largesse mount too rapidly?

After paying off its large

foreign debt, will the surplus funds be used to modernize
obsolete sectors of British industry and reduce taxation
or
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wil! various groups
make exorbitant
claims to satisfy their
Parochial demands and thus
disregard Britain's
needs as a
whole.
I, Britain's internal
problem3
resolved, can anyone expeot
that it will be able
t£)
&
Positive contribution to
the EC and the
problem pertaining
to Western Europe?
Today Britain stands
at a decisive point
in its modern history.
It can continue on
its present course
of doubt and hesitation,
particularly with respect to
the EC
while being wracked by ever
greater domestic problems
whose
intensity will preclude any major
British contribution

^^

^

be-

yond its shores.

Or an imaginative and innovative
British
government can attempt to resolve
Britain's
social and

economic problems in concert with
the other members of the
EC, thus inspiring the British
with confidence to make a
major contribution to the international
problems that beset
Western Europe. Which course will Britain
adopt? That is
the question that still remains
unanswered. I shall examine
three areas that are of decisive importance
to Britain in
the present context. Britain and the ECj
the relations be-

tween Britain, France, and West Germany! and the
relationship
between the United States and Britain. What policies
did

Kissinger follow regarding these areas?
if any, occurred in his views?

What modifications

Kissinger was an astute ob-

server of Britain's psychological and political vulnerabilities.

He recognized that the Suez crisis and the Skybolt

affair had been serious blows to Britain's pride and
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self-confidence in

action

to imposing Very

straints upon Britain's
political options.
Therefore, in a
Period of profound politioal
ana social o han ge
with Britain
.
suffering a serious domestic
malaise. Kissinger's
polioies
could have aimed at
providing new guidelines
for the AngloAmerican relationship. At
the same time one
should expect
American policies that would
attempt, insofar as this
is
possible, to enhance or augment
Britain's confidence so
that
Britain can make worthwhile
contributions to
the world.

Britain and th f f. roTlpar r.r^^i+y
,

Once the British thought that
they could choose between
the Commonwealth, the United
States, and Europe.
The choice
no longer exists.
The Commonwealth is but a symbol
of an
imperial past that recedes ever
further into history. The
special relationship with the United
States, once the pride
of Britain, is in reality an empty
shell.
Britain has only
one place left; Europe. F. S. Northedge
writes that
"the

effectiveness of British foreign policy would
be increased
if that policy were framed in a community
context. nl 7 There
are two areas in particular in which Britain would
benefit

from a greater involvement both in the EC and with
the

Western European statesi

in economics and defense.

Britain's serious
economic problem
have greatly diminished its capacity
to conduct a
,
resolute foreign
policy.
« methods of
British
industrial m
industrial
management are archaic.
.
The
industrial plant is badly
i„ nee
„„
need
d of m
modernization.
With
respect to technology.
Haymond Vernon writes,
"the
•

v.

.

.

o-

m

•

tech-
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still grappli ng with
a sense of technological
inferiority that is deeply
disconcerting. "18 Agri
culture. now
that preferential
arrangements with the
Commonwealth countries are becoming a thing
of the past, is
certain to cause
Problems because of rising
prices.
The British desire
for
lower prices will he
contested in
"' "anee,
France W«+
West rGermany, and
Italy.
All of these problems
were further exacerbated
during the seventies by a
very high level of inflation
that,
by 1976, according to OECD
statistics, was 15 percent. 20
Labor relations po Se a difficult
problem. The failure of
the unions to take measures
to discipline "wildcat
strikers",
whether they had a just grievance
or not. has time and again'
seriously disrupted British public
life.
There must be an
equitable balance between business
and labor in the modern
state.
When either business or labor become
too powerful,
a society's interests as a whole suffer.

Consequently, even with its persistent
economic problems, the possibility exists that
Britain's membership in
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this problem was beyond
his control, his
unilateral methods
combined with other
adverse economic policies
meant that the
EC was going to have
a much more difficult
time with monetary and financial
problems and economic
growth.
Thus '
Partly because of these
difficulties the EC presented
a
somewhat disorderly economic
model for Britain.
Kissinger's
unilateral economic policies
also encouraged those in
Britain who believed in similar
approaches. Behind the ambiguities of his rhetoric and
policies was a lack of a coherent and consistent policy
as regards Britain and the
EC.
Membership in the EC could prove
of immense value to the
British economy. Should the
economy fail to change in the
areas previously mentioned. Britain's
ability to make its
influence felt in even a regional
context will be seriously
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defense, a major British
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of NATO ground forces,
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the Naval
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speech, Nixon talked of
the need for greater
European
defense contributions clawing
that the United States
devotes a much higher
ier
sharp of
nf its
i+o economic
snare
g
product to defense than the Europeans. 221

A vital task for Britain will
be to ensure that the
EC
remains firmly committed to
the Atlantic Alliance.
With
the diminished threat from
the East,

the rise in the cost of

defense, and the pressures upon
Western economies, many West
Europeans favor reducing defense
expenditures and commitments to the point where Western
Europe's security could be
seriously threatened. Such trends
are already evident in
Denmark and the Netherlands. Moreover,
French policy is
sometimes too indifferent to the EC and
the Atlantic Alliance.

According to the London Economist "So
far Mr. Kissinger has not told Britain flatly that
it is more
use to
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tish membership is
the best wav of h
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Concerning Britain-s
defense budget, Andrew
Shonfield

remarks, "that (1)

ma
ae
-de

-

of any
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these will involve
.
fundamental change in
British policy about
the defense of
the Continent, (2) tha
h^-p ~
hlS d6fenSe
c °™tment is
concurrent with
Britain's political membership
in the EC, (3) the
crucial
relationship with West Germany
wouia also suffer.
(4) one
ccula plausibly argue that
from the point of view
of the
U.S.. the maintenance of
an enlargea EC (with
Britain inside) is a major objective
of policy in the secona
half of
the 1970-..-* I have
alreaay aiscussea the basically
«s

ne-

gative attitudes that Kissinger
expressea toward the EC.
Obviously his views toward the
EC have undergone serious
modification and in this respect
his policy towards Britain
was based on satisfying more
ephemeral considerations of
immediate interest than in the
(long-term) necessity of ensuring British participation in the
EC.
In addition one
must stress the interdependence of
the EC and NATO. Britain
and the major states of Europe could
ensure stable, longrange economic growth by cooperating in
the EC through common monetary, industrial, and social
policies. Thus only if
the West Europeans, under the aegis of
the EC, can attain
economic growth over the long-term can they
provide the
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means to ensure their
security. im.
securitv
Kissinger displayed
little
or no recognition
n of the interdependence
l«+ a
between
•

the EC and

cooperate in each organisation.

Without sound economic

growth and progressive
social policies that
do not f ul ly
engage Britain how. over
the long-term, can
the West Europeans assume greater
responsibilities for their own
defense?
The future of Britain's
nuclear strike force is
also
important. Will the British
eventually cooperate with
France (and will both be
aided by West

^

Port) in a small West European
nuclear entity that, through
NATO, was linked to the
United States, yet had a
certain
degree of autonomy (Is a small
European nuclear force inevitable or even necessary)? As
regards nuclear weapons.
Andrew Pierre has written "with
Britain in Europe, the special Anglo-American nuclear
relationship has become, in some
ways, an anachronism. - 2? The issue
of American aid to Britain's nuclear program is no longer
a source of serious con-

tention with the French.

But this is due chiefly to the

fact that the French have succeeded in
their endeavor to
build a small but efficient nuclear force with
little or no
help from the Americans.
It remains to be seen what effects

a second SALT agreement will have upon Western Europe's
potential nuclear forces.

Kissinger has, however, done

reasonably well in both informing and respecting the Europeans' fears and concerns over this issue.
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have an important
in,

events.

Furthermore, these stat
es
should also have a
positive relationship
with the United
States.
For the survival of
Western values in a
revolutionary world presupposes
trans-Atlantic political
and economic cooperation.
It is apparent that
Britain, France, and West
Germany
Will, in various ways,
preserve some freedom of
maneuver,
while they slowly attempt
to strengthen and
enlarge the
scope of the EC. Yet hesitations
and doubts ensure that
the EC will have a highly
circumscribed role in the
future.
Relations with the United States
also pose a question marie.
Will the Americans really
support the EC as it slowly
consolidates its position and thus
threatens to (or actually
does) harm American economic

interests?

Consequently. London. Paris, and Bonn
must conduct
their affairs with due regard for
their own triangular relationship and with respect to the United
States.

This

means that a very complex diplomatic
situation exists with
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respect to most issues
and

+M«S

)
1S
eVen more apparent
in the
when a combination of
economic energy,
economic,
en
,
and polit
tical problems add
to the difficulties.

„

.
seventies

^ere

is no q u eS tion that
dipZomatic transactions
between and with Britain,
France, and West
Cermany in the
seventies can be very
time-consumin 5 and
non-productive.
When Kissinger did most
of his writing on
Western Europe
the situation was not
nearly so complex and
intractable
Yet even if the adverse
diplomatic situation of
the United
States in the early
seventies and the difficult
situation
of the West Europeans was
certain to reduce the
opportunities
for trans-Atlantic
cooperation, was this a
sufficient explanation for some of Kissinger's
policies?

Some conceptions of the
Atlantic world emphasized
the
nation-state, others the supra-national
aspects of organizations such as the EC. As
pertains to these opposing

conceptions, did Kissinger's policies
mitigate the differences
between the British and the French,
for example? As a
scholar, he was emphatic that
eventually Western Europe
must obtain the highest levels of
consultation and cooperation not only between its largest
states but also with the
United States. On numerous occasions
he refers to the

schisms or divisive tendencies in the West
that precluded
or wrecked Western unity to the detriment
of all. While
recognizing that differences could occur. Kissinger
knew
that the West must avoid internal schisms if
western values
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are to be maintained
in a r
PVnin-n
evolutionary
world.
then did
he fe.l
hG
* ^atened
+
fGel +
th
by the prospects
of a Euro.
,
European Europe?
wv,
Why
was he insistent upon
Maintaining ^erican
American h
hegemony when

^

.

it

ca^ne to

d.p^atic-strategie matters?

^

In this way
singer assure, that
British (.ore
interdependence with the
*nted States) and P renoh
(advocates of a European
Europe)
conoeptions pertaining to
Europe wouid rema in
unhridgeahie.
But did his failure in
this res
respect
h i
P ec t not help
perpetuate the
very same divisions in
the West that he had
originally
warned against?

Consequently, while some
aspects of the Gaullist
legacy
have been modified, Britain
and France still find
it difficult to cooperate in many
respects.
Britain is a member of
the EC but uncertainties
persist as to the direction

that
the EC should take; less
dependence on the U.S. and
more
self-assertion or more stress on
trans -Atlantic ties and

cooperation with the United States.

Consider economic issues.

Due to West Germany's

"economic miracle", serious disparities
already complicate
its relations with states in
less-favorable economic situations.
West Germany has basically sought to
cooperate in
a trans-Atlantic forum as has Britain
to solve economic issues.

But Kissinger's unilateral measures have
politically
undercut Bonn and London when they advocated
cooperation.
The French, once again, refused to go along
with the British and West Germans for they thought that
the Europeans
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st rive for more
economic self . assertion
_
the French disagreement
<
6 eemenx on Kissinger's
IEA pmri
i +o
-"-^
ana its
avowed
PoHoy of confrontation with
OPEC.
The French

^

preferred
work cuietly with
the Arabs and OPEC.
Th us on raany
economic
issues (an, energy) the
Orleans advocated

^

the French another,
while Britain and
West Germany
"here in between and for
the most part heipless
to bridge the
^P. Again. by his tactics ana an
often inconsistent longter ra vision. Kissinger
aid not always
demonstrate that he
appreciated the difficult
nature of relations between
Britain. France, and West
Germany. Yet relations
between Britain (France, and West
Germany) are further
complicated by
the necessity for cooperation
with the United States.

The United R+otes and

R.u lin

In a period of pervasive change
when men look to the
old and the familiar with longing
and view the new and the

uncertain with apprehension, an
opportunity exists for the
articulation and implementation of a new
framework for po-

litical and social life.
need of a new vision.

Anglo-American relations were in

While special ties would always ex-

ist due to affinities of language,
race, and culture, what
effects, for example, would Britain's increasing
involvement in the EC have upon its relationship with
the United

States?

As Britain continued to identify itself with Eu-

rope, how would this affect its nuclear relationship
with
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the United States?

Did Kissirwr^
**
Kissinger address
himself to these
problems? What did he
contribute,
contribute +towards the
restructuring
of Anglo-American
relations?

Andrew Shonfield has a
good understanding of
the problems concerning the
United States
and Britain.

These problems are (l) British
economic nationalism and
its attendant
economic problems will need
to be contained as
a potential
source of discord in the
international system, (2)
Britaininternational policies - and
possibly its relationship
with
West Germany - could be
adversely affected if the West
Germans were to replace Britain
as the chief partner of
the
United States in Europe,
(3) if there is a resurgence of
German nationalist feeling, the
situation will be easier to
handle if at least one other
important European power is
committed to NATO and the defense of
West Germany, (4) the
chances of Britain continuing as a
leading and effective
member of the Western Alliance will probably
depend chiefly
on the vitality of Britain's connections
with Europe. 28

How did Nixon and Kissinger deal with
these problems?
The American record, with respect to economic
nationalism,

can hardly have been encouraging to Britain.

Kissinger did not set a very good example.

From 1971 on,
In the summer

of 1971 Nixon and Kissinger commenced to undertake,
without

consulting the Allies or giving them advance notice, a widespread change in the manner in which the world conducted its
monetary and financial affairs.

The United States ended

"
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^
^
^^ ^
^

the convertibility
of do ll ars to gol d
thus national cur .
rencles were no longer
P eg Ced to specific
piuctu _
atin g currencies make
international
^

H

nee the EC is by far
the
*oul d have the more

trading

dimcult

shoes" were unpleasant
surprises
British

„

probiems>

to America . s

the West Europeans
were shocK ed an d n
a g ere d . an d
later somewhat pu z ,l ed
over this unilateral
abrogation of
arrangements that ha d been
agreed
e
u P° n bv
unon
all parties in 1944
°y .n
Was Kissinger co rape lle d
to aot in this manner?
The Europeans'
while often annoyed at
Washington's failure to curb
certain
abuses in its international
economic policy, were by
no means
unsympathetic to Washington- s
plight,
Lon d on an d Bonn,
in particular, a policy of
patent compromise, of attempting
to arrive at a consensus
on such a vital issue, woul
d perhaps, have led to agreement,
even if not as rapidly as
some
woulo wish. Nor di d the general
economic situation justify
the measures that Kissinger
employee).
A world of interde-

...

^

m

pendent economic powers (particularly
the United States.
Western Europe, and Japan) would seem
to require increaseO
consultation an d cooperation rather than
secretive, unilateral moves. As Stanley Hoffmann writes
"there is a growing need for pooled sovereignty, shared
powers and effective

international institutions in all the realms.

29

The Euro-

peans and the Japanese are as interest ed as the
Americans in
a smoothly functioning monetary system. Moreover,
was not
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the resentment
caused by Kissinger
Kissing. „s measures
more costly
v
„.
+
than the results
he acnieved
"e
achlm,^ so
„
rapidly?
Of course, economic
issues were further ,
""-Plicated by
the "oil cns
„ both
crisis"
ls but regarding
his tactics and
of purpose. Kissinger
has
ard
lng Shonfield-s
g
second
,

point ,

^

^

^

tain by West Germany
as America's chief
partner in Europe
the dispute with West
Germany over American
policy in the
Middle East and the shipment
of war material to
Israel from
NATO bases in West
Germany, energy po i icy
,
troops
Europe, U.S. policy toWards

^

^^^

economic issues all ensure
that it is unli ke ly
that West Ger
rcany will rep l ace
Britain as America s
rope.
The Americans and the West
Germans are trying to develop a relationship that will
reflect
equality
allow for disagreements. 30
Yet this new relationship
is
not meant to displace or threaten
Britain's relationship
with the United States. Concerning
the dangers of a revived
German nationalism. Kissinger has
often been a bad example.
Moreover, his indifference or even
hostile policies toward
the EC guaranteed that, if a resurgence
of German nationalism does occur, it will be more difficult
to handle.
With
respect to the necessity - the vital necessity of Britain's European connections, Kissinger
also set a very bad
example.
His advocacy of unilateralism, his denigration
of
not only the EC but the OECD and other
multilateral
,

^

^^

^
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institutions nave encouraged
those in Britain

^^

the EC.

Thus, unlike West
Germany ana France,
there were no
important direct bilateral
disputes between the
United
States and Britain.
Kissinger's failures with
respect to
Brxtain were of a more
indirect kind - his
aggressive unilateralism, the failure
adequately to consult, his
denigration of the EC and the
other multilateral
institutions
(excepting NATO), and his
determined advocacy of American
primacy not only increased the
very real possibility of
fragmentation within Western Europe
but also would -

if
this fragmentation occurs seriously damage the very
fabric
of trans-Atlantic cooperation.
It is difficult to see how.
in these circumstances. Britain
could make a positive con-

tribution to overcoming the transnational
problems that
afflict the nations of the North
Atlantic basin.
Summary

In his writings on Britain Kissinger
displayed sympathy
and understanding for Britain's plight.
He was highly
critical of the insensitivity of American foreign
policy,
particularly in the years before and after the Nassau

Con-

ference.

The preparation for the Conference itself and
the

final agreement were all displeasing to Kissinger.

He fore-

saw that, after the Conference prompted de Gaulle
to reject

229

Br. tain.

bid to enter the EC,
two competing
concepts of
Atlantic partnership had
emerged and that clashes
between
these concepts could have
the most serious cons
eq uences for
Britain and Western Europe.
But, despite these
views
Kissinger's actual policies
did not mitigate let
alone resolve the breach between
Britain and France.
Britain's
hesitation and doubt concerning
the EC reflect
disagreements
among Western Europe's three
major states over the policl
.es
and objectives a united
Western Europe would pursue.
Whil,-e
s

Kissinger's rhetoric acknowledged
the necessity for the
United States to accept short-term
problems with the EC to
justify long-term benefits, all too
often his unilateral
policies were designed to ensure American
primacy.
Thus

Kissinger's actions aided unilateralists
in Britain, France
and West Germany.
In the seventies as pertains to Britain's
relations

with the EC, its relations with France and
West Germany, and
the relationship with the United States,
there exists grounds
for concern.

In these areas Kissinger's policies added to

the difficulties.

A great statesman is one who has a vision

and transmits this vision to his people.

Bismarck had such

a vision, so did de Gaulle, and though their tactics varied

their objectives were never in doubt; to place Germany and

France in the front ranks of nations.

One cannot say the

same regarding Kissinger's vision concerning Britain and

Europe.
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In a speech in
London in December,
"but
Wit 1p+
i
let no
us also
remember that even
en the
ffiaftM

m — -—-o

2*1 °"~
603151

*

tlanu

«t

^

1

973
f5t Kifi
Klssl, nger said,

the h
best+ consultative
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t

especially
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n vision and
share

;

network of intangible

^ ^.^^

take care lest , in
defining £uropean
galls tic a manner,
er, we
wp lose
ino Q n,v,
what has made our
Alliance
unique
that in the deene^t O o„c r
P6St Sense Eur °P« and
America do not
think of each other
as foreign entities
conducting traditional diplomacy, hut
as members of a
larger Canity engaged, sometimes painfully
but ultimately always
cooperatively in a common enterprise."^ 1

^

-u

v.

i

The relationship between
the United States and
Britain
and the Western Europeans
should be restructured to
allow
the development of real
partnership, to redefine
relations
between a super-power and a
number of medium
and small

powers.

To accomplish this task will
be no easy matter.

It will require statesmanship
of a very high order that
demonstrates consistency of purpose
and moral acceptability.
In neither of these measures did
Kissinger succeed regarding
Britain and Europe. He did not articulate
and implement new
guidelines that would better serve the
Anglo-American relationship in a period of pervasive change.
Instead his policies caused doubt, hesitation, and
uncertainty, concerning
the relationship between the two countries.
In many respects
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he appeared uncaring o r
oblivious to Britain's
p sychological
and political pli ght
as the British
^
factory role in an often
confusing ana harsh world
Con .
sidering the brilliant and
incisive nature of his
scholarly
work. Kissinger's
performance „ as indeed
a disappointing one
as regards Britain.
But while Britain's ra
ilitary and economic prestige have declined.
Britain's political and
moral

^

^

^

.

Prestige command widespread
respect in the world, for
who can
envision the alleviation of raany
of the problems
both Western Europe and mankind
without a major contribution
by Britain? But Kissinger is no
longer preoccupied with
Britain and Europe, as a statesman,
his major efforts were
directed elsewhere.

^^
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THE RECORD OF A
SCHOLAR-STATESMAN

The relationship
between thec United
unixea States
q+
and Western
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Europe is rapidly
ly changing.
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Common peroeptions

and polici es
concerns, the threat
of Soviet power
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the world can cause
diff ering peroeptiong
is a world where

^

^^
^

reactions

not elioit oommon
accords.

^

Consequently the challenge
for
the West is to accept
diversity within a
framework of
partnership.

Kissinger frequently pointed
to the dangers
of debilitating divisions
in the West, asserting
that in
order for Western values to
survive in a revolutionary
world, the West would have
to overcome its divisive
schisms
and -show the way to a new
international order. -1 Thus
shared powers and responsibilities
would be encouraged
as

well as an increase in the
power and authority of multilateral and international institutions.

The failure to overcome these
difficulties could have
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grave consequences as
Peter Jay writes -Wh +
What new order does
the United States offer
thee world7
a„„ what
world? And
u
great principle or principles define
legitimacy and guide
American
involvement? Nineteen
seventy-nine was the third
year of
the Carter administration's
effort to supply some
answers
to the questions identified
by Kissinger in 1 68
but there9
after almost wholly ignored
in the Kissinger years." 2

^

Yet, what were the main
characteristics of Nixon's and
Kissinger's foreign policy? P
ierre H assner writes "Henry
Kissinger sometimes uses a
rhetoric of cooperative bipolarity, sometimes the rhetoric
of a multipolar balance of
power, sometimes the rhetoric of
the Atlantic Charter and of
free world unity reminiscent of
the 19^0's and the
19 5 0's,

sometimes the rhetoric of global
interdependence and world
community. "3 He then writes "the goal
of the Nixon-Kissinger administration was to keep as much
of a central role
for the United States in world affairs as
possible under new

conditions that require skilled diplomacy and
bargaining." 4

Concerning the methods of Nixon's and Kissinger's foreign policy, Raymond Aron asks, "how is Nixon's policy dif-

ferent from his predecessors?

First in the philosophy of

interstate relations and second in the situation itself,
hence a diplomacy which openly obeys the rules or customs of

Realoolitik or of power politics tries to build a world of
one partner-adversary (the USSR) and several partners, allies or adversaries within the various subsystems."^

Given
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the unsavory views
associated with tealviliMK
among large
sections of the public in the
United States and Western
Europe, was it wise (or merely
expedient) to follow such
po-

licies?
However, there can be little
doubt that from 1 9 6 9 to
1975. American foreign policy was
characterized by a new
approach which specifically attempted
to preserve a central
Place for the United States in the
world.
With the resignation of President Nixon in August,
1974, most of the previously noted aspects of E^gJLitiji
became less apparent.
There were several reasons for this.
The futility of RealBSlilik strategies with respect to Western Europe
and Japan
were apparent. President Ford, though
obviously influenced
by Kissinger, did not seem to be so enamoured
of Realoolitik
as his predecessor.

Finally, the new administration was in

delicate domestic circumstances, and international
events,
too, discouraged Realnolitik .

Yet, the question remains, why did Nixon and Kissinger

practice their brand of Realnolitik ?

Would the absence of

the Vietnam war have made any real difference in the conduct

of their diplomacy?

When the new administration assessed the situation in
1969, events seemed to require, as a top priority, the with-

drawal of the United States from Vietnam without being hu-

miliated, while ensuring the status quo.

Concurrently a

strong diplomatic effort was launched to influence Hanoi's

'

supporters, the Soviet Union
and China were
to pressure
Hanoi to agree to ma intain
the division o f
Vietnam, and to
link the resolution of
America sr dilemma
America
„
Vietnam with
progress on other bilato^oi
bilateral issues between
the United States
and the Soviet Union
and China.

m

Michael Brenner has noted
that in the Nixon-Kissing
foreign policy view,
the Soviet Union
satisfied powers, ( 2 both
)
these countries seek to
nurture
the impression that the
flow of history and the
balance of
forces in the world is shifting
in their favor,
(3) hence
they try to expand their
range of influence, (4)
thus they
are prepared to make the
maximum use of military force
as
an instrument of coercion,
intimidation

^

^^^

and symbol of status

while exhibiting great restraint
in its use (except in areas
such as Eastern Europe). "6 Brenner
then places these views
on adversarial relations within the
overall context of
Nixon's and Kissinger's world view for
(l) "the world is
moving from a condition of bipolarity
toward one of multipolarity (Japan, Western Europe and China will
exercise
greater independence) hence diplomatic flexibility
and op-

portunity for maneuver is one outcome and (2) despite
the
qualification of bipolarity in these centrifugal developments, the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China (increasingly) will
pre-

dominate and constitute one another's chief concern." 7

Nixon and Kissinger also greatly mistrusted or were
contemptuous of the State Department, Congress, and the
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bureaucracy while relying on
a very small staff to
carry out
their policies. Consequently,
they became more isolated
domestically and their foreign
policy (except for adversaries) often reflected an
even greater degree of
E^ppliii*.
In order to thoroughly
understand Nixon's and Kissinger's
foreign policy and to discuss
Kissinger's philosophy

of
history, an overview of Kissinger's
global statesmanship
would be useful.

Petftntpi

The Soviet. Union pnH

t^

rnj

From 1969 perhaps Kissinger's chief priority
was to
deepen and broaden detente with the Soviet
Union

and China.

Considering his interest in arms control and
concern for the
nuclear arras race, it is not surprising that the
Soviet Union
was the keystone for Nixon's and Kissinger's policies.
Indeed Lincoln Bloomfield "gives Nixon praise for the develop-

ment of a relationship with the Soviet Union (SALT, increased trade relations, major outer space and scientific

cooperation)." 8

He then "praises Nixon-Kissinger Realpolitik

for going a good distance toward deideologizing our vitally

important state-to-state relations with the Soviets and
China."?
Moreover, as James P. Sewell writes, "few observers
would deny the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations have changed pro-

foundly in the last eight years.

And some modification of
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the rest of the international
constellation has resulted.
For this transformation,
Kissinger is largely responsible. "^
But the question renins,
does too great an emphasis
upon
adversarial relations in a rapidly
changing and dangerous
world not also pose dangers?
Alastair Buchan is concerned
about this for "it is my own
fear, which I think is
shared
by both Europeans and
Americans, that if the Vladivostok
Agreements cannot be translated into
firm restraints on innovations and, indeed, into reductions
of Soviet and American strategic weapons systems, the
process of mutual deterrence may become so complex that it will
become increasingly
accident-prone, difficult to comprehend or
operate, and may
perpetuate an antagonism whose political motivation
may
otherwise be ebbing." 11 There is no question
that Nixon and

Kissinger by enlarging upon the scope of detente
and greatly
increasing the number of agreements with the Soviet Union
have indeed changed the character of relations between
the
two superpowers.

But Buchan raises the question of balance with respect
to adversaries and allies, for he "recommends coalition (with

allies) and concert (with USSR) to be defined and emphasized
and give substance to concert in an increasingly fragmented,

disorderly and dangerous world. w1 ^
Will future events confirm the wisdom of the Nixon-

Kissinger views?

Will the deepening of detente between the

two adversaries lead to arms control and then arms reduction?
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Or will too much emphasis
upon detente arouse too
many unobtainable expectations? If
neglect of America's alliance
relationships causes too many
problems. America's political
and military commitment to
the security of Western
Europe
might be seriously eroded.

With respect to China. Nixon
and Kissinger deserve high
praise for bringing to an end a
situation that might have
proved increasingly dangerous.
Diplomatic relations do not
guarantee peaceful relations between
states.
But the continued lack of contacts between the
United States and China,
particularly in a crisis, might contribute to
serious misunderstandings between the two countries. Nixon
was particularly anxious to bring China into world
politics,
how-

^

ever, certain actions undertaken during this
period, from

the extraordinary concern for the impact of
international

events on American domestic opinion to the failure to
inform
the Japanese, were regrettable.

These actions (except for

the failure to inform Tokyo of a change in America's China

policy) are not really important when compared to the utter

necessity of ending the twenty-year freeze on relations between the United States and China.

Except for the mainte-

nance of China's territorial integrity, however, the United

States and China have few common interests.

Detente characterizes a mixed cooperative/adversarial
relationship with both the Soviet Union and China.

But both

these countries, and in particular the Soviet Union, tend to
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view detente from a rather
narrow perspective,
the necessity
to avoid nuclear war,
achieve arms control
measures, and
Perhaps, cooperation on a few
other issues. However,
most
Americans have a much broader
concept of detente which
embodies the previously mentioned
areas and a desire to secure
acceptable Soviet behavior in the
Third
World, for example.

There is a difference in theoretical
perspective herei the
American belief that international
conflict (which may involve coercion and the threat or
the actual use of force)
is an aberration and unacceptable
while to the Russians (and
Chinese), international conflict in its
many manifestations
(not precluding the occasional use of
force) is an acceptable way to obtain their objectives.

Nixon and Kissinger attempted to influence Soviet
policy
in one area in a desired direction by implying
that progress
in another area was contingent upon acceptable Soviet
behavior.

But each administration must carefully establish the

limits of detente and in various circumstances.
Finally, in terms of his policies toward the Soviet Union
and China, Kissinger demonstrated consistency of purpose and
a concern for moral principles.

It is probably only a

slight exaggeration to say that Kissinger believed that the

prospects for a third world war would depend on how the
United States managed its relationship with the Soviet Union.
Moreover, he had read de Tocqueville and wondered

i

could a

democratic state such as the United States maintain a
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consistent, resolute policy
towards the Soviet Union
(ana
later China) that allows for
both agreement on issues
suoh
as SALT, and for disagreements,
i.e.. Soviet policy in
Africa?

Th e Hunlear Bal

^

r

Kissinger's concern over Soviet
(and Chinese) poli,cies
was complemented by his intense
interest
in strategic nu-

clear weapons.

The arms race and arms control
were of the
most serious concern. During his
tenure in office much of
his attention was devoted to strategic
nuclear weapons. The
first SALT agreement of May 1972 and the
follow-up Vladivostok Agreement of November 1974 were the
first attempts
to place ceilings upon the strategic
nuclear weapons pos-

sessed by each superpower.

The agreements also represented

the American acceptance of nuclear parity with the
Soviet

Union.

It is not my intent to analyze these agreements, but
there can be little doubt that both represent important

accomplishments.

If mankind is ever to resolve the diffi-

cult and frightening problems raised by nuclear weapons,

both sides must be prepared to engage in a lengthy process
of negotiation.

Nuclear parity must be the basis for

agreements that first set ceilings, then begin the actual
task of reducing the nuclear stockpiles of the superpowers.

Of course, other countries possessing nuclear weapons must

eventually adhere to
clear stockpiles.
cess.

^^

^

This

win

^^

2^3

r nu^

be a long. time-consuming
pro-

But Nixon ana Kissinger.
building on their
sors- achievements, made
the oontrol of the
nuclear arms
race a keystone of their
foreign policy. They also
maintained the nuclear balance,
which must be done
concurrently
with attempts to limit, then
eventually reduce nuclear
weapons stockpiles.
If in the next decade or
two nuclear ceilings are
firmly
set and nuclear stockpiles
reduced, Nixon and Kissinger
will
receive due credit for their vital
contributions. But to
accomplish these two objectives, to
maintain the nuclear
balance, and contend with the problem
of proliferation will
be difficult.
Moreover, how will tactical nuclear
weapons
and conventional weapons be included in
this process? And
can all of these issues be resolved within
a framework that
places primary importance upon relations with
adversaries
and secondary importance upon relations with
allies?

A be-

ginning has been made but it is still tentative, still
fragile, still very much subject to the destructive vicis-

situdes of politics.

However, Kissinger's policies with respect to the nuclear arms race were consistent with his ideas as a scholar.

The agreements in 1972 and 197^ presupposed a flexible di-

plomacy that also had consistency of purpose.

Moreover,

Kissinger had always thought that in "the nuclear age, peace
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is a fundamental moral
imperative." 1 ^

While, in a personal sense,
the Arab-Israeli dispute
was important for Kissinger,
he has written very little
on
the subject.
However, during the October
War in 1973, the
political and economic daggers
became readily apparent. Not
only was the threat of superpower
confrontation very real,
but the subsequent oil embargo
and the quadrupling of the
price of oil posed a grave and
unforeseen threat to the
world's political and economic order.

Kissinger's record with respect to the
Middle East has
both negative and positive aspects.
The outbreak of war in
October was. despite the buildup of serious
tension, unexpected.

Even if greater attention by Nixon and Kissinger

to the area's problems did not preclude the
resumption of

conflict, at least the administration could have
dealt with
the crisis, once it arrived, in a more systematic
manner.

While war contains many imponderables, the ad Mc. manner
in

which Nixon and Kissinger dealt with the repercussions of
the war on Western Europe (and Japan) was less than commendable.

With respect to economic security it was evident that

in the event of an oil embargo Western Europe and Japan would
be placed in very vulnerable positions.

Apparently Nixon and

Kissinger thought that it was not worthwhile to follow a
contingency plan, or if they had planned in advance, one can
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^

see very little evidence
of -cms
this in the way in
which they
respond to Western Europe's
ana Span's need
fop
supplies o f oil. Consequently,
the West Europeans
were
Plaoeo in a difficult
position b y the African
de.and for
support in their hour of need
tv,« rneed.
The
Europeans, and in particular the French, have not
agreed with America's
support
and arming of Israel, and
yet they and NATO were
expected
openly to support the American
position in the Middle East.
With respect to energy,
Kissinger also made a number
of
miscalculations. He had always
warned that threats to Amer-

ican security might not always
be in an -unambiguous form."
But when the oil embargo and
subsequent quadrupling of the
price of oil occurred, Kissinger
was as unprepared as everyone else.
Regrettably the parsimonious attitude
of the administration regarding the sharing of oil
with its allies in
Western Europe and Japan was complemented
by Kissinger's

con-

frontation politics with Jobert over the
founding of the IEA
and his rather abrasive behavior concerning
the entire
issue

of energy.

On the positive side Kissinger has to be given
credit
for taking advantage of circumstances (Sadat's expelling
the

Russians in 1972) and initiating a more even-handed American

policy in the Middle East, particularly after the October War.
He gave the Egyptians considerable economic aid; moreover,
his "shuttle diplomacy", after the war, stabilized the situ-

ation at least temporarily.

The process of arriving at a
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just and lasting peace
in the area proved
to be more difficult than expected. In
retrospect, it was too soon
to
achieve an overall settlement.
Even in l 9 8l a comprehensive
settlement is not around the
corner.
But a general settlement should be arrived at
soon while specific
details will
have to be resolved within
this general framework.
Nixon
and Kissinger have tried
to ensure that American
diplomacy
is more even-handed in the
Middle East.
The United States
can no longer unconditionally
support just one country but
must be able to put pressure on
or offer inducements to
Israel or Egypt (along with the other
Arab states and the

Palestine Liberation Organization) as
the situation demands.
Japan

Bruce Mazlish states that "all in all, Kissinger
(like
Nixon) had no respect for the Japanese.
At Harvard Kissinger was almost exclusively interested in Europe,
past,
present, and future, and had little or no interest in
Asia.
As a statesman, his relative indifference towards Japan

con-

tinued and this was no secret in Tokyo where Kissinger was

mistrusted and disliked for his actions, particularly after
the surprise change in America's China policy in the summer

of 1971.

For a scholar particularly interested in philosophy of
history, Kissinger showed an acute ignorance of the impor-

tance of Japan in East Asia.

The unilateral devaluations of
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doUar in 19?1
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19?3 surprisea
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^

shQcked

* China policy
in ^he summer of
^-l Wa
1971
„
was~ an ^
even greater affront.
Many
Japanese have not, prior
.
1Q71
P
to 197I,
agreed with America's
Chin, policy. But i„
deference to
r

.

^

leaders have eschewed
almost all contact with
China.
However, there are few
Japanese who would defend
the wisdora of
tins policy,
making such an abrupt and
unannounced change
x» .America's China policy.
Kissinger ignored the
domestic
impact upon the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) and
internationally made it seem as
though Japanese interests,
on this
vital matter, were of little
or no con seq uence to
Washington.
Thus Prime Minister Eisaku
Sato was subsequently eased
out
of power and replaced by Kakuei
Tanaka. who established diplomatic relations with China in
September of I972.

m

But the damage had been done, and
the Japanese never
trusted Kissinger again. The
Japanese-American relationship
is vital for both countries and
involves political, security, and economic ties.
If Japanese doubts

were greatly to

increase because they no longer thought they
could rely on
American military support and protection, can Japan's
extensive rearming be precluded?

Furthermore, there are

asymmetries between the two countries that are compounded
by
cultural differences.

The relationship with Japan must be

visualized in terms of a greater measure of partnership than
has previously been the case.

The danger is that unilateral

2kS

policies such as Kissinger's
^nger s om,^
could eventually drain
the
Japanese-American relationship
of all substance.

Kissinger wrote with interest
on the plight of the
developing countries, however,
this interest was not
well refleeted in his p
nolicip*?
o
LlcleSt 16 James Sewell
writes; "in
practice, if not in precept,
the Kissinger order
relegated
the other foreign relations
of the U.S. to subordinate
status.

The past 8 years have brought
contacts with nations of Latin America. Asia,
and Africa to a state of
greater friction than even the Johnson
administration had
managed to achieve. «17

For Nixon and Kissinger regional
disputes such as the
Indo-Pakistan War in 1971 had excessive
importance with
respect to superpower relations. According
to Bruce

Mazlish, "Kissinger is simply not attuned
to the new world
of revolutionary political, social and
economic developments
and aspirations.
His long-range historical and strategic

understanding have been faulty. Mi8
agree with these conclusions.

One may not entirely

But while Kissinger may have

further broadened America's ties with countries such as
Iran
and, more temporarily, Pakistan, his interest in improving

the condition of the people of the Third World was never

really reflected in his policies.

Certainly Kissinger was

aware of the political and moral dilemmas that the United
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States faced with respect to
the Third World.
However, it
is possible that he did
not have the necessary time
to devote to this problem. Faced
by so many real and
potential
crises, it is understandable
that statesmen in the seventies
simply cannot do everything.
Nixon's and Kissinger's global
vision, for whatever reason, did
not consider the Third
World countries to be of very great
importance.
The Emerprpnnp of Econo mic Irrups

Both at Harvard and during his tenure in
office, Kissinger did not have very much interest in or
knowledge of
economics.
From I969 to 1976, the American economy
moved

from a position of hegemony to a position as first
among
equals in the world.

Needless to say the relative decline

of America's economic position during this period was
often

accompanied by considerable strains that were also borne in
large measure by America's allies.

For example, America's

failure to rectify its balance of payments deficit meant
that inflation was passed on to America's trading partners.

Moreover, as the dollar, still the world's trading currency, declined in value, the international economic system

was further weakened.

Theoretically and practically, Kissinger was unprepared
for these strains which were, of course, compounded by the

Vietnam war.

Nixon and Kissinger must be given quite low

marks for the manner in which they handled the general
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situation.

Unilateralism and the aggressive
pursuit of the
national interest seemed to be.
in most oases, the guiding
themes of their policies.
Wilfred Kohl writes, "the results
of the August 1 3 -U,
1971. Camp David meeting (to terminate
converting dollars
to gold and the 10* import
surcharge) was to inject suspicion and tension such as had not
existed for years in Atlantic relations and from which we
have still not
re-

covered. m1 9

From monetary affairs to the halting of
soya
exports and the energy crises, the record of
Nixon and Kissinger with respect to economic issues is a
very poor one.
Their attempts to link economic concessions from
the West

Europeans (and Japan) with American political and military
commitments was highly resented in Europe and Japan.

Once

again, as in the thirties when the United States failed to

grasp the necessity for exercising world economic leadership, real leadership appeared to be lacking.

seem to be any consistent policy.

There did not

A mixture of contra-

dictory policies were followed that at times sounded the
litany of cooperation and at other times reflected the unilateral pursuit of self-interest.

Kissinger, in a recent

article, has stated that the restructuring of economic rela-

tionships is one of the most important challenges facing the

United States during the remainder of this century. 20

It is

regrettable that he did so little in this respect for it is
apparent that in the seventies, the focus will shift to
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economic needs wi
tM^« +^
within
the noncommunist
world and these needs
will have to be met
multilateral!
QO +u
maxerallyv as
the unilateral role
of
the United States declines. 21

The relationship between
morality and foreign policy
is
complicated and often ambiguous.
For Americans the degree
of morality in foreign
policy has been the occasion
for considerable conflict. Idealists
and realists have argued
and
disagreed for decades over this
complex relationship. My
concern here is not to analyze
every aspect of Kissinger's
policies regarding their moral content.
Rather I am concerned with the moral legacy Nixon and
Kissinger left the
American people. To what extent, for
example, should the
United States support dictatorships that
ignore or actively
oppress their citizens' rights and liberties?

Michael Brenner writes that, "the most distinctive
difference between the Kennedy- Johnson and Nixon
periods is
the

diminution of ideological zeal for the need for an
American
liberal mission to assist activity (though tailored to circumstances) in the nurturing of democratic societies." 22

This development was almost inevitable as the world becomes

more multicultural.

American foreign policy has inflicted

great damage upon other societies when it has insisted that

they live up to or achieve the standards of a democratic

society such as the United States.

Regarding the "liberal

252

mission" or the United
States, a better balance
should be
struck than in the past.
The desirability of
civilized
virtues is apparent and
ye t the outright imposition
of one
people's views upon another
must be avoided.

Kissinger has stated that in
the nuclear age "peace is
a fundamental moral imperative."^
Moreover, he maintains
that "the ultimate test of
morality in foreign policy is
not
only the values we proclaim but
what we are willing and able
to implement. "2^ Thus Kissinger
is indeed responsive to the
moral obligations of the state in the
1970'
s.

But he re-

cognizes that circumstances may compel
action by the statesman that may transgress moral principles.
For not only must
a statesman ensure the security of the
state but he must

also reckon with the consequences for the
entire system if
a key state loses its stability.

Consequently, these statements on moral purpose do not
conflict with the Nixon-Kissinger power-realist approach
even though their approach may, at times, be indifferent to
the Third World and the handling of Alliance relationships.

Of course, the historic relevance of the balance-of-power
approach to world politics in the seventies can be questioned. 2 ^

Anthony Hartley has noted that, "relations with allies
are one of the most difficult problems for the Nixon-

Kissinger foreign policy, it is contrary to moral neutrality and the need to maneuver diplomatically." 2 ^

Moreover,
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Hartley Eays that>

..

Kissinger

.

s

ther towards moral
neutrality." 27

^^^^

moved

^_

Yet tension has developed
between the tenets of
the
N.xon-Kissinger world view
and the importance of
morality
in their policies. This
tension Wag never
policies with respect to
detente and the removal of
the
threat of general and nuclear
war reflected a high
degree of
moral purpose. Yet many of
their other actions

^

lack of moral principle.

™

showed a

However, if the SALT negotia-

tions are successful in reducing
the peril of nuclear war.
then Nixon and Kissinger will
he praised for their concern
for the greatest moral issue of
the era.
the necessity to
avoid nuclear war.

But aside from their concern with
this issue what
moral legacy have Nixon and Kissinger
left for the

short-

term?

Here the record is much more ambiguous and,
perhaps,
negative in some respects. Unilateralism and
the
aggres-

sive pursuit of the national interest are
dangerous pre-

cedents.

Yet it depends on how far these policies are car-

ried and under what circumstances.

Undeniably the crisis

over Vietnam was of the most serious order and centralization of decision-making in the White House was probably inevitable.

Indeed, since the Continental Congress directed

the Revolutionary War, every conflict has resulted in a

concentration of power in the executive branch for the duration of the crisis.

Furthermore, while one may disagree
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with many aspects of Nixon's
and Kissinger's policy in
Vietnam, a definitive evaluation
of their policies is still not
possible. Even now, let alone in
the 1970's, it is a supposition that is still unproven that
the North Vietnam,lese
would have been amenable to different
American polici,es
(that stressed less bombing of North
Vietnam, for example).
Perhaps Hanoi would have come to terms sooner,
perhaps not.
Yet, while one can, of course, question
Kissinger's tactics
in Vietnam, he is entirely correct in
appreciating that the
United States could not suffer a complete humiliation
in
Vietnam.

What effects would a debacle have had upon America

domestically and its international obligations?

Of course

in the end Saigon fell and the United States did not escape

humiliation.

But would those who urged a complete American

withdrawal in the late 1960's and early 1970's have ensured
the complete humiliation of the United States without suf-

ficient regard for the domestic and international conse-

quences?
future is

The question that will engage historians in the
»

was there a middle way?

Vietnam too long?

Did Kissinger remain in

Would most of his critics have departed

too rapidly with little or no regard for the consequences?

However, Nixon and Kissinger failed to overcome or resolve the tension between their balance-of-power approach to

world politics which involves secrecy* bargaining, and the

need to maneuver with the need to consult and to engage in

cooperative ventures.

Paul Seabury has written that, "in

"

'
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more recent ti.es our most
effective action in international
politics has invariably occurred
only when the United States
acted in close concert with
many others. If this is true,
future American action abroad
should be grounded in broad
coalitions.
This need for multilateral
legitimation is not
without risk. Yet the test of future
American policy will
be our success in encouraging indigenous
coalitions to keep
the peace and assure their own defense. 2 ?
Finally, their
alleged involvement in Chile (through the
CIA), their friendships with dictators such as the Shah of
Iran, and their
acquiescence in the slaughter of Bengalis by the
Pakistanis,
all seemed to indicate a curious moral lassitude.

In the seventies there is a growing (though not new)

de-

sire to seek to limit, and certainly not to condone, the use

of force in international relations.

This is particularly

true as regards a superpower, such as the United States, and
a smaller, weaker country.

But this moral and philosophical

revulsion against the use of military force in international
relations is still ambivalent and inchoate in many respects.
Witness the presence of Cuban troops in sub-Saharan Africa

which elicits little if any protest from Third World Countries.

With respect to the avoidance of nuclear war, Kissinger's policies were consistent with his previously elu-

cidated political and moral views.

However, in pursuit of

this objective, was he inclined to deal too quietly with

256

atrocities such as occurred
in Bangiadesh?
Kis s i„ ger s record concerning mo rality
in foreign policy
has elements of
-biguity but then perhaps
that re f le cts the
real nature of
politics which onlv
n±y rarplv
+
rarely permits sharply
defined moral
positions.
.

Ki ssinger

P MJl aasBhy of

m«±n TY

It is apparent when considering
Kissinger's work as a
scholar on Western Europe and
his subsequent policies
that a
considerable divergence exists. Of
course to know is not
necessarily to do. Some divergence,
some modifications in
Kissinger's policies were bound to
occur.
However, as I
have indicated, in some respects
the difference between the
ideas of the scholar and the policies
of the statesman was
striking. What can account for this
difference?

Kissinger's primary objectives were focused
upon the
avoidance of nuclear war. Consequently the
relationship
with the Soviet Union had absolute priority

over all other

concerns.

His concerns with the decline of the Western

Alliance and the emergence of new centers of power were
secondary considerations.

Kissinger's was basically a con-

servative philosophy of history in that while recognizing
the revolutionary nature of the present period, he placed
the highest importance upon Soviet-American relations.

Despite his criticisms of both Metternich^ 0 and Bismarck^ 1

,

Kissinger's philosophy of history was similar to both these
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statesmen in terms of his
preoccupation with stability.
A
further characteristic all
three statesmen had was
their
belief in the essentially
fragile nature of their
state's
political order. Yet, was this
really true of the United
States? Thus Kissinger's concern
with stability - a pare nt
p
in his work as a scholar became a virtual preoccupation,
often to the exclusion of other
problems, when he was a
statesman.

Basically Kissinger envisaged a world
in which two
great states had the primary responsibility
for world peace.
Thus the highest value was placed upon
the stability of
bath, the United States and the Soviet
Union.
If domestic
or international problems were severely
to effect
the sta-

bility of either state, the result could, in
the nuclear age,
perhaps make a global conflict inevitable. This is
(one

reason) why in the 1950 's Kissinger was so opposed
to Communism.

For Communism necessitates a revolution that, in

the nuclear age, may be the prelude to disaster.

Conse-

quently, Kissinger greatly feared that the adverse repercussions of the Vietnam war might imperil America's ability to

maintain the nuclear balance.
The other states would assume tasks and responsibilities that were commensurate with their capabilities.

Kis-

singer worried, however, that the West Europeans and Japanese
were becoming too dependent on the United States, so he
sought to prod these countries into assuming increased
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responsibilities.

He has written that
"for the future the
most profound challenge
to American policy
will be philosophical, to develop some
concept of order in a
world
which is bipolar militarily
but multipolar politically. "32

Consequently Kissinger envisaged
a hierarchical world
in which the primary
responsibility for

world peace would
rest with the two greatest
powers while lesser states
would
assume responsibility for secondary,
but still important,
issues.
Stanley Hoffmann writes, "insofar
as there was a
new policy in behalf of the old
goals, it amounted
to a

multiple demotion of the alliances,
which resulted partly
from the new ordering of priorities.
The top of the agenda
was now occupied by the search for
the 'stable
structure'

and the new triangular relationship. "33

Hoffmann only to the extent that

I

j

would differ y;ith

believe that Kissinger

placed somewhat more emphasis upon the Soviet Union
and
somewhat less upon China. But these are not decisive

con-

siderations.

As Hoffmann writes, "the triangular relation-

ship was seen as more than central to international poli-

tics

i

it was thought commanding. "3^

There are, of course, great risks in Kissinger's

vision for, as Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the German
Federal Republic, states, "let me say once again that

leadership from the U.S.
political

- is

-

financial, commercial, monetary,

sorely needed.

But the lack of an American

response following the fivefold increase in oil prices, and
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the inability even to
livee im
tn the
+v,
Up t0
Promises and obligations which had been
undertaken. .. .have contributed
significantly to the threat of
a world depression. '**
Thus
one can question whether,
in this multifaceted
and complex
world, an approach that
places too much emphasis
on adversarial relations and too little
on relations with
allies
is, in the long-run, really
adequate. Moreover, what

priority would other outstanding
global issues receive, few
of which can be resolved by only
the superpowers or the
West?
However, when Kissinger joined
the Nixon administration
in 1969 he had a long association
with many of
the nations'

political and military elite.

Far more than most academics,

he had gained considerable knowledge
from those who had ex-

ercised power.

Therefore, he was, prior to his tenure in

office, more knowledgeable concerning the
complexities in-

herent in both the academic world and the world of
practical
experience.
spectives.

He was also aware of the need to modify his
per-

As

I

pointed out in Chapter

2,

diplomacy, (with

the potential for the occasional use of force) an awareness

of tragedy, and the political and moral necessity for peace
in the nuclear age are enduring attributes of his per-

spectives on international relations.

Yet, Kissinger be-

lieves quite strongly in the ability of mankind to influence
its destiny in the Twentieth Century.

Concerning the dis-

agreements of the West with the rifts in the Communist world,
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he writes.

ZT

—

"free from the
shackles „ f .

lneV

_

«- -ions of the West
great service by
demonstrating that wh* +
whatever meaning history
has is derived from
the convictions
CTlons =nrf Purpose
of the 6
generation which shapes
"36
it.

^

Moreover, as Stephen
Graubard writes, "to
Kissinger
statesmanship was a Twentieth
Century possibility.
The
statesman's talents were
mainly psychological,
he had to
estimate the objectives
of societies different
from his own
he had to be able to
judge correctly the
real relationship
of forces, he had to
possess a vision and know
how to translate that vision into reality. "37
Therefore(

^^^

a statesman. Kissinger
was prepared as few
others for that

Despite his occasional
Spenglerian remarks Kissinger's
Philosophy of history was not
rooted in the conviction
that

vast social and political forces
would, regardless of mankinds' efforts, overwhelm all
efforts to control them. On
the contrary great men could,
if possessed of an adequate
vision, shape their world and exert
some degree of control
over social and political forces. Kissinger,
then,
had a

rather activist philosophy of history that
assumed that mankind was capable of determining its own
fate provided that
its leaders possessed adequate intellectual
convictions and
the courage to act upon those convictions.

While he was no

believer in the eventual arrival of the millennium,
he did
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believe that a reasonably
just world, free
j-j-ee of
»
01 xne
the scourcp
.
of
war. oould be attained
if mankind wag
d3 equal to the
_
,
many obstacles that must be
overcome.

By 1 9 69 international
changes clearly signaled
the beginning of the den,ise of
the post war era.
Econonic issues
nad become a maj or
source of contention
in the trans-Atlantio
relationship. As a result
of
these

to international
cooperation was on the
increase in Western
Europe and the United States.
International cooperation
was
politically Qinicult,
i -p
difficult
*
if not impossible, to
y
achieve on some
issues and this general
situation was exacerbated by
the oil
crisis of 1 973 . But, as Klaus
Knorr states, "international
conflicts do not turn more now
on economic issues than in
the 1920.
or 1930- s, also interstate
s
conflicts over economic
issues are not necessarily conflicts
over economic values
(i.e. France and the U.S.). "38

In Western Europe disagreements
continued between nationalists and those who hoped that the EC
could transcend
the differences between the states and
make Brussels the
focus for the new Europe. But from the late
sixties a serious malaise, a sense of drift had settled over
Western Europe.

There was hesitation and doubt over how Europe's

problems could best be resolved, as George Kennan writes,
"the West Europeans are worried not so much
about external

i
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power and pressure but
to internal
u
internal w«
weakness
vigor in ones own civilization. "39

- to the

lack of

Thus it would see,
proper at this Juncture
to briefly
summarize the record of
Henry Kissinger in
a difficult and
very challenging decade.
His major accompli
shunts include,
the
improvement of detente,
progress in the
Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT), reducing the danger of nuclear
war between the
two superpowers-still
the primary problem of
each superpower and the foremost
danger that
threatens mankind?
- establishment of contacts with
China that broke

a twenty-year hiatus in relations
between the
two countries?
-

the increased involvement of the
United States
in the Middle East on both sides and
America's

emergence as the single most influential
power
in the area;
- the withdrawal of

American forces from Vietnam

without causing irreparable domestic and international losses.
The other side of the ledger shows rather significant

defects
-

the excessively delayed withdrawal of American

forces from Vietnam, which did considerable

damage to the institution of the Presidency

and caused a domestic
crisis of the most
serious order-whose
full consequences
are
still not completely
clarified- diverting
attention from other,
even more serious
concerns of foreign policy
such as the
Middle East;
-

the excessively fluctuating
relationships

with Western Europe,
particularly the European Community, which generally
had a nega-

tive impact on both sides
of the Atlantic
and seriously damaged the
concept and fabric
of trans-Atlantic partnership?

the inept conduct with respect
to Japan;

a key country in an area of utmost
concern
to the United States;

excessive concern for adversaries in contrast to the relative indifference toward

America's allies;
the signal failure to alert and educate the

American public to the threats posed by a
broad range of environmental issues (in
particular, energy) in world politics;
the failure to educate the American public

concerning the international problems faced
by the United States and to transmit to the

public adequate guides for the future conduct
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of the United States in
world politics.
This is a list of impressive
accompli shments and
important
failures.
Will future assessInents
dWeU
as

^^^

failures as Kissinger's
contemporaries have done?
Or will
Kissinger's failures recede into
the background. as
ChurchHi's often mistaken strategies of
World War II receded in
the light of his accomplishments?
Ultimately, this remains
the task of future generations,
who will De in a position
to judge more accurately
the consequences of
accomplishments
and omissions that, from our
perspective, appear blurred or
fragmented.
However, given recognized limitations,
the con-

temporary analyst is also obligated to
make judgments. What
can be said of the record of Henry
Kissinger and the rela-

tionship between the realm of the scholar
and the realm of
the statesman.
As the Soviet threat

-

though still potent

-

has become

more ambiguous, as other problems (such
as energy) have
emerged, and the Western European states have
gained political stability and confidence, common responses
to these

problems have become more difficult.

Moreover American

foreign policy has undergone a change as John Campbell
writes, "military and intelligence officials are heavily

represented on nearly every committee, symbolizing an important shift that has gradually occurred in American perceptions of the outside world

i

national security, a con-

ception of permanent crisis, has displaced foreign policy,
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a more generalized no-H™ «-r +v
notion of the more
peaceful and only occasionally violent ebbs and
u IJ
flows
ow s of international
politi cs
,

-

and national interests.

Kissinger was well aware of
the constraints domestic
structures impose upon the
foreign policies of
democracies
Yet perhaps his gravest error
in

*

transatlantic relations was

his failure to educate and
engage public opinion.
His unilateral policies, ignoring or
denigrating multilateral institutions, abrupt power plays
and his pursuit of American
primacy did not arouse the enthusiasm
or encourage the commitment of the public, on either
side of the Atlantic, towards the goal of infusing the
Atlantic Alliance with a new
sense of purpose, a renewed commitment
to develop a new

principle or principles to govern their
relations.
The concerns of the Western Europeans
are discussed by
Fritz Stern, "It is not only Helmut Schmidt
who is outraged
by what - in his milder moments - he calls
America's abdication of fiscal leadership or responsibility.
The United
States, once the pillar of the postwar economic
order, is

now viewed as its disrupter, pursuing policies inimical
to
itself and to its allies." 2* 2

Yet in White House Years

»

Kissinger reiterated his pre-

viously stated views that (particularly as regards Western
Europe and Japan) "A world of more centers of decision,

I

believed, was fully compatible with our interests as well as

our ideals. H ^3

Given the tumultuous events of the late
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I960 s and early l
970

.

s

md

the increaged self .
absorption

^

the West Europeans in
defining and clarifying
their own relationships Kissinger, of
course, cannot he blamed
for all
of the problems of the
Atlantic Alliance
J-Lance
Y.t
.
,
*et, *
«
by +
the
1970's
relations with
a America
Amerim' Rs most important
*
allies were entering a state of crisis.
Alastair Buchan has written,
-j do
not believe that the
European-American (or the Japanese-

American) relationship contains
the seed of inevitable
demise but I do believe that,
by a ser ies of careless
actions
on all sides, both relationships
could become so hollow that
it would only take an incident
to make them seem no longer
worth sustaining. «<*
addition, both Nixon and Kissinger
mistrusted and disliked working with
cumbersome, inefficient
bureaucracies and their representatives.
Close relations
with Western Europe (and Japan) would
mean a great deal of
this type of contact. Moreover Nixon
and Kissinger both had
a predilection for the "great statesman"
(their mutual

m

ad-

miration for de Gaulle) of an essentially
conservative cast.
Given their love of the "grand stage" and their
own essentially conservative philosophy, is it really credible
that,
as a statesman, Kissinger would have tolerated a serious
di-

lution of his power?

For the reasons previously cited, dur-

ing the period from 1969 to 1975, alternative policies were

precluded by the desire to maintain American primacy.
The Nixon-Kissinger legacy with respect to Western Europe and Japan should be a major concern of the present
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administration.

The possible fragmentation
and weakening of
Western Europe and Japan
could have the most
adverse effects
on world politics for, to
q uote Alastair Buchan, "it has
been
the West that has been
the cradle of political
ideas,
in-

cluding Marxism, and seems
likely to remain so. However
great the power of Russia, however
fine and fair the civilization of China or of India, however
just the claims of the
developing countries, if the springs
of political improvisation in the West dry up, then the
new agenda of world politics will be a barren one."^
However, Kissinger's policies toward
the Soviet Union
and China were consistent and displayed
a recognition of the
highest moral imperative of the nuclear
age.
He also hoped
to encourage greater East-West cooperation
which in turn
might help to promote a greater measure of
international

cooperation in a badly fragmented world.

For each statesman

must have a vision and act to implement that vision.

And it

is in the nature of politics that sharply defined moral
po-

sitions rarely indicate precisely what measures are necessary to rectify the situation.

All agree on the necessity

to prevent nuclear war but few agree on precisely how this

can be accomplished.
What, then, can be said of Henry Kissinger?

In one of

the best analyses to appear thus far, Stanley Hoffmann com-

ments upon Kissinger's resilience and flexibility "in EastWest relations, he reshaped his theory and consequently
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restored the priority
of Alliance relation,
relations, as was shown
by
the various moves
toward tighter
-H^+
economic cooperation
(at
summits or at OECD), by
closer
mili-h
military coordination
y
with
^apan.
by a new emphasis on
^
identity and col laborati o„
with other nations who
share
values."" This CQincides
obseryations throughQut
this paper that from
1969 to 1 97 1 and from l
975 to 19?6
Kissinger sought a more
cooperative relationship
with America's allies (or at least
the policies of
fc^lBelilik were
not quite so apparent).
But Hoffmann is. though
sometimes
ambivalent, basically critical
of the Kissinger legacy
for
"whereas Metternich's foreign
policy was dictated by his
concern for Austria's vulnerability.
Kissinger was a practitioner of the primacy of foreign
policy. But one can say
of him what he said of Castlereagh.
his own country
.

^^

^

^^

de-

feated him.

His policy has turned out to be
simultaneously
too complex in execution for the
domestic forces whose support he needed, and too simple in design
for the present-day
world, despite its being far more subtle
than the earlier
simplicities of containment. "^7

There is considerable merit in Hoffmann's statement.
V/ill

history's verdict be more favorable than Hoffmann's?

Perhaps, perhaps not.

Nixon and Kissinger did seriously mis-

judge the domestic repercussions of their foreign policy.

In the end the path led from Vietnam to Watergate! and the

loss of the Presidency for Richard Nixon.

Moreover, by
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emphasizing extensive
military
ary operating
aerations and„ complex
diplomatic maneuvers, thev
fanri
d thelr
P^ecessors) policies have
- + ,
d
definitely
exacerbated iorces
forces whose
who,. final
*s
outcome cannot be
predicted (the revolutionary
chances th
cnanges
n+ occurred in
that
Amerlean society during the
late 196o s were
were greatly intensified
due to Nixon's and
Kissinger's policies in Vietnam). The
insistence Qf
challenging (and even defying)
presidential prerogatiyes
foreign policy, the
disenchantment of the intellectuals
.

^

^

<

.

^
^

^

^

^

^

^

and
the public with rational
processes and the denegration
of
the life of the mind, and
the resurgence of
parochialism in
the United States that extends
over the entire country and
embraces every group including,
most seriously, the intellectuals. The final outcome of
these trends, reflected in
Europe as well, shall probably have
a major influence in determining the emerging structure of world
politics.

The attendant demoralization and
confusion afflicting
intellectuals is most serious. The methods
that both
Presidents Johnson and Nixon used to resolve their
diplomatic dilemmas (and their failure adequately to
explain and
educate the public concerning their policies) have
decimated
and confused the intellectuals and the public alike
as con-

cerns both the present and future directions of American

foreign policy.

S. Frederick Starr, secretary of the

Kennan

Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Woodrow Wilson

International Center for Scholars, has called for "greatly
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™

increased attention
on to
i
t0 fnr^i
foreign-language
study at the preuniversity level.
evel.
w« ^+
He
noted that the proportion
y
of American secondary-school
students
eits sturivW
studying a modern foreign
language in the mid-1970
±y(v 'ss - *hm,+
i <
about 16
percent was no

greater than in the 1890-s.

According to Richard Brod.
director of foreign language
programs at the Modern Language
Association, "Nationwide.
e Ru^ian
i, v
Russian is
becoming an exotic language and that shouldn't be
allowed to happen." ^9 At
'

a
time when politically and
economically the United States
is

becoming more interdependent with
and dependent upon the
rest of the world, these figures
indicate an alarming degree of parochialism.
However, it will not be easy to
determine the legacy
of Henry Kissinger, the statesman.
Undeniably Kissinger
faced serious obstacles, both in the
domestic situation and
the international realm; however, his
tactics and his

strategy were, in certain respects, questionable.

His

gravest error was his preoccupation with Vietnam.

He ex-

aggerated or placed too much emphasis upon possible
catastrophe in Vietnam and the linkage with America's ability
to

maintain the nuclear balance.

This is not to say that his

critics were entirely correct, but to a greater extent than
should have been the case, the war in Vietnam dominated

Kissinger's concerns to the detriment of developing dangers
in the Middle East and the erosion of relations with Western

Europe and Japan? the general neglect of the Third World and
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his failure to impart
Part to the public a
greater understanding
of the challenges America
must face in the conduct
of its
foreign policy. In other
areas Kissinger has
earned a
greater measure of success,
however, a long-term
perspective
is necessary to finally
determine his place in history.
What, then, can be said of
the relationship between
the
scholar and the statesman.
The scholar searches for
final
solutions, however, the statesman
knows that few solutions
are final.
As Harrison Salisbury writes
"The academic mind
is trained at problem-solving,
at presenting finite solutions to finite problems. Politics
is the art of the indefinite.
Its best practitioners know that
no real-life
•

problem can be neatly or permanently
solved on squared
paper.
They understand that all questions war. peace
foreign policy, domestic policy - are in
the end constituency problems, issues of give and take, of
fudgy language
and accommodation. "50

There are

additional differ _

ences between the two, for as Kissinger has written,
"the

most difficult, indeed tragic, aspect of foreign policy
is
how to deal with the problem of conjecture.

When the scope

for action is greatest, knowledge on which to base such action is small or ambiguous.

When knowledge becomes avail-

able, the ability to affect events is usually at a minimum.

Moreover, the demise of the post-war era has compounded the

problems of the statesman for "the conjectural element of
foreign policy

-

the need to gear actions to an assessment

"-5 1

2?2

that cannot be proven
true when it j-b
is made
maae -- i«
is «
never more
crucial than in a revolutionary
period.
Then, the old ord er
is obviously disintegrating
while the shape of its
repl leTnent is highly uncertain.
Everything depends, therefore,
on
some conception of the
future.
But varying domestic
structures can easily produce
different assessments of the
significance of existing trends and.
more importantly, clashing
criteria for resolving these
differences. This is the dilemma of our time. "52
is the

^^^

„

objective reality and subjective
interpretation, that differentiate the world of the scholar
from the world of the
statesman.

Thus the connection between the world
of the scholar
(the realm of ideas) and the world of
the statesman (the
realm of practical solutions), the theme
of this

paper, is

best characterized by the term interdependence.

The rela-

tionship between the world of the scholar and
that of the
statesman is basically analogous to the relationship
be-

tween intellect and intelligence.

As Richard Hofstadter

writes "Intellect, on the other hand, is the critical,
creative, and contemplative side of mind.

Whereas intelli-

gence seeks to grasp, manipulate, re-order, adjust, intel-

lect examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, criticizes,

imagines.

Intelligence will seize the immediate meaning in

a situation and evaluate it.

Intellect evaluates evalua-

tions, and looks for the meanings of situations as a whole.
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^

Intelligence can be praised
as a
lect, being a uni u e
q
manifestation of human
dignity, i s
both poised and assailed
as a quality in
When the
difference is so defined,
it oeco.es easier
to understand
why we sorneti.es say
that a mind of admittedly
penetrating
intelligence is relatively
unintellectual, and why, by
the
same token, w e see among
minds that are unmistakably
intellectual a considerable range
of intelligence."^

^

Wl

However, the scholars ideas
can be too abstract.
Thus
Raymond Aron has written, "By
devising a multiplicity of
schemata and models, the self-styled
scientific study of
inter-state relations has often
contributed to the decline
of the art of analysis rather
than to the training
of

minds.

Consequently, scholars (particularly
in the
Social Sciences) have paid insufficient
attention as to how
their ideas can be implemented. Conversely
American Statesmen have too often neglected the vital
role that theory can
have in directing policy? they have concentrated
too much
upon the implementation of ideas that were
theoretically
in-

adequate.

Thus policies that were successfully implemented

were often found to be inadequate.

Theory must identify and

analyze the problem, it must provide direction, but theory

must also recognize that implementation is necessary if the

problem or difficulty is to be resolved.

In this manner the

realm of ideas and the realm of practical solutions demonstrate both their interdependence and their differences.

™
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However, excessive
abstraction and inadequate
concret,
application are acco mpanied
by a third ma oor
difficulty,
that of professionalised
knowledge. The serious
nature of
these problem (and some
of the reasons for the
present
malaise) are discussed at
length by Alfred North
Whitehead
who has written thatt
is

th^L^overy

6

^

£ JZ?$%&-%S
%

en

e

0f the SUCCess

^

of
Pro?es S !o^ali^nro?T
? ,
fessionalising
of knowledge,
there
are
two
ooint^ tn
be kept
mind, which differentiate our
present a*e
from the past.
In the first place, the rate
of
progress is such that an individual
hu^aS
being,
of
ordinary length of life, will be
called upon t? face
Uatl ° nS
ich find no Parallel in his past?
f
ed person or th * fixed duties,
who in older
f
if eS aS SUCh
a g° ds ^d, in the future will be
T
a public danger.
In
the second place, the modern
professionalism
knowledge works in the opposite
direction so far as the intellectual sphere
is concerned.
The modern chemist is likely to be weak in
zoology, weaker still in his general knowledge
the Elizabethan drama, and completely ignorant of
of
th e> principles of rhythm in English versification,
it is probably safe to ignore his knowledge of
ancient history. Of course I am speaking of general
tendencies? for chemists are no worse than engineers,
or mathematicians, or classical scholars. Effective
knowledge is professionalised knowledge, supported
by a restricted acquaintance with useful subjects
subservient to it.

m

^ r^ /

^

-

m
,

This situation has its dangers. It produces
minds in a groove. Each profession makes progress,
but it is^ progress in its own groove. Now to be
mentally in a groove is to live in contemplating a
given^ set of abstractions.
The groove prevents
straying across country, and the abstraction abstracts from something to which no further attention is paid. But there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the comprehension of
human life.""
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statesmen and
cu u relatively -r
few men of fereat
exeat jyit.n
*
,
intellectual
.
abilave pretty in .
practical sense

capaMHties inmates
realms.

^^

^
^^^

*

that there are

Yet at times a person

does transcend these
barriers
ers<

^
JT

thesg

^

p
B

Bury writes of a
great statesman and conqueror
of long agoi
'

t>

*

^appreciable influence on the cou?sp
It
n ° SUCh cci "
dent has diverted lit
?
vl±ZTf%i^
50 mani "
festly and utterly as thp Lily, I

^

Many^ A^pSftiSS

^

only been begun.
transformation of his
empire had beef initiated,— plans whichAsiatic
reveal his orifH nJH ill f
conception, his breadth of grasp
(sif )
hold of facts, his faculty
for organisation HE
wonderful brain-power,
but allele schemed
and lines of policy needed
still many
development under the master's shapingyears of
and hiding hand
The unity of the realm/whicfwaf
an
essential part of Alexander's conception,
disappeared upon his death. The empire was
broken up
among a number of hard-headed Macedonians,'
capable
al Ul rS but ithout the hi gher qual^
f^Ll
nr i£
! !
ities of
the founder's
genius.
They maintained
the tolerant Hellenism which he had
initiated,
his lessons had not been lost upon themj
and thus
his work was not futile; the toils of even
those
twelve marvellous years amoothed the path for
Roman sway in the East, and prepared the ground
for ohe spread of an universal religion. "5o

-

/

—

However, a person of Alexander's capabilities appears

only once in an age, a statesman like Churchill appears
once
in a century.

In the modern era (except for occasional

flashes of brilliance) the capabilities of leaders often
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barely exceed a level of
basic competence. Yet
the rapi(J
rate of change and the
turbulence of the international
realm
.n the modern era confront
statesmen with unprecedented
problems.
Expert opinion may be divided
or problems may appear
that are insoluable.
Therefore. Kissinger found that,
given his diplomatic
priorities, most of his ideas
concerning the development of
a more mature partnership with
Western Europe, were often

very difficult to even tolerate
let alone implement. Thus
statesmanship (the realm of practical
solutions) won out
over scholarship (the realm of ideas)
in this case. Yet
what general lesson can be learned from
a study of Kissinger as a scholar-statesman that can be
of value in the
conduct of American foreign policy? No matter
how care-

fully crafted, ideas represent finite, abstract
solutions
that require implementation in an environment that
is

characterized by an absence of final solutions.

In these

circumstances a quest for dogmatic certitude is a recipe
that will probably end in catastrophe.

Increased know-

ledge is of great value and yet in the statesman's realm
there is an irreducible aspect that does not yield

rational analysis.

to

In an age and a society often preoc-

cupied by the search for rational solutions, it is vital to

understand both the possibilities for and the limitations
upon ideas and reason in the international realm.

It is

the awesome responsibility of the statesman to correctly

judge the path his nation
must take
*-<nve lor
for nis
his In
ideas may lead
to disaster or they
may change the course
of history. Consecuently. the successful
statesman leaves hehind
an enduring legacy which
demonstrates that he has
understood the
connection, the interdependence,
between the worlds of the
scholar (the realm of ideas)
*.
eas; a3X1(1
nH +h
theQ ^+
statesman
(the realm
of practical solutions).

In a situation characterized
by unprecedented social,
economic, and political changes
on a global scale, where
both ancient problems (war) and
new problems (environmental,
the destruction of the rain
forests) threaten the
state, where nationalism is a
vital political force for some
and dilution of sovereignty a
reality for others, the potential exists for both leaders and the
public alike
to take

refuge in simplistic solutions and bellicose
rhetoric.
Nowhere is this tendency more pronounced
than in the United
States.
In a brilliant essay Kissinger writes, "In
a so-

ciety that has prided itself on its "business"
character,
it is inevitable that the qualities which are
most esteemed

in civilian pursuits should also be generally rewarded by
high public office.

As a result, the typical cabinet or

sub-cabinet officer in America comes either from business or
from the legal profession.

But very little in the experi-

ence that forms these men produces the combination of po-

litical acumen, conceptual skill, persuasive power, and substantive knowledge required for the highest positions of
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government. "57

What is occurring in
the United States is
a dangerous
widening of the gap between
intellect and policy or
to put
it another way, between
the policymaker and
the intellectual.
Thus, in recent decades,
w e witness the rise
of the national
security state, the increasingly
beseiged and beleagured
attitude of both leaders and
the public with respect
to world
politics. Yet what can be
done? Again we turn to
Kissinger.
"The solution is not to turn
philosophers into kings or kings
into philosophers.
But it is essential that
our most eminent
men in all fields overcome the
approach to national
issules as

an extra-curricular activity
that does not touch the core of
their concerns.
The future course of our society
is not a
matter to be charted administratively. »5 Q
A partial soluti on
to this dilemma. Kissinger continues,
is that "A way must be
found to enable our ablest people to
deal with problems of
(

'

policy and to perform national service in their
formative
years.

This is a challenge to our educational system,
to the

big administrative hierarchies, as well as to national
po-

licy."^
For American statesmen, the intellectuals, and the public, the trials of the past ten years reflect the participa-

tion of the United States in world politics.

As Raymond

Aron writes, "It appears as if the intellectuals, academics,
and journalists have not yet accepted the fact that it is

entirely

'

normal

1

for the American republic to participate
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in the play or inter-state
relations.
In their revision
fro. the horrors and
absurdities of the Vietnam
War they have
conjured up, in order to
rationalize their detachment
from
the outside world, an
imaginary picture of
spheres of influence stabilized once and
for all, a Soviet Union
permanently
satisfied with the status
q uo, Japan and Europe already
grea t
Powers, and an armed force
never to be used again.
Some of
them reconstruct an imaginary
history in which the United
States is supposed to have
provoked Stalin, while others
attribute urban decay, crime,
racial tension, and all the ill
s
with which American society is
manifestly afflicted to th
cost of exercising power. «6o The
Americans should learn that
the United States, despite its
triumphs and tribulations, is

now unquestionably a part of the
inter-state system.
The United States can, within the
limitations imposed by
its political system, provide important
leadership in the

world community.

In the waning decades of the twentieth
cen-

tury, the necessity of resolving international
political,

economic, and environmental problems will become
paramount
if a more just and orderly world community is, eventually,
to
be constructed.

The necessity of international cooperation,

while avoiding the scourge of war, will impose a heavy bur-

den upon the vision and skills of those responsible for the
foreign policy of their countries.

The United States will,

on many occasions, find this burden onerous.

But by virtue

of its power and the appeal of its ideals, the Americans

canno*.

^
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Nation

*
of their obligations.
avo.a the responsibilities
o f leadership that,
in concert
others
of
simil
ar views, the world
««.
so de finitely needs.
The Un.ted States aust,
therefore. be guided by
statesmen
whose vision and skill,
are superior to those
of their predecessors. In this never-ending
q uest for wisdom. knowledge
of the successes and
failures of Henry Kissinger,
who cornbanes to a rare extent the
learning of the scholar with
the
ability of the statesman,
should contribute usefully
to the
great tasks that lie ahead.
^
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